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Abstract 
This dissertation analyzes how institutional change affects social-ecological outcomes, 
with a focus on forests, over the first two decades of Indonesian democracy (1999 to 2016). 
Canonical research concludes that self-organized groups can employ rules, norms, or behaviors 
(i.e. institutions) that permit the sustainable management of natural resources for long-term 
benefit. However, institutions are not static. Periods and places of institutional transition may 
generate outcomes for people and natural resources that differ drastically over time and space. 
With sweeping changes in contemporary land cover occurring alongside shifts in governance 
across the Global South, it is of crucial importance to study institutional transitions and 
environmental change together.  
Over the past two decades, Indonesia has experienced two revolutions rarely studied in 
tandem. The first revolution is political. After the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia transitioned 
to become the world’s third largest democracy amid a succession of policies that mandate direct, 
proportionate elections for political positions and increase the decentralization of government 
authority. The second revolution is environmental. Since Indonesia’s turn toward democracy, it 
has lost over 15% total tree cover, demonstrating the second greatest loss (24.4 Mha), and the 
greatest acceleration in tree cover loss, of any tropical nation in the world over the same period. 
Although research often examines these changes separately, analyzing them in tandem provides 
insight into how institutional transitions generated outcomes for forests and people in 
contemporary Indonesia. 
 xiii 
 To examine changes in institutions, forest cover, and livelihoods this dissertation draws 
on institutional analysis and land systems science. It uses a mixed-methods approach, combining 
analysis and interpretation of policy content, land cover change, and survey data. Specifically, it 
provides analysis of national forest-related policy from 1999 to 2016 to determine if and how 
policy changes reflect national pledges to reduce forest cover loss. Then, it combines remotely 
sensed land cover change with the Village Census (Sensus Potensi Desa) to measure the impact 
of decentralization on forest cover loss from 2000 to 2014 using statistical matching and fixed-
effect models. Finally, it combines land cover and primary survey data (n=1,304) from the 
Kerinci-Seblat National Park landscape to understand the legacy of international conservation 
assistance on forests and communities. 
This dissertation makes several novel contributions. First, it introduces a new method for 
policy network visualization and provides the most comprehensive analysis of Indonesian forest-
related policy to date. Second, it performs the first analysis of regulatory dispersal on forest 
cover change through the creation and analysis of a social-ecological dataset with higher spatial 
and temporal resolution of any other published study. Third, it provides the first study of social-
ecological legacies from Indonesia’s largest Integrated Conservation and Development Project. 
Together, these contributions demonstrate how overarching political trends affect forest-related 
outcomes in Indonesia. In doing so, it demonstrates the benefits and potential for analyzing 
institutional change as transitional processes when studying social-ecological outcomes. 
  
 1 
Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
The first two decades of the 21st century have witnessed rapid environmental change. The 
conversion and modification of land cover from human activities has generated ecological 
changes in all well-studied, marine, freshwater, and terrestrial systems (Parmesan 2006). This 
conversion continues through processes of deforestation, intensification of agriculture, 
desertification, and urbanization (Ellis et al. 2017; Hansen et al. 2013; Mahmood et al. 2014; 
Potapov et al. 2017b; Seto, Guneralp, and Hutyra 2012). However, the type, scale, and 
magnitude of environmental change does not necessarily follow from one or many antecedent 
causes (Meyfroidt 2016a). Rather, these changes are the consequences of different rules, norms, 
and behaviors that combine to influence how, when, and where people interact with one another 
and the environment. Studying environmental change in the Anthropocene requires an 
understanding of how institutions operate across space, scales, and time to structure human-
environment relationships. 
Institutions are the the set of rules, norms, and behaviors that shape human interaction 
(North 1990), and which structure how people access, use, and benefit from environmental goods 
(Ribot and Peluso 2003). Environmental goods include supporting, provisioning, regulating, and 
cultural services (Duraiappah et al. 2005). Common-pool resources (CPRs) are one type of 
environmental resource that provide ecosystem services. CPRs are defined by the difficulty for 
people to monitor them (excludability) and their depletion upon use (extractability) (Ostrom, 
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Gardner, and Walker 1994). Classic examples of CPRs include forests, fisheries, and irrigation 
systems (Ostrom 1990). In challenging the tragedy of the commons, canonical research on 
collective institutions finds that action shaped by specific “design principles,” such as ensuring 
those affected by resource use rules can participate in modifying them or providing low cost 
means for dispute resolution, can lead to long-term and sustainable CPR management (Becker 
and Ostrom 1995; Ostrom 2005). Social-ecological systems (SES) research builds on 
foundational institutionalist research, recognizing that natural resources, people, institutions, and 
environments comprise multi-scalar and interconnected wholes that, together, produce outcomes 
(Ostrom 2009). Extending these insights, national or global governance that promotes 
polycentric management of natural resources and incorporates design principles holds promise 
for lage-scale, sustainable resource use (Ostrom 1999, 2010; Ostrom and Cox 2010). 
Understanding the relationship between institutions and social-ecological outcomes is thus key 
for Sustainability Science (Kates et al. 2001). 
Initial research on institutions and social-ecological outcomes focused on conditions that 
facilitate the sustainable management of CPRs over time (Baland and Platteau 1996; Ostrom 
1990; Wade 1988). A number of subsequent studies incorporated empirical research to 
understand how institutions influence SES outcomes for CPRs (Agrawal 2001; Nagendra 2007; 
Persha, Agrawal, and Chhatre 2011). However, reconciling data on natural resource stocks and 
flows with socioeconomic and institutional data from user groups or proximate communities 
regarding rules and norms posed considerable challenges, and the difficulty of collecting social 
and ecological data across systems limited empirical study. More recently, the increase in 
publically available remotely sensed imagery and enhanced computing capacity enabled a wave 
of rigorous empirical studies that examine the impact of specific institutions on land cover 
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change (Ostrom and Nagendra 2006). These contemporary studies have provided valuable 
insight into the effectiveness of protected areas (Andam et al., 2008; Honey-Rosés, Baylis and 
Ramírez, 2011; Nolte et al., 2013; Ferraro et al., 2015; Shah and Baylis, 2015; den Braber, 
Evans and Oldekop, 2018) and the drivers of forest cover change (Blackman 2013; Blackman et 
al. 2017; Heilmayr and Lambin 2016; Wright et al. 2016). With a focus on spatially defined 
“treatments” and counterfactual “controls,” this research often seeks to compare the most similar 
units—be they parcels of land, households, or administrative units—to draw conclusions about 
the causal impact a rule has on a group of people or a resource (Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014). In 
these studies, it is standard to control for overarching institutional changes, such as new political 
leadership, altered administrative boundaries, or shifts in relative or overall funding. However, 
failing to investigate how overarching institutional change interacts with the specific rule, norm, 
or behavior under examination to produce social-ecological outcomes is problematic on three 
fronts.  
First, ignoring institutional histories can produce “baseline blindness.” Baseline blindness 
refers to how studies that specify a baseline can overlook significant changes that occur before 
the study period (Kotiaho, ten Brink, and Harris 2016). This is a potential problem for all 
empirical work, but it can be alleviated by matching questions with appropriate temporal 
windows and controlling for parallel trends pre-baseline. Selecting appropriate baselines for 
empirical study of social-ecological outcomes requires careful attention to an institution’s legacy, 
and controlling for pre-baseline trends requires attention to an outcome’s history. Second, 
overarching institutional change may drive the outcome of interest. For example, it is common to 
overlook administrative boundary and leadership changes when evaluating the efficacy of an 
environmental policy. However, it is possible that systematic institutional change, such as 
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elections or new boundaries, mediate or drive the effect of an environmental policy on a social-
ecological outcome (Agrawal 2014). Incorporating information on SES history and governance 
into analysis can help guard against such oversight. And third, assessing how the effect of a rule, 
norm, or behavior shifts as a result of overarching institutional transitions can lead to better 
scholarship, more informed implementation of policy, or both. Major institutional changes 
influence SES. Ignoring them can lead to biased estimates or, in a worst-case scenario, spurious 
outcomes. Although scholarship that examines institutional and social-ecological change in 
tandem poses additional difficulties, contemporary trends demand it. 
Along with rapid environmental change, the first two decades of the 21st century have 
witnessed significant social, political, and economic shifts. For example, migration connects 
families and generates environmental impacts across continents (Chen et al. 2014; Gray and 
Bilsborrow 2014; Oldekop et al. 2018; Qin 2010); through large flows of international finance, 
investors affect relationships between labor and land thousands of miles away (Liu et al. 2013; 
Margulis, Mckeon, and Jr 2013; Tscharntke et al. 2012); and governments across the Global 
South are decentralizing and deconcentrating administrative powers and redrawing jurisdictional 
maps (Grossman and Lewis 2014; Pierskalla 2016). SES researach must study human-
environmental interactions under the assumption of overarching institutional change, not despite 
it. It is no longer enough to study how the “rules of the game” effect social-ecological change by 
attempting to control for social, economic, or political shifts. Rather, institutional studies of 
social-ecological outcomes must examine how periods of institutional change unfold through an 
examination of how timing and spaces of change generate social-ecological outcomes.  
This dissertation examines how institutional change affects social-ecological outcomes, 
with a focus on forests, over the first two decades of Indonesian democracy (1999 to 2016). The 
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remainder of this introduction provides the foundation for understanding how institutional 
transitions and forest cover change in Indonesia are related. Section 1.1 elucidates the concept of 
institutional transition. Section 1.2 explains the relevance of studying tropical forest cover. 
Section 1.3 provides information on institutional transitions and forest cover change in 
Indonesia, and Section 1.4 outlines the rest of this dissertation. 
1.1 Institutional transitions: Institutionalism meets land system science 
 
Institutionalist studies of natural resource use frequently consider institutional change, 
but they less often engage with institutional transition. Institutional change refers to the alteration 
or implementation of a rule, norm, or behavior setting is altered (North 1990, Eggerston 1996). A 
common form of research that examines institutional change is policy-focused causal inference 
(Angrist and Pischke 2009, 2017; Athey and Imbens 2016; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). 
Policy-focused causal inference often seeks to understand whether or not a formal rule (policy) is 
responsible for generating outcomes different than would be expected had the rule not been 
implemented. For example, in the realm of forest management, causal inference studies show 
that providing communities with collective-use rights promoted sustainable forest use in Bolivia 
(Wright et al. 2016) and that increasing the amount of formal land titles decreased forest loss in 
Peru (Blackman et al. 2017). Rigorous impact evaluations provide valuable information on 
whether institutional change generates an effect on a particular outcome; however, they often 
overlook investigating if and how institutional changes generate environmental outcomes over 
time and space.  
Land systems science (LSS) is an interdisciplinary research field dedicated to observing, 
understanding, and modeling land use and land cover change and its relationship to human-
environmental vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability (Meyfroidt 2016b; Turner, Lambin, 
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and Reenberg 2007; Verburg et al. 2015). Although many studies of social-ecological outcomes 
do not focus on land cover, using the analytical underpinnings of LSS with the topical focus 
institutionalist studies generates a novel and important insight: Institutional change arises from 
social processes that occur over space and time.  
Empirical analyses of institutional change often operationalize change as discrete. 
Although it may be possible to identify units—pixels, households, villages, or forest parcels—
that have undergone an institutional change, binary identification can be problematic. For 
example, because a forest parcel is within the boundary of a protected area (PA) does not 
necessarily indicate that the institutions which govern how people interact with resources 
represented by that pixel have changed. It can take years to establish offices, begin monitoring, 
and formalize sanctions involved in PA governance. Further, there are many examples of “paper 
parks” that, though they may have official recognition, do not have sufficient budgets or 
personnel to monitor territory or enforce sanctions (Blackman, Pfaff, and Robalino 2015; 
Bonham, Sacayon, and Tzi 2008; Bruner et al. 2001). Although rigorous empirical study has 
established to what extent PAs are effecting changes in conservation goals, the assumption of 
discrete institutional change can hinder further investigation. Understanding institutional change 
as formed from transitional practices enhances the ability to identify and understand causal 
mechanisms that produce social-ecological outcomes. To guide analysis of social-ecological 
outcomes, this dissertation deconstructs institutional change as “institutional transitions” that 
occur over space and time.  
Analyzing institutional transitions includes three opportuninites for investigation. First, 
timing/sequence refers to the combination of when and where institutional change occurs. The 
sequence of events that occur before an institutional change can alter social-ecological outcomes 
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(Pierson 2000). For example, the moment in time when a payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
project is implemented in relation to previous weather patterns or commodity prices can alter the 
extent to which an ecosystem service is protected (Brunner and Grêt-Regamey 2016). Also, 
when participants are paid for protecting ecosystem services, in relation to their economic 
concerns, can affect their willingness to participate (Jayachandran et al. 2017). Investigating 
timing/sequencing requires knowledge of a system, and as discussed previously, conscientious 
selection of the baseline and period of a study.  
Second, the longitudinal effect refers to how the effect of an institutional change on 
social-ecological outcomes fluctuates over time. For example, institutional histories that reflect 
path dependencies of resource extraction can be difficult to reverse. Voluntary forest certification 
may not immediately promote sustainable forest management in such contexts (Ulybina and 
Fennell 2013), but as resource extraction becomes part of a more diversified set of economic 
activities, concessions managed in line with certified standards may demonstrate more 
sustainable harvest regimens (Rana and Sills 2018). Measuring the impact of forest certification 
on harvest practices in the first one or two years immediately following certification can produce 
different results than measuring impact over longer time horizons. Explicitly addressing time 
through baseline selection, selecting a period of study based on SES knowledge, and examining 
longitudinal effects can strengthen findings.  
Where institutional change occurs can explain variation in transition, cause, and effect. 
The difference in institutional change over space is the spatial variation of institutional 
transition. Both spatial variation, and lack of spatial variation, are important for understanding 
how institutional change affects social-ecological outcomes. For example, the technical and 
human resources necessary to monitor fishing vessels and enforce catch quotas varies depending 
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on the range of the species in question; oceanic, transboundary species require greater resources 
than others (Caddy and Seijo 2005). Research that seeks to understand the efficacy of 
institutional change related to fisheries management must consider the spatial, and spatio-
political, variation of enforcement. Additionally, institutional change can generate social-
ecological outcomes that take identifiable spatial patterns in different locations (Brown, Aspinall, 
and Bennett 2006; Turner et al. 2013), thus lending additional insight into when, where, and how 
institutional change and land cover change are related. Perhaps one of the most well-known 
spatial patterns linked to land change process is that of the “fishbone pattern of deforestation” in 
Amazonia that follows from land parcel allotments for frontier agriculturalists (De Oliveira Filho 
and Metzger 2006).  Clustering standard errors enables a practitioner to demonstrate that an 
effect is robust to different and higher-level spatial patterns (Abadie et al. 2017) and data pre-
processing or model specifivation can help control for the differential impact of an effect over 
political space (i.e. administrative boundaries) or geographical space (Angrist and Pischke 2009; 
Ho et al. 2007). However, removing the spatial signals of institutional transition, rather than 
investigating them, represents a missed opportunity.  
Empirical research that investigates how institutional change affects social-ecological 
outcomes should concern itself with institutional transitions. In institutional studies of social-
ecological outcomes the sequential, longitudinal, and spatial variation of an effect are often 
considered nuisance parameters. These same transitional elements are not nuisance parameters, 
but often the focus of inquiry in LSS research (Lambin and Meyfroidt 2010; Turner, Lambin, 
and Reenberg 2007). Drawing on institutionalist studies and land systems science, this 
dissertation analyzes political transitions and social-ecological outcomes, focusing on change in 
tropical forest cover.  
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1.2 Tropical forests: A Common-pool resource of inter-scalar concern 
 
Concern about global environmental change has led governments and donors to identify 
cost effective initiatives to reduce global carbon emissions while conserving biodiversity and 
contributing to rural livelihoods and well-being. Many analyses conclude that conserving and 
sustainably managing tropical forests are two of the most cost effective methods for reducing 
global carbon emissions, conserving biodiversity, and providing livelihood benefits for forest 
proximate people (Houghton, 2005; Gullison et al., 2007). Despite international agreement that 
tropical forests are indispensable for reducing global carbon emissions and conserving 
biodiversity, there is no consensus on how to manage them sustainably. This lack of consensus, 
at international and national levels, continues amid the consistent decrease in global tropical 
forest area (Hansen et al. 2013). 
Tropical forests are valuable as both income and assets, leading to the difficulty with 
which they are managed. As a source of wood, fiber, and non-timber forest products, tropical 
forests provide direct and indirect contributions to millions of rural livelihoods (Agrawal and 
Chhatre 2006; Newton et al. 2016).  From 2000 to 2012, global deforestation was four times that 
of reforestation (Hansen et al. 2013). A variety of state- and market-based efforts seek to stem 
this trend of global deforestation and forest degradation in the tropics and change the nature of 
global forest governance (Agrawal, Chhatre, and Hardin 2008). With the third largest area of 
forest of any country in the world, Indonesian forest cover change is of crucial importance for 
climate change mitigation, biodiversity conservation, and millions of livelihoods. 
1.3 Indonesian forest cover change and institutional transition, 1999 to 2016 
 
Understanding how, where, and why Indonesian political changes and forest cover 
changes co-occur, and with what environmental and socioeconomic impacts, is of global 
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importance. Indonesia is home to over 250 million people, over 35 % of whom live within five 
kilometers of primary or secondary forest (Hansen et al. 2013; Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
2012). Approximately 63% of all Indonesian land is managed by the state as national forest area 
(Kawasan Hutan) (Ministry of Environment and Forestry 2018). As Indonesia has transitioned to 
become the world’s third largest democracy, it has experienced a period of forest cover loss 
unprecedented across Southeast Asia (Woodruff 2010). Between 2000 and 2012, tree cover in 
Indonesia disappeared at a faster rate than any other country, and Indonesian tree cover loss in 
2016 was the highest of any year since 2000 (Hansen et al. 2013). Analyzing changes in forest 
cover and proximate populations considering institutional change that occurred across the 
Indonesian archipelago from 1999 to 2016 is the central task of this dissertation. 
Between 1999 and 2016, Indonesia transitioned from an authoritarian state to the world’s 
third largest democracy. This shift in government generated a drastic reconfiguration of 
government and authority, achieved through a series of policies that decentralized power across 
provinces, districts, and villages and gave citizens the right to select their political 
representatives (Vickers 2013).  Following the fall of Suharto’s New Order government in 1998, 
a period of reformasi ushered in new laws that mandated independent monitoring of elections, 
established the freedom to create new political parties, and prevented the military from aligning 
itself with any one political group. In 1999, Indonesians directly elected national, provincial, and 
district parliaments to office. The newly elected People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat) selected presidents until 2004. Following 2004, the People’s 
Consultative Assembly became a bicameral legislature, comprised of the Regional 
Representatives Council (DPD) and the People’s Representative Council (DPR). Also, after 
2004, the President of the Republic of Indonesia became a directly elected position. Indonesian 
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candidates are selected through an open-list, proportionately representative system. Citizens 
select both party and individual candidates. Since the fall of the New Order, Indonesians have 
elected national legislative representatives four times and have held three presidential elections. 
As with the selection of political respresenatives, Indonesian environmental governance changed 
rapidly from 1999 to 2016 (Agrawal and Lemos 2007). Specifically, increases in formalization, 
decentralization, and globalized governance reshaped forest governance in the first 18 years of 
Indonesian democracy. 
The formalization of forest governance in Indonesia occurred through a variety of policy 
reforms, enacted throughout the 1999 to 2016 period. Formalization refers to the extent to which 
citizens interact with formal organizations that monitor and/or structure behavior, as well as the 
predictiability with which these interactions unfold (Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, and Ostrom 
2006). Governmental technologies that produce policy, mandate methods of implementation, and 
specify regulation and enforcement often determine the actors and practices associated with 
increased formalization (Putzel et al. 2015). From 1999 to 2016 , Indonesian political actors have 
sought to formalize the governance of land (Kelly and Peluso 2015) and the production of forest 
products (Obidzinski and Kusters 2015). By specifying who has rights to land and forests, what 
these rights entail, and how to obtain them, the Indonesian state has increased the codification of 
land use, management, as well as the production of timber and agricultural commodities. 
Although contemporary scholarship often focuses on how contemporary environmental 
governance in Indonesia remains informal, with overlapping land claims leading to unpredictable 
patterns of land use (Gaveau et al. 2017), the legal role, capacity, and resources of the Indonesian 
state have steadily increased over the period preceding Indonesian democracy (Bedner 2016; van 
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der Eng 2017; Mccarthy and Robinson 2016). This process of formalization has occurred along 
with and through increased decentralization. 
The rights and responsibilities over forest areas afforded to different levels of Indonesian 
government has changed repeatedly over the past two decades. Political actors issued a series of 
policies to alternately distribute rights and responsibilities to province and district governments 
at different periods, from 1999 to 2016. Some scholars suggest that shifting certain powers from 
provinces and districts aimed to weaken secessionist movements across the archipelago (Barr et 
al. 2006; Kimura 2013). One key aspect of this strategy was to alternate the way in which 
provinces and districts provided access and received rents from Indonesian forests. More 
recently, laws, pledges, and judicial rulings have begun to increase village-level rights over land 
use (Antlöv, Wetterberg, and Dharmawan 2016; Myers, Intarini, Thomas, et al. 2017; Santika et 
al. 2017). In addition to the decentralization and deconcentration of political authority (Ribot, 
Agrawal, and Larson 2006), the number of provinces, districts, sub-districts, and villages 
increased precipitously. As the Indonesian state reconfigured rights and responsibilities within its 
borders, it enacted policy to promote trade and diplomacy beyond its borders. 
International rules, norms, and market incentives increased the impact of international 
actors on Indonesian forest governance from 1999 to 2016 (Bernstein and Cashore 2012). 
Complying with international rules regarding timber trade, Indonesian timber is now verified as 
legal through third party auditing (Cashore et al. 2007; Lesniewska and McDermott 2014). 
International norms for reducing carbon emissions have been formalized through multiple, 
national policies (Law 17/2004 and Law 16/2016) and have resulted in Indonesia receiving 
increasing amount of conservation aid dedicated to tropical forest conservation and rural 
livelihood improvement (Angelsen 2017; Wells, Michael; Guggenheim, Scott; Khan, Asmeen; 
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Wardojo, Wahjudi; Jepson 1999; A. Wibowo and Giessen 2015). And international sustainability 
certification seeks to ensure that the production of timber and agricultural commodities, 
including coffee and palm oil, are not contributing to illegal forest loss and promote positive 
livelihood outcomes (Carlson et al. 2017; Miteva, Loucks, and Pattanayak 2015).  
The combination of striking political change and unprecedented forest cover loss make 
Indonesia an ideal region in which to study how institutional transitions affect social-ecological 
outcomes. Although formalization, decentralization, and globalized governance are not 
exhaustive of all political change in Indonesia from 1999 to 2016, they represent a set of key 
shifts in forest governance (Agrawal, Chhatre, and Hardin 2008). This dissertation examines 
these shifts through a series of chapters that analyze them as institutional transitions and 
discusses their impact on Indonesian forests and people.  
1.4 Dissertation overview 
 
Understanding how institutional transitions shape social-ecological outcomes requires the 
combination of different data sources to analyze information from the halls of government, 
remotely sensed satellite imagery, and field-based observations and measurements (Ostrom and 
Nagendra 2006). This dissertation uses a combination of data and methods to examine three 
overarching institutional changes that occurred in Indonesia from 1999 to 2016 and influenced 
social-ecological outcomes related to forests. Chapter 2 examines the formalization of 
Indonesian forest governance through an analysis of forest-related policy content. Chapter 3 
examines decentralization by analyzing the effect of regulatory dispersal on forest cover change. 
And Chapter 4 provides insight into how globalized governance, implemented through 
international conservation funding and commodity demand, combine to generate conservation 
legacies from Indonesia’s largest Integrated Conservation and Development Project. Together, 
 14 
these chapters provide specific insights on political change, forests, and people in Indonesia, and 
they support future research of institutional transitions and social-ecological outcomes. 
Chapter 2 provides insight into the initial stages of formalization through an analysis of 
forest-related policy. Using a dataset of coded forest-related policies legislated since 1999, this 
chapter assesses general policy trends to determine if and how forest-related policy has changed 
across three five-year periods that coincide with Indonesia’s transition to full democracy. By 
doing so, it examines the period and timing of institutional transition, as recorded in Indonesian 
law. This chapter concludes that Indonesian forest-related policy changed to promote more 
conservation-friendly policy during the first 18 years following democritization, but these 
policies permit interpretable flexibility via policy layering. Ambiguity related to policy layering 
helps explain the paradox of increasingly pro-conservation policy and consistently increasing 
rates of Indonesian forest loss.  
 Since its transition to democracy, thousands of new villages, hundreds of new sub-
districts and districts, and eight new provinces have proliferated across Indonesia (BPS, 2015). 
Each of these proliferations requires the establishment of new administrations. In establishing 
new administrations, governments disperse regulation across a greater number of units. Chapter 
3 examines the effect of regulatory dispersal on forest cover change in Indonesia from 2000 to 
2014. In Indonesia, regulatory dispersal has increased the density of regulatory units, but 
contemporary research has not yet investigated the impact of regulatory dispersal on forest cover 
change. This chapter demonstrates that periods following the proliferation of new administrative 
units increases forest cover loss, but the type of regulatory dispersal and when it occurs 
influences this effect. 
 15 
Chapter 4 assesses how a legacy from international conservation funding affects local 
livelihoods and village-level development surrounding Indonesia’s second largest, terrestrial 
protected area. The largest conservation and development project of its time, the Kerinci-Seblat 
Integrated Conservation and Development project (KS-ICDP), initiated the transfer of direct 
conservation payments to villages across central Sumatra in the early 2000s (World Bank 2003). 
Chapter 4 assesses the legacy of this conservation funding, using primary survey data (n=1,304), 
village-level development indicators, and forest cover data. It concludes that villages which 
received KS-ICDP funding demonstrate forest cover trends in direct contrast to the project’s 
stated objectives, and households within villages that received direct funding report livelihood 
strategies that preference greater and more informal land ownsership. Failures of the project 
during its time of operation, coupled with how it may haved crowded out conservation 
motivations, help explain this legacy. 
 Chapter 5 provides a set of conclusions about how forest cover and livelihoods in 
Indonesia have been shaped by the overarching political institutions that result from its transition 
to democracy. Policy change, regulatory dispersal, and conservation finance provide windows 
through which to examine institutional transitions related to formalization, decentralization, and 
globalized governance. To study institutional drivers of social-ecological outcomes, research 
must pay careful attention to the time, the sequence, and the space over which the institution 
operates. This dissertation concludes by reiterating the role political change played in affecting 
forest cover change across the archipelago through specific policy, regulatory, and conservation 
practices, discussing limitations of studying institutional transitions and social-ecological 
outcomes, and identifying areas for further study.  
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Chapter 2  
 
Assessing, analyzing, and visualizing change in Indonesian forest-related 
policy content from 1999 to 2016 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
Despite numerous pledges by Indonesian authorities to reduce emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation, Indonesian forest cover loss has consistently increased over the past two 
decades. To determine if forest-related policy demonstrates a paradigm shift toward forest 
protection, we identify and code a set of 218 national forest-related policies passed between 1999 
and 2016. We assess the type of forest-related content, whether a change in policy has occurred, 
and the mechanism by which change has or has not taken place through the interpretation of 
policy citation networks and statistical analysis of temporal relationships between forest-related 
policy content and change over time. We find there has been a significant increase in the amount 
of Indonesian forest-related policy and that this increase is largely comprised of content that 
promotes forest protection and redefines the structure and funding for forest-related 
organizations. However, these content changes have primarily occurred through the process of 
policy layering, when new policy does not amend or repeal old policy and regulation. We 
examine current trends in the regulation of forest territory and flow in Indonesia and find further 
evidence of policy layering. Thus, although national forest-related policy in Indonesia has 
changed to promote increased forest protection and monitoring, policy layering promotes 
interpretable flexibility, which can enable continued forest cover loss. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Growing recognition of tropical forest conservation as a low-cost option for mitigating 
climate change has motivated international efforts to reduce forest degradation and deforestation. 
Actors, organizations, and states that promote international forest conservation, sometimes 
referred to as the International Forests Regime (IFR), often seek to reduce forest cover loss by 
promoting cooperative agreements and good forest governance (Giessen 2013; Smouts 2008). 
Through different pathways, international governance can influence domestic governments to 
produce formal laws and regulations that deliver policy instruments to achieve these goals 
(Bernstein and Cashore 2012; Cashore et al. 2007; Maryudi 2016). States that contain large tracts 
of tropical forest and ascribe to the objectives of the IFR should demonstrate an increase in 
national-level policy that promotes reduced emissions from forest cover change as well as good 
forest governance. However, little empirical evidence on forest-related policy content exists to 
document and understand whether and how this policy trend occurs. 
Political leaders in Indonesia have voiced significant support for Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) as well as sustainable forest governance. 
However, studies conclude that primary forest loss in Indonesia increased consistently from 2000 
to 2012 (Margono et al. 2014), and over the same period Indonesian forest cover loss has 
accelerated at a greater rate than any other nation (Hansen et al. 2013). The reality of forest loss 
despite the Indonesian state’s purported dedication to REDD+ and sustainable forest governance 
present a puzzle: has Indonesian forest-related policy changed? If it has, what type of forest-
related policy content best summarizes this change, and through what mechanism of policy 
change has it occurred? This research examines whether and how national forest-related policy 
change occurred in Indonesia between 1999 and 2016. 
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2.2 Theories of policy change 
 
Identifying change in policy content requires an analysis of what content is changing, 
over what period, and how new and old policies relate to one another. These analytical focuses 
can be considered the “what,” “when,” and “how” of policy content change, and they are referred 
to, respectively, as directionality, tempo, and mode of policy content change (Cashore et al. 
2007; Howlett and Cashore 2009; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Thelen 2004).  
  The directionality of policy content describes the way in which it shifts over time toward 
different objectives (Nisbet 1972). Cumulative policy change exists when there is a concerted 
shift in policy content objectives. Policy content change that remains in equilibrium is 
characterized by new policy that, over the period in question, does not shift toward different 
objectives. This occurs when a set of subsequent policies promote the same set of objectives or a 
set of different objectives that consistently offset one another. Considering the directionality of 
policy content change alongside tempo provides a method for assessing when policy content 
changes (Table 2.1). 
Policy content change is often considered a long, stochastic process of “muddling 
through” (Lindblom 1964). This “classic incremental” pattern of policy change does not 
demonstrate a cumulative directionality toward different policy objectives over the short-term. 
Rather, it defines a set of policy content that may differ in objective and purpose from baseline 
Table 2.1: Policy Change (adapted from Cashore and Howlett 2007)  
  Tempo 
Directionality Fast Slow 
Cumulative 
Classic 
Paradigm 
Progressive 
Incremental 
In  
Equilibrium 
Faux 
Paradigmatic 
Classic 
Incremental 
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content but in aggregate and over long time horizons. Therefore, it is not unusual for research to 
examine changes in policy content over many decades.  
However, policy change can also occur within shorter timeframes. Policy change that 
occurs quickly in response to an exogenous cause is referred to as a “classic” paradigm shift or 
“punctuated equilibrium” (True, Jones, and Baumgartner 1999). A fast shift in policy 
directionality that changes objectives but is subsequently offset by another set of policies is 
referred to as “faux paradigmatic.” Analyzing policies for evidence of policy change requires the 
definition of timescales appropriate to the political systems and histories from which they come. 
 The mode or type of policy change identifies the process through which policy content 
aggregates. In conjunction with directionality and tempo, the mode of policy content change 
establishes the political practices upon which policy content is predicated and how policy 
implementation unfolds. Different modes of policy change represent contrasts in creation and the 
implementation of policy content (Table 2.2). Policy displacement or layering occurs when new 
content is created. Displacement refers to when new policy replaces old rules. Layering, when 
new policy content does not replace existing content. Drift and conversion represent two 
scenarios where existing rules persist, new rules are not introduced, but the implementation or 
impact or existing rules changes. Thus, displacement and layering are relevant when cumulative 
policy change has occurred, whereas drift and conversion pertain to policy content change that is 
in equilibrium (Table 2.1).  
To assess the directionality, tempo, and mode of policy content, analysis must be based 
on strong rationale for the timeframe under study and the scope of policy being examined. 
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Sections 2.3 and 2.4 present information on the period under study, types of policy, and 
identification as well as coding protocols that comprise the present study. 
2.3 Forest-related policy in Indonesia 
 
Forest-related policy in democratic Indonesia represents a stark break from forest-related 
policy before the democratic transition. Before the democratic transition, Indonesian forest-
related policy was based in the 1967 Basic Forestry Law. This law, which characterizes 
Indonesian forest-related policy before the democratic transition, granted central authority over 
143 Mha of “forest land,” which covered over three fourths of Indonesian land area. The Basic 
Forestry Law of 1967 allowed the New Order regime to implement an insular patronage system 
through the forestry sector that dominated forest-related policy until 1998 (Obidzinski and 
Kusters 2015). However, with the fall of Suharto’s New Order government came a series of new 
forest-related policies. These policies respond to the decades of centralized control the New 
Order regime practiced, and they inculcate international influence and funding (Roberts, Habir, 
and Sebastian 2015). 
The years between 1999 to 2016 provide an ideal time in which to study if and how 
national forest-related policy changed as Indonesia transitioned to full democracy. As a 
Table 2.2: Mode of Policy Change (adapted from Mahoney and Thelen 2010) 
Mode of Change Characteristics 
Displacement Removal of existing rules, introduction of new rules 
Layering No removal of old rules, introduction of new rules 
along with maintenance of old rules 
Drift No removal of old rules, no introduction of new 
rules, changed enactment of old rules due to 
environmental change (not strategic) 
Conversion No removal of old rules, no introduction of new 
rules, intentional redeployment of old rules 
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democratic nation, Indonesia welcomed a number of actors, organizations, and states who sought 
to promote general concepts related to the IFR, including REDD+ and sustainable forest 
governance (Bernstein and Cashore 2012; Sahide, Maryudi, et al. 2016), which represents a clear 
break from previous forest-related policy during the New Order.  For purposes of analysis, we 
divide the 18 years including and between 1999 and 2016 into three periods, each of which 
contains unique events in the democratic evolution of the Indonesian political system (Table 
2.3). Within these periods, and across 18 years of Indonesian democracy, we examine trends in 
forest-related policy.  
Indonesian legislative structures extend to province and district levels, but we limit the 
present study to national forest-related policy. We focus on national-level policy content because 
of data constraints: a database or centralized system for province and district policy does not yet 
exist. Within national policy content, we examine five types of policy (Table 2.4). These policy 
Table 2.3: Executive and legislative changes in post-transition periods of Indonesian democracy 
  Executive Changes Legislative Changes  
Period One: 
Transition to full 
democracy 
(1999-2004) 
President elected by Parliament 
 
Amendment to elect president 
through direct elections (2002) 
 
First direct presidential election (7 
and 9/ 2004)  
First free election since 1955 
 
Reorganization of legislatureinto two 
houses without military appointees 
(2002) 
 
Second free legislative election 
(4/2004)   
Period Two: 
First period of full 
democracty 
(2005-2010) 
First term of directly elected  
president (10/2004-10/2009) 
 
Second direct presidential election 
(7/2009)  
First term of reorganized legislature 
(10/2004-9/2009) 
 
Third free legislative election 
(4/2009) 
Period Three: 
Second period of 
full democracy 
(2011-2016) 
Second term of directly elected  
president (10/2009-10/2014) 
 
Third direct presidential election 
(7/2014) 
Second term of reorganized 
legislature (10/2009-9/2014) 
 
Third free legislative election 
(4/2009) 
 
 22 
types include laws, government regulations (GRs), presidential regulations (PRs), presidential 
decrees (PDs), and presidential instructions (PIs). The following section describes the steps we 
took to identify and code national forest-related policy passed in Indonesia between 1999 and 
2016.  
2.4 Methods 
 
Our analysis of policy content proceeded in three steps. First, we searched for and 
identified forest-related policy. Second, we read and coded forest-related policy according to a 
set of formal criteria. And third, we visualized, analyzed, and tested hypotheses about forest-
related policy change in Indonesia.  
2.4.1 Defining the policy set 
 
To identify forest-related policy, we used a two-step search protocol. First, we conduct a 
search of two Indonesian policy databases (Hukum Online 2018; Produk Hukum 2018) using a 
Table 2.4 National policy types and information (Sources: Laws 10/2004 and 12/2011) 
Policy Type Political Actor/s Method of Passage Notes 
Law (Undang-Undang) People's Representative 
Assembly (DPR) 
Drafted by People's 
Representative Assembly 
with presidential consent. 
Subjected to  review via 
Constitional Court 
Legislated regulation 
planned,  prepared, and 
ratified by legislature and 
President 
Government Regulation 
(Peraturan Pemerintah) 
People's Representative 
Assembly (DPR) 
Enacted by the President Prepared and enacted by 
President to implement law 
Presidential Regulation 
(Peraturan Presiden) 
President of Indonesia Enacted by the President Regulation prepared and 
enacted by president 
Presidential Decree 
(Keputusan Presiden) 
President of Indonesia Enacted by the President Often a set of instructions, 
specifying an action to be 
completed 
Presidential Instruction 
(Instruksi Presiden) 
President of Indonesia Enacted by the President Orders or instructions from 
the President's office, often to 
ministers and ministeries 
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set of terms common within forest-related policy identified in current literature (Ardiansyah, 
Marthen, and Amalia 2015; Brockhaus et al. 2012; Sahide, Supratman, et al. 2016; Singer, 
Elated, and In 2009). These terms include: 
“plantation” OR “forestry” OR “garden” OR “forest” OR “natural resources” OR 
“environment” OR “tree” OR “wood” OR “palm” OR “rubber” OR “coffee” OR “food 
sovereignty” OR “food security” OR “food safety1”  
 
Any policy that contained at least one of the key terms was identified for further review. We also 
used legal product databases to determine total yearly counts for all categories of national policy 
considered in this research. Following this database search, we identified relevant white and gray 
literature that focuses on Indonesian forest-related policy to complement the hits from our database 
search. Appendix D lists additional sources that identified Indonesian forest-related policy. 
2.4.2 Coding policy documents 
 
We coded policy documents according to a set of eight forest-related categories. These 
categories include: “Ecosystem Services/Biodiversity,” “Allowable Harvest,” “Reforestation,” 
“Road Building,” “Forest Protection and Monitoring,” “Riparian or Coastal Zones.”  Table 2.5 
contains the definitions for these categories. We selected these categories based on precedent in 
forest-related policy literature (Cashore and Howlett, 2007; McDermott et al. 2010; McDermott 
et al., 2012). In addition to these categories, we added “Financial Mechanisms for Forest 
Regulation” and “Organizational Mechanisms for Forest Regulation” content categories, based 
on current literature that emphasizes changes in forest-related organizations and administrations 
(Nurrochmat et al., 2014; Nurfatriani et al., 2015; Sahide and Giessen, 2015). We coded each 
policy document based on all the forest-related policy content it contained as well as the 
                                                     
1 Indonesian translation: “perkebunan” OR “kehutanan” OR “kebun” OR “hutan” or “sumber daya alam” OR 
“lingkungan hidup” OR “pohon” OR “kayu” OR “sawit” OR “karet” OR “kopi” or “kedaulatan makan” OR 
“ketahanan pangan” OR “keamanan makanan” 
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“majority” content type for each document. Two coders read and coded all policy documents in 
Bahasa Indonesia, and they dual-coded a 10% (n= 22) sample of to ensure inter-coder reliability. 
In addition to policy-content, we identified the references contained within each policy 
document. Indonesian policy documents provide clear references to the policy they cite and/or 
modify. We determined if the policy document in question directly amended or repealed a 
previous policy, the name of the policy it amended, and the name of all policies referenced in the 
document. Appendix D includes a complete list of all forest-related policies included in this 
study. 
2.4.3 Analyzing forest-related policy 
 
To analyze forest-related policy, we assessed the relationship between policy-content 
themes, the years or periods in which they were passed, and the amendments each document 
Table 2.5: Forest policy content categories 
Content Name Definition 
Ecosystem Service and Biodiversity Regulation related to management, protection, or evaluation 
of ecosystem services or biodiversity 
Allowable Harvest Regulation related to management or evaluation of forest 
products (e.g. wood, non-timber forest products, eco-tourism, 
and etc.) 
Road Building Regulation related to the management and construction of 
roads within or surrounding forest areas 
Reforestation Regulation related to the management, location, funding, or 
implementation of reforestation activities 
Forest Protection or Monitoring Regulation related to the the management, protection, 
conservation, and/or evaluation of forest areas 
Riparian or Coastal Zones Regulation related to the management, protection, evaluation, 
or use of forest areas that are in riparian or coastal zones 
Funding or Financing for Forest 
Organizations 
Regulation related to the funding, financing, or taxation of 
forest-related organizations 
Structure or Organization of Forest 
Organizations 
Regulation related to the structure or organization of forest-
related organizations (e.g. ministries, agencies, special 
cabinets, etc.) 
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contains. To confirm our coding themes and assess their salient relationships, we created and 
analyzed citation networks. Then, we conducted statistical tests to determine the relationships 
between time and the rates of forest-related policy, content, and amendments. 
We examined policy citation networks to confirm and guide policy change hypotheses. 
Using Gephi visualization software, we visualized policies as nodes, connected to one another 
through in-text citations (edges). Citations in these networks are of two types: policy reference or 
amendment. We assumed that different policy-content themes would create distinguishable 
clusters based on high levels of cross-policy references. Identifying these distinguishable clusters 
resembles community-detection in network analysis, which identifies groups of nodes that are 
more densely connected to one another through edges than to other nodes (Meerow and Newell 
2015; Newman 2006). In addition to providing broad insight into policy citation communities, 
we use policy citation networks to examine how content types changed across our different study 
periods by visualizing the network during the first (1999-2004), second (2005-2010) and third 
(2011-2016) period. Using policy network visualization to guide hypotheses about policy content 
change, we proceeded to statistical analysis. 
We used several statistical tests to analyze if the amount and type of forest-related policy 
changed between 1999 and 2016. Following interpretation of policy-citation networks, we tested 
null hypotheses of whether policy type, content, and references are independent of the period in 
which they were passed using chi-squared tests of independence and Kendall’s rank correlation 
(Kendall’s tau) statistics. First, we assessed whether the rate of forest-related policy is correlated 
across time and if it is significantly dependent upon the period in which it was passed. We 
conduct these tests on the proportion of forest-related policy to total national policy, to control 
for the potential confounding relationship of overall national policy passage over time. Second, 
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after identifying general trends within the policy citation networks, we tested whether specific 
forest-related policy content (identified from the policy citation networks) is independent of the 
period in which policy is passed. We tested whether different time periods contain significantly 
different rates of policies that focus on a forest-related policy type using chi-square tests of 
independence, since real 0s in the data made Kendall’s tau tests unreliable.  
To direct our interpretation of the mode of policy change, we assessed the rate of forest-
related policy amendments. We first examined the relationship between the number of forest-
related policies with amendments to total forest-related policies using a Kendall’s tau correlation 
test and chi-square tests of independence. We repeated these tests using the rate of forest-related 
amendments to total policy per year. A significant and positive relationship between year, the 
rate of new forest-related policy, and the rate of forest-related amendments indicates that new 
policy displaced pre-existing policy (Table 2.2). A significant relationship between year and the 
rate of new forest-related policy, but no significant relationship between year and forest-related 
amendments indicates new policy is layered over pre-existing policy. And, should no significant 
relationships exist between year and forest-related policy, drift or conversion may best explain 
forest-related policy change in Indonesia.  
Coding, visualizing, and testing policy-content rates over time can establish if change 
occurred, but sector-specific insight is necessary to reconcile how content and implementation 
occur together. We used empirical results to inform a discussion of major trends in the regulation 
Indonesian forest territory and forest product flow from 1999 to 2016. 
2.5 Results 
 
The search criteria returned 289 policy documents. 254 of these documents were relevant 
to the timeframe of this study, and 218 contained policy content related to the set of categories 
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we used to define forest-related policy. No small set of categories represented the content within 
the policies our search found that we determined to be unrelated to forest management.   
2.5.1 Visualizing and interpreting Indonesian forest-related policy citation networks  
Visualizing the policy citation network illustrates addition of forest-related policy over 
time. Panels A through C (Figure 2.1) highlight the addition of new forest-related policy between 
periods. The 218 forest-related policies contain 1,289 references. Of these, 6.9% are amendments 
and 93.1% are references. Policy citation networks also highlight dominant categories of forest-
related policy content. 
National forest-related policy in Indonesia, from 1999-2016, is dominated by three 
overall categories. Policy-content coded as primarily addressing “Forest Protection and 
Monitoring” comprises 24% of the final citation network, “Financial Mechanisms for Forest 
Regulation” comprises 22.9%, and “Organizational Mechanisms for Forest Regulation” 
comprises 22.4%. Policy citation networks illustrate the dominance of these three content 
categories within the overall network (Panel D, Figure 2.1). All other major content categories 
comprise 10.1% or less of the total citation network. Across policy citation communities, there is 
a strong co-occurrence of “Forest Protection and Monitoring” and “Ecosystem 
Services/Biodiversity.” This co-occurrence is the strongest within the citation network, with two 
thirds of all “Ecosystem Services/Biodiversity” majority policy references citing “Forest 
Protection and Monitoring” policies. This citation co-occurrence is double the amount of the 
second highest co-occurring categories (“Reforestation” and “Forest Protection and 
Monitoring”). We use the trends illustrated by the policy citation networks to inform our 
statistical analyses. 
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Figure 2.1: Policy citation networks for Period 1 (Panel A), Period 2 (Panel B), Period 3 (Panel C), and the overall citation 
network with non-forest and forest-related policies (Panel D). Nodes with color indicate forest-related policy. Nodes without 
color indicate policy-content referenced by forest-related policy. 
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Although the policy citation network demonstrates changes in counts, it does not control 
for the rate of all national-level policy creation. Our statistical analyses formally test whether the 
proportion of forest-related policy to total policy, as well as the number of forest-related 
amendments to total policy, significantly change over time and across periods to control for 
increases in overall policy-content generation that may influence results. 
 We used findings from the policy citation network to focus statistical analysis. We tested 
the following hypotheses to examine the tempo, directionality, and mode of Indonesian forest-
related policy: 
1. Forest-related policy has increased in amount from 1999 to 2016 
 
2. Forest-related policy content increasingly focused on: 
a. Forest protection and monitoring 
b. Financial mechanisms for forest regulation 
c. Organizational mechanisms for forest regulation 
 
3. Forest-related policy demonstrates an increase in direct policy amendments 
 
2.5.2 Analysis of forest-related policy trends 
 From 1999 to 2016, the People’s Representative Assembly and the President of Indonesia 
passed an increasing amount of forest-related policy (Table 2.6). Period 1 (1999-2004) contained 
55 forest-related policies (25.2% of all forest-related policies), Period 2 (2005-2010) contained 
65 (29.8%), and Period 3 (2011-2016) contained 98 (45.0%).  A Mantel-Haenszel chi-squared 
test demonstrates that this change is significantly different from the null hypothesis of 
independence between year and number of forest-related policies as a proportion of overall 
national policies (Table 2.6). Further, Kendall’s Tau Correlation demonstrates that this 
significant relationship is moderately positive (Figure 2.2).   
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Descriptive analysis demonstrates an increase in “Forest protection and monitoring & 
ecosystem services and biodiversity,” “Structure and organization,” and “Funding and financing” 
content over the three periods of analysis. These counts represent the total number of policies 
that included content related to categories, rather than the number of policies primarily defined 
by one category. “Protection and Monitoring & Ecosystem Services and Biodiversity” has the 
highest overall proportion of overall policy content (2%), consistently increases from Period 1 to 
Period 3, and is the greatest percentage of forest-related policy passed in Period 3 (44.9%). 
“Structure and Organization” of forest-related organizations also demonstrates consistent 
increases and is included in 36.7% of national forest-related policies from Period 3. Policy that 
addresses “Funding and Financing” of forest-related organizations also increases from Periods 1 
to 3 and is referenced in 38.7% of all policy from Period 3. The increasing amount of policy that 
Table 2.6: Forest-related policy, content, and amendment rates and significance from Mantel-Haenzel chi-squared test by 
period  
  
Total 
Period 1 
(’99 - ‘04) 
Period 2 
(’05 - ‘10) 
Period 3 
(’11 - ‘16) 
  
  
  
N % N % N % N % χ2 p-
value 
Total National Policies 5,149 ---- 1905 ---- 1472 ---- 1775 ---- ---- ---- 
Total Forest-Related Policies 
(FRPs) 
218 4.23 55 2.89 65 4.42 98 5.52 15.90 <.01 
FRPs with Amendments 67 1.30 19 1.15 20 1.36 25 1.41 0.73 0.69 
FRPs with Protection and 
Monitoring Content 
85 1.65 24 1.26 24 1.63 37 2.08 3.86 0.15 
FRPs with Protection and 
Monitoring & 
Ecosystem Services and  
Biodiveristy Content 
103 2.00 27 1.42 32 2.17 44 2.48 5.59 0.06 
FRPs with Funding and financing 
Content 
77 1.50 22 1.15 17 1.16 38 2.14 7.68 <.05 
FRPs with Forest-Related 
Organization and Structure 
Content 
60 1.17 19 1.00 19 1.29 36 2.03 7.19 <.05 
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contains “Forest protection and monitoring & ecosystem services and biodiversity,” “Structure 
and organization,” and “Funding and financing” content is in contrast with the proportion of 
forest-related policies that introduce amendments over the same period.  
The proportion of forest-related policy amendments over time demonstrates significant 
decrease. A Mantel-Haenzel chi-squared test of the proportion of forest-related amendments 
from overall policy cannot reject the independence between time periods (Table 2.6). However, 
testing the proportion of forest-related amendments of only forest-related policy with a Kendall’s 
tau correlation indicates that the rate of forest-related amendments per forest-related policy 
decreases over time (tau = -0.29, p=0.1).  
2.6 Discussion 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Kendall’s tau correlation results for year (x-axis) by proportion of forest-related policy of total policy (top) and 
forest-related amendements by total forest-related policy (bottom) 
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National forest-related policy in Indonesia demonstrated significant change between 1999 
and 2016. This change is best described as a classic paradigm shift toward forest protection and 
monitoring, which occurred through a layering process. This discussion examines the trend of 
policy change and then considers how Indonesian governance of forest territory and the flow of 
forest products reflects policy layering. 
2.6.1 The classic paradigm shift in Indonesian forest-related policy 
 
Between 1999 and 2016, Indonesia passed more forest-related policy that emphasizes 
forest protection and focuses on restructuring forest-related organizations. Classic paradigm 
shifts occur when the tempo of policy change is relatively fast and the directionality is consistent 
(Cashore and Howlett 2007). This often occurs through an exogenous pressure, and is referred to 
as a “punctuated equilibrium” that overwhelms standard incremental change of policy content 
(Nisbet 1972). The significant increase of forest-related policy over time demonstrates a 
continuous change in policy-content focus. The marked increase in financing, organizational 
restructuring, and forest protection support the classic paradigm shift hypothesis of forest-related 
policy change. 
Since reformasi, the amount of forest-related policy that addresses forest protection, 
monitoring, biodiversity, and ecosystem services has increased significantly. International rules, 
norms/discourse, market intervention, and access to domestic policy comprise four pathways 
through which international regimes—including uncomprehensive regimes, like the IFR—can 
influence domestic policy (Bernstein and Cashore 2012). Increasing trade restrictions, notably 
those related to CITES, the Lacey Act, and the EU Forest Legality, Governance, and Trade 
Voluntary Partnership Agreements (FLEGT VPAs) for verified legal timber, seek to constrain 
the market for illegal timber and timber products (Lesniewska and McDermott 2014). These 
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restrictions, coupled with market incentives for forest certification and legality verification, and 
international norms, such as committing to carbon emissions reductions, have increased the 
importance of protecting and monitoring Indonesian forests for the Indonesain state. The 
emphasis on forest monitoring and protection is observable in policy content that addresses how 
forest concessions are issued (GR 34/2002, GR 38/2007, GR 3/2008, Law 32/2009, GR 24/2010, 
GR 72/2010, GR 61/2012, Law 23/2014, GR 57/2016), how forests are monitored and by whom 
(Law 32/2009, Law 18/2013, Law 23/2014, PR 16/2015), in policy that addresses timber trade 
(GR 34/2002, GR 6/2007, PR 21/2014), and ratifies international commitments (Law 17/2004, 
GR 21/2014). 
 International financial commitments and contributions that promote forest protection and 
monitoring provide another example of how international pressures have promoted forest 
conservation agendas in Indonesia. Commitments include the 2010 Letter of Intent between the 
Norwegian and Indonesian governments, which pledged $1 billion for evidence of REDD 
impacts, as well as the hundreds of millions of dollars provided through organizations such as the 
World Bank, the UK Department for International Development, and others that focus on “good 
forest governance” in Indonesia. Specifically, international funding has promoted the One Map 
Policy to harmonize ministerial land claims, improved governance of forest management units 
(Sahide et al., 2016), and others. As policy content that focuses on protection and monitoring of 
Indonesian forests increased, forest-related organizations in Indonesia were restructured. 
Between 2011 and 2016, three major changes altered forest-related organizations. First, 
presidents established two ad hoc agencies that report directly to the president. In 2013 President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhyono formed a special agency to implement activities and funding 
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associated with reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (PR 62/2013)2.  
Then, President Widodo established the Peatland Restoration Agency (PR 57/2016). Both of 
these special agencies were established outside the Ministry of Environment and/or Forestry to 
report directly to the president in order to facilitate President Yudohoyo’s 2009 pledge to reduce 
carbon emissions between 26% and 41% by 2020, and President Widodo’s 2015 pledge and 
Paris Agreement commitment to reduce carbon emissions between 29% and 41% by 2030 
(Alisjahbana and Busch 2017).  
Second, President Joko Widodo combined the Ministry of Forestry with the Ministry of 
Environment to create the Ministry of Environment and Forestry in 2015 (PD 16/2015). The 
combination of these ministries created a “mega ministry,” charged with overseeing forestry 
management and conservation activities of the state’s forest areas. Within it, PD 16/2015 gives 
powers over REDD+ to the newly formed Secretariat of Climate Change. Additionally, a new 
Secretariat of Social Forestry and Environmental Partnerships is charged with the allocation of 
12.7 Mha of forest area to communities (Afiff 2016).  
Third, two different laws redistributed rights to control of forest resources in 2014. The 
Village Law (6/2014) extended more authority over natural resources to villages than ever before 
in Indonesian history (Antlöv, Wetterberg, and Dharmawan 2016). Meanwhile, the Province 
Law (23/2014) increased control over forest resources and administration at the province level, 
and established a greater administrative role for forest management units (Sahide, Supratman, et 
al. 2016). The Village Law, in combination with the pledge to allocate 12.7 Mha to communities 
across Indonesia, aims to promote community conservation and natural resource management 
(Myers, Intarini, Sirait, et al. 2017). The Regional Governance Law increases the power of 
                                                     
2 This agency was not appointed until near President Yudhoyono’s term and its mechanism for finance was never 
clarified. In 2015, President Widodo dissolved this agency (Presidential Regulation 16/2015). 
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province governments, clarifying their role in overseeing forest management units, and 
specifying how concession rights to national forest lands are to be allocated (Afiff 2016; Sahide, 
Supratman, et al. 2016).  
International rules, norms, and market incentives represent the pathways through which 
external actors influenced the incentive for Indonesian political actors to legislate in favor of 
forest protection (Bernstein and Cashore 2012). Thus, the People’s Consultative Assembly (DPR 
and DPD) and the President of Indonesia have dedicated increased attention to promote forest 
protection through policy creation that focuses on forest protection and monitoring as well as 
administrative reorganization. The mechanism through which this shift has occurred, however, 
leaves room for contradictory laws, regulatory mis- or re-interpretation, and jurisdictional 
differences in forest-related enforcement. 
2.6.2 Forest-related policy layering and the limits of institutional reform 
 
Although the amount of forest-related policy content that focused on protection and 
monitoring significantly increased from 1999 to 2016, total forest cover loss across the 
Indonesian archipelago consistently increased over the same time period (Hansen et al. 2013; 
Margono et al. 2012, 2014). This points to a discrepancy between new policy content and 
implementation. Policy layering within national-level policy and across different policy levels 
provides a possible explanation as to why this discrepancy persists.  
Through the analysis of policy-content change using citation networks, we identified a 
decrease in policy amendments from 1999 to 2016. As political actors passed more policy 
focused on forest protection and monitoring, they did not displace previous regulation. 30.1% of 
forest-related policy passed between 1999 and 2016 includes policy amendment or repeal. 
Examining current trends in the regulation of forest territory and forest product flow (Sikor et al. 
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2013) illustrates the relationship between policy layering, forest governance, and interpretable 
ambiguity. 
Though related, forest-related policy and forest governance are not synonymous (Rhodes 
2007). Mandates for forest governance are often found within forest-related policy, but the 
intermingling of rules, practice, and context are what generate outcomes for forests and people. 
In general, forest governance focuses on the regulation of forest territory and the flow of forest 
products (Sikor, He, and Lestrelin 2017). Generating and analyzing data on forest-related policy 
identifies patterns in the policy itself, but it does not provide insight into how policy is 
implemented through practices of the state (Foucault 1978; Scott 1998). To connect forest-
related policy and governance in contemporary Indonesia, we discuss the role of forest-related 
policy change and layering in the regulation of forest territory and the flow of forest products. 
Regulating forest territory 
 
The shift to increased forest protection via the layering of forest-related policy has 
significant consequences for how, and through what organizations, the Indonesian state manages 
forest territory. The structure of government organizations imbued with the authority to manage 
and regulate state forests in Indonesia changed more between 1999 to 2016 than in the 30 years 
preceding this period (Barr et al. 2006; Moeliono, Wollenberg, and Limberg 2010). In addition, 
recent policy changes indicate a strong push for the conservation of primary and peatland forests. 
However, overlapping land use claims and layered authority of different ministries and sub-
national jurisdictions challenge the enforcement of national policy and promote local forms of 
tenure and planning. 
Recent forest concession moratoria exemplify policy layering that promotes forest 
protection. With the first moratoria (IP 10/2011), President Yudhoyono signaled to the 
 37 
international community that Indonesia would no longer sell the right to convert primary or peat 
forests. Since this initial passage, three additional moratoria have been passed that maintain the 
prohibition of new concessions in primary and peatland forest. Empirical research finds that, 
were a moratorium on new concessions in place from 2000 to 2010, forest cover loss would have 
been between 2.5 to 7.2% lower (Busch et al. 2014). Assuming consistent trends, this predicts a 
significant effect of moratoria for reducing forest cover loss, but the loss of forest cover on areas 
outside concessions remains high. Additionally, the concession moratoria are neither permanent 
nor are they able to fully prohibit the conversion of land cover in primary and peatland forests 
within primary and peatland forests, due to pre-existing concession claims, competing ministerial 
jurisdictions, and layered policy related to land use planning. 
Indonesian land use planning influences the protection and monitoring of forest territory 
because the authority to govern Indonesian land rests in ministerial jurisdiction and spatial 
planning. The Geospatial Law (4/2011) provides authority to the National Mapping Agency 
(Badan Informasi Geospasial—BIG) to unify information on natural resources and land across 
the country. Despite this mandate, spatial planning remains subject to horizontal and vertical 
layering. Horizontal layering refers to the overlap between different policies as well as 
ministerial land claims. Indonesian ministries, including the Ministries of Environment and 
Forestry, Agriculture, Energy and Mineral Resources, and Public Works and Housing have 
spatially determined authority. Historically, these ministries used their own maps to determine 
where they were authorized to regulate land use (Wibowo and Giessen 2015). The One Map 
Initiative is a national effort to harmonize different ministerial claims across Indonesia. Although 
this initiatives has improved transparency between many ministries, it has yet to produce a fully 
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harmonized map of ministerial territory (Mulyani and Jepson 2017) and is not charged with 
making the one map available to the public (Wibowo and Giessen 2015).  
Vertical overlap in territory demarcation and determination occurs through the process of 
land use planning. In Indonesia, spatial planning relies on the communication and approval 
between district, province, and national governments. Districts generate spatial plans which are 
approved both by province and national governments. These district-level plans determine where 
certain activities can take place, and they can reclassify land cover categories through legal 
means. However, spatial plans do not necessarily represent the tangle of local, corporate, and 
governmental claims to land. Recent scholarship demonstrates how smallholder and industrial 
agriculture demonstrate mutual encroachment (Gaveau et al. 2017), and how ministerial and 
district-level land-claims intersect with community territories to disenfranchise local 
communities (Myers, Intarini, Sirait, et al. 2017). Although Law 4/2011 gives BIG the authority 
to harmonize Indonesian land tenure, ministries are reluctant to compromise jurisdiction, districts 
and provinces retain some control over spatial planning, and local realities do not necessarily 
reflect government maps.  
Despite the challenges policy, ministerial, and administrative overlap pose, significant 
progress toward forest protection and harmonized land-management has occurred across 
Indonesia since its transition to democracy. Recent pledges have indicated that, in addition to 
reforming land-tenure and spatial planning, the national government is dedicated to recognizing 
local authority over community forests (Myers, Intarini, Thomas, et al. 2017; Santika et al. 
2017). Although the pledged redistribution of 12.7 MHa of state forest to local communities 
represents a drastic change in land-tenure, and may generate additional layering, it recognizes 
indigenous and local rights to land. Indonesia is not alone in its struggle to provide clear tenure 
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and protect forest areas; eleven other countries with emerging economies demonstrate similar 
patterns of overlapping land claims (De et al. 2013). As Indonesia enters its third decade of 
democracy, forest protection and land use planning are positioned to remain important topics. 
Regulating the flow of forest products 
 
 Greater attention to forest protection and the structure of forest-related organizations has 
also influenced how forest products are regulated. Specifically, Indonesian forestry governance 
shifted to provincial oversight of forest management units and implemented a new system of 
internationally recognized timber legality verification (Sistem Verifikasi Legalitas Kayu—
SVLK). Both developments reflect change in forest-related policy and were implemented 
through layering. 
 Although forest management units have long been part of Indonesian forest governance, 
they have recently risen to prominence as the key bureaucratic technology for implementing 
regulation and monitoring on behalf of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry and province 
administrations. The ability to issue concessions on state forest land and monitor timber 
production was, in the early 2000s, the right of district administrations. Over time, this authority 
has shifted, and is now held by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry and province 
governments. A series of laws, issued between 2003 and 2016, ushered in these changes, which 
reflect a relative recentralization of state authority over forest resources (Sahide and Giessen, 
2015; Sahide et al., 2016). Although the 1999 to 2004 period included a large amount of policy 
layering, resulting in heightened forest cover change from district-level decentralization (Burgess 
and Olken 2012), more recent administrative changes directly amended previous laws. However, 
this displacement remains partial. Implementing Law 23/2014, depends upon older fiscal balance 
laws (32/2004 and 28/2009). Thus, district, province, and national government administration 
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have been charged with implementing forest regulation and monitoring through Law 23/2014 but 
must share tax and non-tax revenues as determined by outdated fiscal balance laws and 
procedures. During this same period, district-level forestry offices have either been closed or 
integrated with new offices for forest management units, without clear instructions on how to 
complete this transition (Sahide et al., 2016).  
 Timber legality verification demonstrates how, over time, policy layering can transition 
to displacement. Initiated by a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between Indonesia and 
the European Union in 2010, Indonesia implemented mandatory third-party legality verification 
for all timber and timber products (Lesniewska and McDermott 2014). Intended to reduce illegal 
logging, and assist the government ministries and administrations capture full value of timber 
and timber products (Maryudi 2016), the legality verification system mandates third party 
auditing for timber production. International funding for timber legality verification has 
increased through different international initiatives, including the European Commission 
Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development and the UK Department for 
International Development (European Union 2017; Sahide and Giessen 2015). Early in Period 3 
(2011-2016), there was significant confusion with regard to what types of enterprises needed to 
be certified, by whom, and by when (Lesniewska and McDermott 2014; Obidzinski et al. 2014). 
Significant confusion and barriers still exist for small and medium sized enterprises, as well as 
for timber that comes from private or community forests (Nurrochmat et al., 2014; Erbaugh, 
Nurrochmat and Purnomo, 2017). However, the EU FLEGT Facility reports that by 2016, 100% 
of natural and plantation concessions were certified legal (European Union 2017) and the 
majority of Indonesian timber for export is certified legal. Although certified legal timber 
represents a specific “commoditization of legality,” and does not necessarily address issues of 
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land use and planning, indigenous/local peoples’ rights, or sustainable forestry (Setyowati and 
McDermott 2017), it does represent the integration of third party auditing and transparency in 
governance, important qualities of good forest governance (Cashore et al. 2007; Lesniewska and 
McDermott 2014). It further demonstrates how, over time, layered policies can lead to 
displacement and clearer implementation guidelines. 
The limits of institutional reform 
 
 In many ways, layering national forest-related policy is an optimal solution for national 
politicians. Passing an increasing amount of policy focused on forest protection and monitoring 
signals a willingness of the Indonesian state to modernize in accordance with the wishes of the 
IFR (Andrews 2013). Layering new forest-related policy on top of older policy, in contrast to 
displacing older policy, maintains space for jurisdictions, sub-national administrations, and 
corporations to continue current extractive activities and anonymizes illegal or extra-legal land 
cover change (Gaveau et al. 2017).  
Indonesian political actors often rely upon extractive industries (Berenschot 2018). 
Ambitious economic growth targets set by the president, high campaign costs, and economies 
dominated by specific agricultural commodities connect sub-national political actors and land 
cover change (McCarthy 2004; McCarthy and Cramb 2016). There is empirical evidence that, 
between 2000 and 2007, Indonesian forest cover loss associated with concession rights increased 
during election years (Burgess and Olken 2012). National policy layering thus balances 
international demands for sustainable forest management and improved protection and 
monitoring with maintain a status quo where political power and land use are intertwined.  
New policy is not sufficient to realize institutional change. Increasing levels of forest 
cover loss in Indonesia occurred as national policy shifted to promoted forest protection and 
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monitoring. Although it may be necessary for institutional change, new policy creation should 
not be a goal in itself (Andrews 2013). Rather, policy coupled with transparent and efficient 
systems to for implementation and regulation are necessary to realize changes in Indonesian 
forest outcomes. Future research would do well to examine the relationship between policy 
layering, political power, and Indonesian land cover change. 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
The proportion of total forest policies to all national policy demonstrates a significant 
increase over time. From 1999 to 2016, we identified 269 national, forest-related policies. 
Among them, the amount of content that focused primarily on increasing forest protection and 
monitoring/ecosystem service and biodiversity conservation, determine financial policies for 
forest-related activities, and restructure forest-related organizations (24%) also demonstrated 
significant increases over time. These changes in policy content occurred alongside new 
international rules that restrict illegal timber, international norms that promote climate pledges 
and agreements to reduce carbon emissions, as well as international market incentives that 
provide conditional aid for REDD+ activities (Angelsen 2017) and sustainable forest 
management (Bernstein and Cashore 2012). Thus, this research supports the conclusion that 
national forest-related policy in Indonesia demonstrates a classic paradigm shift, whereby 
exogenous influences have promoted a relatively rapid change in policy content. Although 
national policy demonstrates a classic paradigm shift toward the protection and management of 
Indonesian forest areas, we find that policy changes have not occurred alongside a significant 
increase in policy amendments. Thus, as new policies are passed, older policies are not 
necessarily amended or repealed. This process of policy change, referred to as layering 
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(Mahoney and Thelen 2010),  generates ambiguity in regulation and enforcement. Policy 
layering has impacts for the regulation of forest territory and the flow of forest products. 
Current developments in Indonesian forest governance illustrate how an increase in 
forest-related policy focused on protection and monitoring and consistent forest cover loss can 
co-exist. Land use and planning in Indonesia are subject to significant jurisdictional turf wars. 
Overlapping claims between ministries and local actors exist across the archipelago. Although 
Law 4/2011 provides the legal framework for resolving these overlaps, it neither guides the 
process to integrate different ministerial jurisdictions, nor does it help resolve conflict between 
different national, provincial, and district land agencies that are key in issuing and holding land 
rights (Harahap, Silveira, and Khatiwada 2017). Further, different administrative levels can 
change land use plans. Thus, with unclear ministerial tenure and changing land use plans, the 
implementation and enforcement of new policy that supports forest protection and monitoring 
remains difficult. Additionally, policy layering affects the regulation of forest products. 
Empowering forest management units and timber legality verification have recentralized forest 
governance in the name of transparency and legitimacy. These same policies fail to directly 
modify previous systems of regulation and accountability. However, timber legality verification 
provides an example of how layering can lead to displacement. Since 2010, timber legality 
verification has become increasingly formalized, covering all natural and plantation concession 
areas, and a rising number of small and medium enterprises (European Union 2017). This, 
perhaps, provides insight into the functionality of layered policy: it provides an initial step that, 
over time, generates changes in forest governance. 
The passage of forest-related policy has impacts beyond its operationalization. By 
signaling a willingness to modernize through new policy, the Indonesian state continues to 
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represent itself as modern, open to reform, and willing to engage international actors and foreign 
states (Andrews 2018). A growing literature identifies the way in which national and sub-
national governments and actors in Indonesia pursue multiple agendas through international 
funding for forest protection and monitoring. The Ministry of Environment and Forestry seeks to 
gain power and authority both through forest protection and through forest harvest (A. Wibowo 
and Giessen 2015); local bureaucracies are able to extend their authority through the promotion 
of forest management units (Sahide, Maryudi, et al. 2016); and companies that conduct third 
party audits benefit from mandating independent legality verification of timber products 
(Setyowati and McDermott 2017). Meanwhile, converting forest areas to plantations, intensive 
agriculture, or urban development curries political favor with the communities and corporations 
that benefit from infrastructure and development projects and it helps Indonesia progress toward 
annual development goals. Neither nations, sub-national bureaucracies, nor local people are 
passive recipients of international conservation funding (Myers, Intarini, Sirait, et al. 2017; 
Singer 2009). The passage of more forest-related policy and more forest protection and 
monitoring content should not be considered goals in themselves. Rather, the passage of these 
policies must engender change within forestry and conservation sectors across Indonesia to 
promote the goals which they reflect.  
  
 45 
 
 
Chapter 3  
 
The impact of regulatory dispersal on Indonesian forest cover, 2000-2014 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Countries that contain some of the largest tracts of tropical forest experienced rapid 
decentralization over the past two decades. The creation of new local administrations often 
follows decentralization reforms, which seek to delegate political, economic, or administrative 
powers to lower levels of government. When new local administrations are created, regulation is 
dispersed across a greater number of units. Despite the prevalence of regulatory dispersal across 
the tropics, its effect on forest cover is often overlooked. We measure the effect of regulatory 
dispersal on forest cover in Indonesia from 2000 to 2014 using two-way fixed effect models and 
statistical matching. We find that dispersal of village and district regulation results in higher rates 
of forest cover loss in the period after regulatory dispersal begins. However, the effect of 
regulatory dispersal on Indonesian forest cover attenuates over time and depends on the 
administrative level of dispersal. Our findings highlight the importance of considering scale and 
timing of regulatory dispersal in future analyses of land change or natural resource management. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Conserving and sustainably managing tropical forests are two of the most cost effective 
methods for reducing global carbon emissions to mitigate climate change ( Houghton, 2005; 
Gullison et al., 2007). However, consistent tropical forest loss and fragmentation has continued 
over the past two decades (Brinck et al. 2017; Haddad et al. 2015; Hansen et al. 2013; Potapov et 
al. 2017b). Social-ecological scholarship on land cover change finds that community-based 
management, protected areas, moratoria, and formalized land ownership tend to reduce forest 
cover loss (Andam et al. 2008; Blackman et al. 2017; Chhatre and Agrawal 2009; Ferraro et al. 
2015; Ferraro and Hanauer 2014b; Gaveau, Epting, et al. 2009; Persha, Agrawal, and Chhatre 
2011; Wright et al. 2016), despite improved transportation networks, unclear and overlapping 
land rights, as well as increased demand for agricultural products that often combine to increase 
it (Cropper, Griffiths, and Mani 1999; Gaveau et al. 2017; Lambin, Geist, and Lambin 2002; 
Lambin and Meyfroidt 2011; Meyfroidt and Lambin 2009). Although these insights are crucial 
for understanding collectivism, management of the commons, incentives for sustainable 
common-pool resource use, and deforestation “drivers,” they do not address the widespread 
phenomenon of regulatory dispersal. 
Regulatory dispersal often occurs when states decentralize rights and responsibilities for 
natural resource management (Agrawal 2005). Countries that contain the world’s most 
biologically diverse and carbon rich forests, spanning sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and 
Latin America, have undergone extensive decentralization over the past two decades (Agrawal, 
Chhatre, and Hardin 2008; Manor 1999; Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson 2006).  Decentralization is 
often associated with a suite of benefits, including higher accountability between representatives 
and electors, greater transparency, improved service provision, and democratizing resource use 
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(Blair 2000; Faguet 2014; Larson and Soto 2008; Lund, Rutt, and Ribot 2018). However, 
empirical research demonstrates that, without appropriate safeguards and incentives, 
decentralization can promote outcomes often considered negative (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; 
Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq 2004; Bardhan 2002; Tacconi 2007). Some of these “perverse 
outcomes” include elite or political capture (Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq 2006; Wilfahrt 
2018), reduced financial disbursement and service provision (Adam and Eltayeb 2016), and 
unintented recentralization (Phelps, Webb, and Agrawal 2010; Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson 
2006). Following decentralization reforms, many countries experience rapid administrative 
proliferation.  
Administrative proliferation refers to the creation of new local governments. Devolving 
authority to local governments, as through decentralization reforms, increases their value to local 
elites and citizens. As value increases, demand for local governments increases as well 
(Grossman and Lewis 2014).  Despite the rapid proliferation of administrative units across much 
of the Global South (Dickovick 2011; Grossman and Lewis 2014; Malesky 2009; Pierskalla 
2016), social-ecological impact studies rarely consider how new administrative units affect 
resource outcomes. It is common practice to control for the administrative unit at a temporal 
baseline and overlook subsequent administrative changes through weighting of population and 
land-area, in order to compare land cover and/or socioeconomic indicators over time. However, 
changing local administrative boundaries represents a social process that disperses resource 
regulation across more units (Agrawal 2005) and alters formal or informal regulations that 
structure how people interact with one another to use natural resources (North 1990; Ostrom 
1990). 
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Regulatory dispersal is a process that occurs in time and over space. We distinguish three 
key elements for analyzing the role of regulatory dispersal on resource use and/or land cover 
change. 
1. Regulatory type. Rules, norms, and behaviors are generally categorized as formal 
and informal (e.g. Ostrom, 2005). We extend this categorization to identify formal 
and informal regulatory dispersal in relation to natural resource management. 
Regulatory dispersal that affects formal institutions occurs when units proliferate that 
have codified or otherwise formal rights to regulating natural resource use. 
Regulatory dispersal that affects informal institutions occurs when units proliferate 
that affect norms or behaviors of resource use, but do not have legal rights to resource 
use. Table 3.1 provides a typology of land cover change related to the types of 
regulatory dispersal. In studying regulatory dispersal and resource use, it is important 
to identify the scale of dispersed regulation, in addition to the formal or informal 
authority it claims.  
 
Table 3.1: Formal and informal mechanisms of land cover change 
  
In accordance with formal 
institutions (legal) 
In violation of formal institutions 
(illegall) 
In accordange with informal 
institutions (customary) 
Land converted by actors with 
use/control rights in accordance 
with local custom 
 
E.g., Legal and customary 
agricultural conversion 
Land covcerted by actors without 
use/control rights in accordance 
with local ustom 
 
E.g. Intentional forebearance of 
formal land regulations 
In violation of informal 
institutions (uncustomary) 
Land converted by those with use 
or control rights in violation of 
local customs 
 
E.g., Rapid territorialization or 
exclusion and conversion 
Land converted by actors without 
use/control rights in violation of 
local custom. 
 
E.g., Ungovernable spaces; 
periods of limited regulation 
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2. Sequence and time. The moment when regulatory dispersal occurs may affect 
resource outcomes, and the resource outcomes that result may change over time. 
Policy, national stability, and international influence may vary over time to influence 
local governments. Understanding regulatory dispersal as an institutional transition 
that may be influenced by the sequence of preceding institutional changes is crucial 
for assessing outcomes (Pierson 2000). Further, outcomes from regulatory dispersal 
may change over time. These longitudinal effects may be the result of outside 
exogenous changes, or it may result from endogenous changes within the 
administrative unit.  During the transition from one administration to another, the 
formal and informal institutions that previously guided resource use are in flux, the 
administration that regulates or promotes formal or informal institutions is changing, 
or both institutions and the administration are in transition. 
3. Spatial variation. Regulatory dispersal is a process that occurs over time and space. 
It may result in the increase of regulated territory or through the densification of 
regulatory units within the same area. Although historical examples of regulatory 
dispersal that expands administrative control are many, contemporary trends in 
regulatory dispersal are connected to the process of densification. For example, across 
the Global South an increasing number of administrative units are proliferating to 
serve and regulate the same area (Grossman and Lewis 2014).  
Using administrative proliferation as the signal, this research examines regulatory dispersal on 
Indonesian forest cover. 
Indonesia is an ideal country in which to study the effect of regulatory dispersal on forest 
cover change. In the beginning of the 21st century, Indonesia transitioned from the reformasi era 
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that marked the end of authoritarian rule, to the world’s third largest democracy. Key to this 
process was the proliferation of new provinces, districts, and villages (SI: Background). For 
example, as Indonesia democratized and decentralized between 2000 and 2014, the number of 
district-level administrations increased by 62% and the number of villages increased by 21% 
(Figure 3.1). During this same period, Indonesia also experienced one of the greatest changes in 
contemporary forest cover change (Hansen et al. 2013; Margono et al. 2014). Thus, studying the 
relationship between regulatory dispersal and Indonesian forest cover change can provide insight 
into one of the most significant changes in contemporary and contribute to better understanding 
how institutional transitions impact land cover change. 
To test and measure the effect of regulatory dispersal on natural resource use, we 
construct an original dataset with information on land cover, geophysical attributes, 
 
Figure 3.1: Administrative unit (x-axis) by count frequency (y-axis) by year (legend) (BPS 2006, 2011, 2016) 
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socioeconomic village indicators, and administrative changes in Indonesia from 2000 to 2014. 
This dataset allows us to test three hypotheses related to how timing, regulatory type, and 
sequencing of regulatory dispersal affect forest cover change in Indonesia from 2000 to 2014. 
First, we hypothesize that regulatory dispersal will affect forest cover change in the first 
period following dispersal. If regulatory dispersal affects forest cover change, it will do so either 
during the period in which dispersal is occurring, in the periods following dispersal, or both. 
Since periods following dispersal represent moments when actors have adjusted and are reacting 
to new formal and informal types of regulation, we hypothesize that regulatory dispersal will 
demonstrate a temporal lag effect. That is, the effect of regulatory dispersal on forest cover 
change will be most pronounced in the period following dispersal, rather than the same period of 
dispersal or the period before (reverse causation).  
Second, we hypothesize that the affect of regulatory dispersal on forest cover change will 
attenuate over time. The formalization if Indonesian forest regulation and management has 
increased since its transition to democracy in 1998 (Obidzinski and Kusters 2015). This 
formalization has occurred primarily through a series of reforms that increased the 
recentralization of forest management through policy that gave increasing authority over forest 
lands to ministries and provinces, and reduced the authority of district administrations (Barr et al. 
2006; Sahide, Maryudi, et al. 2016). Although the marginal increase of administrative units over 
time is positive, this trend is in line with the recentralization of power in Indonesia and in other 
national contexts (Grossman, Pierskalla, and Dean 2017; Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson 2006; 
Sahide, Supratman, et al. 2016). Thus, we hypothesize that the effect of regulatory dispersal on 
forest cover change attenuates over time, responding to the increased formalization and 
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recentralization of forest management. We test this hypothesis using a series of matching 
analyses. 
Third, we hypothesize that the effect of regulatory dispersal will vary across regulatory 
type. Given the difference in power and authority over forest resources held by different levels of 
government, we anticipate the dispersal of units with formal authority will differ in its effect on 
forest cover than the dispersal of units without formal authority over forest areas. To examine 
differences in regulatory dispersal type, we focus on village- and district-level dispersal. Village 
administrations represent informal regulatory dispersal since they have no formal authority to 
manage forest areas; district administrations represent formal regulatoy dispersal, since between 
1999 and 2014 they were the primary administrative level through which forest management 
decisions were made (2000-2003) or implemented (2004-2014). We test the hypothesis by 
examining the affect of village- and district-level regulatory dispersal separately in the fixed-
effect models and matching analyses, as well as examining how land cover changes in villages 
affected by village-level regulatory dispersal, village- and district-level dispersal, and district-
level dispersal.  
3.2 Materials and Methods: 
 
3.2.1 Data 
 
To conduct our analysis, we combined datasets containing socioeconomic, boundary, land cover, 
and physical data. We obtained data on village-level, socioeconomic indicators as well as 
jurisdictional boundaries from the Central Statistics Agency of Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik - 
BPS). Village-level indicators are measured every three years through the Indonesian Village 
Census (PODES), which Village Heads complete with direction and oversight from BPS 
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enumerators3 (BPS 2001, 2003, 2006b, 2008, 2011b, 2015c). Village, sub-district, district, and 
province boundaries are updated twice a year (BPS 2015b). We obtained land cover data from 
the Indonesian Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK, 2016). Before 2010, the Ministry 
of Environment and Forestry generated land cover data using supervised classification of 
Landsat Satellite Imagery; it now generates land cover data annually (KLHK - Kementerian 
Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan 2015). From the 22 land cover categories specified by KLHK, 
we combined “primary forest” and “secondary forest” to assess forest cover change. This land 
cover combination has demonstrated 90.2% agreement of forest cover identification (Kappa=0.8) 
with other land cover products generated from Landsat Imagery (Margono et al. 2014). 
 We obtained data on Indonesian road networks from the GROADS dataset  and the 
Indonesian Geographic Information Agency (BIG) for the years 2000 and 2015, respectively 
(CIESIN, 2013; Badan Informasi Geospasial, 2014), and assumed a linear relationship to 
estimate distance to road values between 2000 and 2014. We obtained data on slope and 
elevation from the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM), 90m resolution dataset (Jarvis, 
Reuter, and Nelson, 2008) and precipitation data from the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission 
(TRMM). Precipitation data is the spatial average (mm/day) for two years before and the year of 
each time point (Huffman et al. 2007). Additional information on land cover and biophysical 
variables is in Appendix A. 
Combining boundary, Village Census, and land cover data resulted in the identification of 
51,800 villages with complete data in 2000, 57,824 in 2003, 58,358 in 2006, 67,518 in 2008, and 
74,790 in 2011. These totals are similar to other studies that combined border and Village 
Census data (Martinez-bravo 2013) as well as studies that have combined border, Village 
                                                     
3 Oversight of Village Census completion began in 2008. Before 2008, Village Heads completed the Village Census 
questionnaire independently. 
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Census, and land cover data (Ferraro et al. 2013, 2015; Miteva, Loucks, and Pattanayak 2015). 
Villages with incomplete data demonstrated no distributional differences from villages with 
complete data. Further, statistical matching, which utilizes a set of cross-sectional analyses 
anchored to a “moving baseline” incorporates improvements in connecting border and Village 
Census datasets and provides a robustness check against our panel models, which are anchored 
to a year 2000 baseline. 
3.2.2 Methods 
 
To estimate the effect of regulatory dispersal on forest cover, we used a combination of forest 
cover measurements and analytical approaches. We tested the effect of regulatory dispersal on 
forest area change using two-way fixed effect models. We also assessed the difference in forest 
change between villages that experienced regulatory dispersal (“dispersed villages”) and villages 
that did not (“undispersed villages”) using statistical matching analyses. Together, these 
analytical techniques provide a robust method for measuring the effect of regulatory dispersal on 
forest cover change over time and across administrative scales.  
We examined forest cover using two outcome variables. First, we examined the effect of 
regulatory dispersal on village-level forest area. To normalize variable distribution and model 
real zeros (i.e. villages without forest area), we transformed the number of forested hectares per 
village using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) function (Burbidge, Magee, and Robb 1988).  
The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is defined as: 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 = ln⁡(𝑦𝑖𝑡 + (𝑦𝑖𝑡
2 + 1)0.5     [Equation 3.1] 
Where i indexes a village, t indexes a period of time, and y is the number of forest hectares (ha). 
Second, we examined the effect of regulatory dispersal on the compounded annual rate 
(CAR) of forest cover change. We calculate the CAR of forest cover change as: 
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?̅?𝑖𝑡 =
𝐴𝑖2−⁡𝐴𝑖1
𝑇2−⁡𝑇1
⁡
2
𝐴𝑖1+⁡𝐴𝑖2
      [Equation 3.2] 
Where i indexes an indexes a village, t indexes a period of time, 1 and 2 index the beginning and 
ending of the period, A is the forested area (ha) at year T (Puyravaud 2003). We refer to these 
variables together as “forest cover,” and identify them individually as “forest area” and “rate of 
forest change.” 
To examine the effect of regulatory dispersal on forest cover, we used two-way fixed 
effect models. Two-way fixed effect models control for time effects and endogenous individual 
effects at the village-level (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Further, these models provide the ability 
to analyze the relationship between regulatory dispersal variables and forest area change during 
different periods of regulatory dispersal and forest cover change (Finkel 1995). In our research, 
these models take the form: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝐷𝑖𝑡−𝑧𝛽1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑧𝛽2 + ε𝑖𝑡  [Equation 3.3] 
Where i indexes the village, t indexes year, z indexes time lags/leads, Y is the forest change 
variable, 𝛾 are village fixed effects, 𝛿 are time fixed-effects, D is a vector of regulatory dispersal 
dummy variables, X is a vector of time varying covariates, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are coefficient estimates, 
and ε is the error term. Due to data constraints, and in order to control for different levels of 
regulatory dispersal, we imposed a hierarchical assumption on regulatory dispersal. We coded 
villages that experienced two or more administrative changes in one period as only having the 
highest-level of administrative change. For example, a village that experienced a sub-district 
change and a village change in Period 1 (2000 to 2003) is coded as having sub-district change 
from 2000 to 2003. We imposed this assumption because higher-level changes can affect the 
information that identifies lower-level changes. Thus, coding for multiple administrative changes 
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within one period could lead to the false identification of lower-level regulatory dispersal. 
However, identifying a lower-level administrative change cannot falsely identify a higher-level 
change. The results we provide control for the effect of higher-level changes, but they do not 
lend insight into the interaction between multiple levels of regulatory dispersal. We check the 
robustness of this assumption by examining patterns in land cover change in differently 
dispersed villages (see “3.2.3 Robustness checks”). 
In addition to regulatory dispersal variables, we regressed forest cover change over a set 
of covariates common to analyses of deforestation. Following previous studies on forest cover 
change (Brandt et al. 2014; Ferraro et al. 2015; Honey-Rosés, Baylis, and Ramírez 2011; C. 
Nolte et al. 2013) and administrative proliferation (Grossman and Lewis 2014; Grossman, 
Pierskalla, and Dean 2017; Pierskalla 2016), we controlled for a combination of static and time-
variant covariates. We controlled for static variables that influence forest cover change (i.e., 
elevation and slope) through village-level fixed effects. Variables that vary over time within 
village units, and are associated with forest cover change, include baseline forest cover, paddy 
agriculture, field agriculture, mixed field and tree agriculture, timber plantations, agricultural 
plantations, settlement, protected area (i.e. national parks and strict conservation areas), as well 
as presence of village council, average Euclidean distance to nearest road, household population, 
and multidimensional village development (i.e. development and infrastructure). Appendix A 
includes further variable descriptions and Appendix B includes a discussion of the 
multidimensional village deprivation indicator (MDVDI) we used to control for 
multidimensional village development in this research. We combined insights from the two-way 
fixed effect models with statistical matching analyses to check and further investigate the 
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direction, magnitude, and significance of the effect of regulatory dispersal on forest cover 
change.  
Pre-processing data using statistical matching provides a non-parametric alternative for 
assessing the effect of regulatory dispersal on forest change. We paired each dispersed village 
with the most similar undispersed village/s, based on a set of covariates that influence forest 
cover change and regulatory dispersal. Matching dispersed and undispersed villages controls for 
selection biases from identified variables that influence which villages experience regulatory 
dispersal in addition to the rate of forest cover change (Morgan and Winship 2014), assuming no 
omitted variable bias (Woolderidge 2010). We match villages using the set of covariates within 
our fixed-effect models, including time-invariant covariates (elevation and area of village over 
12% slope), as well as the rate of forest cover change from the previous period. We include the 
lagged rate of forest cover change to ensure that forest cover change between dispersed and non-
dispersed villages does not vary significantly leading up to regulatory dispersal. We do not 
include average precipitation and province in our matching criteria because they demonstrate 
strong correlation with other covariates.  
To leverage our time-series data in a matching framework, we generate a total of 15 
matched datasets, matching groups of dispersed versus undispersed villages based on the period 
in which they proliferated, across subsequent time periods. For example, we matched villages 
that experienced regulatory dispersal in the 2000 to 2003 period with undispersed villages during 
this period and calculated the average difference in their rate of forest change. We then re-
matched this same group of villages with the most similar undispersed villages in 2003, to assess 
CAR of forest cover change over the 2003 to 2006 period. We repeated this procedure for each 
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subsequent period (in this example, 2006 to 2009, 2009 to 2011, and 2011 to 2014), and repeated 
it again for each period of regulatory dispersal.  
After matching, we ran a weighted least squares (WLS) regressions to calculate point 
estimates of the difference in annual forest cover loss between villages that experienced 
province, district, and village dispersal and those that did not. Using WLS on pre-matched data 
provides a “doubly robust” effect estimation for administrative proliferation by controlling for 
potential confounding variables within the matching pre-processing step and in the WLS 
regression (Ho et al. 2007). We calculate all effects with robust standard errors. 
To examine variation in regulatory dispersal type, we examine data on how land cover 
changed in villages during the first and second periods following regulatory dispersal. From 
2000 to 2014, less than 1% of Indonesia’s forest estate was managed by village administrations 
(Lee, Rianti, and Park 2017). Meanwhile, districts were the primary administrive level at which 
forest management occurred, first as determined by district administrations, and later as 
determined by the national government. Thus, we assess the percentage change in forest, 
agricultural plantations, timber plantations, field agriculture, mixed agriculture, and paddy 
agriculture across villages that experienced no regulatory dispersal, villages that experienced 
only village-level dispersal, villages that experienced village- and district-level dispersal, and 
villages that experienced only district-level dispersal. In our analyses and discussion, we thus 
focus on the effects of village and district dispersal.  
Examining village- and district-level dispersal provides several advantages in addition to 
providing information on how informal and formal regulatory dispersal varies in its effect on 
forest cover change. Village-level and district-level regulatory dispersal are common occurrences 
across Indonesia, unlike province-level change that occurs far less frequently (Figure 3.1), 
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rendering them more amenable to statistical analysis over time. Further, villages and districts are 
autonomous administrative units, unlike sub-districts, which districts manage. This means that 
the effect of regulatory dispersal in these units is more likely driven by political causes, rather 
than bureaucratic planning. Although we do not explicitly address results from province or sub-
district regulatory dispersal, our methods control for them, and our models summarize them. 
3.2.3 Robustness checks  
 
To determine the most appropriate model, we used a Lagrange Multiplier test to 
determine the need to control for villages and time periods, and a Hausman test to assess the 
suitability of a mixed model with random intercepts (Hausman, 1978; Gourieroux, Holly and 
Monfort, 1982). The results of these tests demonstrated the need to control for endogenous 
variation within the villages and time-periods. This directed our choice to use two-way fixed 
effect models (Woolderidge 2010). In order to assess the robustness of the two-way fixed effect 
model restults, we used the same set of covariates on alternate forest cover variables and 
transformations. In Appendix E, Table E.2 provides values for the log of village forest area plus 
0.01, and Table E.3 provides values for CAR of forest change per village. We assessed 
multicollinearity by examining correlations between variables and assessing variable inflation 
factors within pooled models for each variable and model type combination. We calculated all 
two-way fixed effect models using “xtreg” command in Stata, as well as in R with the plm 
package (Croissant and Millo 2008). 
We accounted for different theories of village-level autonomy by providing different 
clustered robust standard errors. Clustering robust standard errors at the village-level maintains 
the assumption that individual villages function as independent entities, and thus there is no need 
to correct for design or treatment issues within the models (Abadie et al. 2017). Clustering robust 
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standard errors at the district-level maintains that village-level variables should be interpreted as 
district-level clusters in order to correct for treatment issues and spatial correlation within land 
cover variables. For all models, we provide village- and district-level clustered robust standard 
errors.  
 To assess the robustness of our matching results, we re-matched our data using two 
alternative matching techniques, and we examine the balance of our 15 matching results across 
all covariates. The type and specification of matching procedures can significantly affect the 
resulting dataset (Stuart, 2010; King and Nielsen, 2016). We compared outcomes from one to 
many propensity score matching, one to one propensity score matching, and full matching 
(Appendix E: Robustness checks). In each, we dropped a village if a match was not found within 
0.25 standard deviations of the propensity score for selection into administrative change. For the 
one to many propensity score matching, we matched each dispersed village with non-dispersed 
villages according to the ratio of dispersed to non-dispersed villages within the dataset. For 
example, the period 2000 to 2003 contained approximately 10,000 “treatment” villages and 
50,000 “control” villages, so we matched each treatment village with the best five control 
matches, with replacement. Including multiple controls for each matched treatment provides 
additional assurance that matched groups better reflect qualities in the population and control for 
confounding variables (Stuart, 2010). We conducted statistical matching using the “Matchit” and 
“optmatch” packages in R, and ran weighted regressions to provide point estimates in base R. 
We provide information on the number of villages available for each match (SI: Results) as well 
as alternative matching approaches and covariate balance results in Appendix E.  
 We assess whether our “hierarchical assumption” of regulatory dispersal is tractable by 
examining the patterns of land cover change between village- and district-level dispersal. If 
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patterns of land cover change between villages that experienced village- and district-level 
dispersal demonstrate outcomes that strongly resemble either village-level only dispersal or 
district-level only dispersal, we assert that it is unlikely the assumption has effectively isolated 
village- and district-level dispersal. If there exists no distinction in land change patterns between 
villages that experienced the three types of dispersal, we assert that the analysis provides no 
additional information about the hierarchical assumption. And, if land change patterns in village- 
and district-level dispersal resemble a middle-ground between village-level only and district-
level only land change patterns, we assert it is more likely that our hierarchical assumption has 
effectively isolated different dispersal types that create different land cover patterns. Although 
this analysis represents a post-hoc test of robustness, the structure of our data is such that other 
robustness checks are not possible. 
3.3 Results 
 
From 2000 to 2014, we estimate that 11.4% of the primary and secondary terrestrial 
forest in Indonesia was deforested (KLHK, 2016b). This sum resembles forest-loss findings from 
others studies that look at total loss of natural and plantation tree cover loss (Hansen et al., 2013) 
and primary forest-loss (Margono et al. 2014). Aggregating forest loss within villages that did 
and did not experience any administrative change between 2000 and 2014 demonstrates that the 
majority of Indonesian forest cover loss occurred in villages that experienced some form of 
regulatory dispersal. Further, the annual rate of forest cover change in dispersed villages 
increases over time as compared to undispersed villages (Figure 3.2). Although these trends 
indicate that regulatory dispersal may increase forest cover loss, it does not control for important 
confounding variables that may account for a village’s propensity to undergo regulatory dispersal 
as well as forest cover change. To control for these variables and examine the effect of 
 62 
regulatory dispersal on forest cover over time, we model forest area over time and use matching 
analysis to test differences in dispersed and undispersed villages’ compounded annual rate 
(CAR) of forest cover change. 
3.3.1 Fixed effect model analysis 
 
After controlling for individual-level variation, variation over time, and time-variant land 
cover and socioeconomic variables, we find that regulatory dispersal significantly reduces forest 
cover (SI Results: Table 3.3).   Figure 3.3 illustrates the effect of village- and district-level 
dispersal over time, with standard errors clustered at the village-level. Examining the effect of 
future regulatory dispersal on forest area predicts more forest cover in villages that experienced 
village-level dispersal (𝛽 = 0.014, SE = 0.01) and district-level dispersal (𝛽 = 0.011, SE = 0.004). 
However, examining the effect of regulatory dispersal on forest cover in the first period after 
 
Figure 3.2 Period of analysis (x-axis) by average km2 of forest cover loss per year (y-axis). Colors represent different average 
estimates for villages that did not experience any regulatory dispersal (blue color, dotted trend line) and villages that did 
experience regulatory dispersal (red color, solid trend line) 
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dispersal occurred demonstrates a negative effect on forest cover in villages that experienced 
village-level dispersal ( =- 0.021, SE = 0.009) and district-level dispersal (𝛽 = -0.014, SE = 
0.004). These findings are robust to a logged transformation of forest area and they mirror results 
from two-way fixed effect models of CAR of forest change (Appendix E: Robustness checks).  
Thus, we support our hypothesis that regulatory dispersal affects forest cover change in the first 
subsequent period. 
Subsetting the data to examine only villages that experienced dispersal shows that 
baseline forest cover, agricultural area, average distance to roads, presence of village council, 
and MDVDI significantly predict forest cover change (SI Results: Table 3.4). Increasing the 
amount of agriculture across all agricultural variables predicts greater declines in forest cover in 
the first period following dispersal for villages that experienced regulatory dispersal. Increasing 
the amount of development deprivations (MDVDI) and the average distance to roads reduced the  
 
Figure 3.3: Coefficient estimates of forest cover area transformed by the inverse hyperbolic sine function (x-axis) by time 
effect of village-level dispersal (Panel A) and district-level dispersal (Panel B). "Same Period" estimates the effect of 
regulatory dispersal on forest cover area in the same time period. “Lead x1” estimates the effect of regulatory dispersal on 
forest cover area in the first period before the dispersal occurs (i.e. reverse causation). “Lag x1” estimates the effect of 
regulatory dispersal on forest cover area in the first period following dispersal. All coefficients are estimated from two-way 
fixed effect first difference models that control for relevant covariates with cluster robust standard errors at the village-level. 
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overall amount of forest cover loss. Statistical matching provides a robustness check of these 
findings, and it provides additional information on the time-trends of regulatory dispersal.  
 3.3.2 Matching analysis 
 
Matching results confirm consistent and significant negative effects of village-level 
changes on CAR of forest change over time. One-to-many propensity score matching provided 
the best balance, compared to one-to-one and full matching. Matching analysis shows that, over 
time, the effects from village- and district-level dispersal decreases in magnitude and becomes 
less significant (Figure 3.4). This finding supports our second hypothesis, that the effect of 
regulatory dispersal on forest cover change in Indonesia attenuates over time. 
 In contrast to fixed effect models, matching analysis demonstrates a varied effect of 
district-level regulatory dispersal on village-level CAR of forest change. Although certain 
 
Figure 3.4: Matched differences in compounded annual rate of forest cover loss between villages with village-level regulatory 
dispersal (Panel A) and district-level regulatory dispersal (Panel B). Shading represents nonsignificant differences (p>0.05). 
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periods of district-level dispersal demonstrate negative effects on annual forest cover change, 
most of these effects are positive or non-significant. This is especially true in the periods after 
2008. This supports our third hypothesis that different types of regulatory dispersal demonstrate 
different effects on forest cover.  Matching analysis supports the overall negative effect of 
regulatory dispersal on forest cover from the fixed effect models during the period of 2000-2003, 
and 2006-2008. Findings from matching analyses are robust to alternative matching techniques 
(Appendix E: Robustness checks). In the following section we discuss how the consistently 
negative effect of village-level dispersal and the varied effect of district-level dispersal on forest 
cover change contribute to understanding the type, timing, and variation of regulatory dispersal. 
3.3.3 Land cover change 
 
Villages that experienced only village or only district dispersal demonstrate different land 
cover change patterns, and villages that experienced both village- and district-level dispersal 
depict a combination of these results (Figure 3.5). Villages that experienced only district-level 
dispersal show an increase in field agriculture cover (3.5%) and a decrease in mixed agriculture 
cover (-1%) over the first two periods (5 to 6 years) after regulatory dispersal. Villages that 
experienced only village-level dispersal see a smaller gain in field agriculture (0.8%) as well as a 
gain in mixed agriculture (0.6%). Villages that underwent village-level and and district-level 
dispersal represent a middleground, with an increase in field agriculture (1.8%) and mixed 
agricultural (0.2%). These findings further support our third hypothesis, that regulatory type 
demonstrates a varied effect on forest cover change. These findings also provide reason to 
believe that our hierarchical assumption is likely to have identified different dispersal types that 
generate different outcomes for land cover change. 
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Figure 3.5: Land cover type (x-axis) by mean area change within village (y-axis). Panels refer to villages without regulatory 
dispersal (A), villages with only village-level dispersal (B), villages with only district-level dispersal (C), and villages with 
district-level and village-level dispersal (D). 
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3.4 Discussion 
 
Between 2000 and 2014, regulatory dispersal across Indonesia increased forest cover 
loss. However, our analyses demonstrate that the impact of regulatory dispersal on forest cover 
change depends upon the time, sequencing, and type of regulatory dispersal. Regardless of type, 
between 2000 and 2014 Indonesian regulatory dispersal generates forest cover loss in the period 
immediately following dispersal (two to three years), an effect which attenuates over time. 
However, the effect of regulatory dispersal on forest cover change is markedly different between 
village-level and district-level dispersal. Village-level regulatory dispersal demonstrates a 
consistently negative effect on forest area and rate of forest change, while district-level dispersal 
does not. After discussing results for village-level dispersal and district-level dispersal 
individually, we consider the difference in these effects through the different forest use rights 
village and district administrations hold. 
3.4.1 Village-level regulatory dispersal 
 
Villages are legally defined as autonomous communities that maintain the right to raise 
funds and, in certain circumstances, reject higher-level policy (Antlöv 2003). A village head, 
often democratically elected (within this study period), and a village council, either appointed by 
consensus of village members (2004-2014), or elected (2000-2004 and 2014-present) comprise 
village government (Antlöv, Wetterberg, and Dharmawan 2016). Although a small number of 
villages have rights to community, village, or adat forests, such community-based forests are 
roughly 1% of the national forest estate (Lee, Rianti, and Park 2017). Dispersing regulation at the 
village-level thus imparts no formal changes of forest use, at the population level. However, we 
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find a significant and negative effect of village-level regulatory dispersal and forest cover 
immediately after a village-level change.  
Village-level regulatory dispersal shows a consistent negative effect on forest cover in the 
fixed-effect and matching analyses. Matching analysis finds that from 2000 to 2011, villages that 
experienced village-level dispersal experienced at least one period with significantly great CAR 
of forest loss. Fixed effect analysis demonstrates that the period after village-level regulatory 
dispersal contains the highest level of forest cover change with the smallest standard error. The 
lack of formal rights village administrations hold over forest management in Indonesia, and the 
consistently negative effect of village dispersal on forest cover in the periods following dispersal 
point to an informal mechanism of land conversion. 
3.4.2 District-level regulatory dispersal 
 
 Districts are sub-national units that, over the study period, had changing authority over 
the sale and management of forest land. When the district-level regulatory dispersal occurs 
changes its effect on forest cover. We estimate 8,000 villages experienced district-level dispersal 
between 2000 and 2003, compared with half that many between 2003 to 2006 and 2006 to 2009. 
Even fewer villages experienced district-level dispersal from 2009 to 2014 (SI Results: Table 
3.5). This contributes to the attenuated significance of district-level regulatory dispersal, but it 
does not explain the variation in the magnitude and sign of the difference district-level regulatory 
dispersal displays over time. We attribute this variation to policy-level changes that shifted 
administrative authority over forest resources. 
At the turn of the 21st century, new districts formed at an accelerated rate, and district 
leaders were able to issue forest concessions as a way to increase district revenues and personal 
income (Barr et al. 2006). The fixed effect models we use, as well as previous findings on 
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district-level changes and their effects on forest cover, are likely largely determined by these 
early periods of district dispersal (Barr et al. 2006; Burgess et al. 2012). Villages that 
experienced district-level dispersal between 2003 and 2006, however, demonstrate different 
trends in forest cover. A 2002 Government Regulation revoked the right for district leaders to 
issue forest use concessions, and in 2004 new Local Government and Fiscal Balance laws (UU 
32/2004 and 33/2004) recentralized forest use and concession rights. Further, a moratorium on 
district-level splits from 2004 to 2006, the 2008 Financial Crisis, and a significant restructuring 
of forest management and forest management units over the same period, help interpret district-
level changes after 2003 and the effect of district-level change on forest cover (Nurfatriani et al. 
2015). Given the moratoria on district splits and the revocation of concessionary rights, district 
leaders were not able to raise revenue from timber as in previous periods, and they likely began 
to focus on alternative sources of district revenue. 
In contrast to villages that experienced district-level dispersal in the 2003-2006 period, 
villages that experienced district-level dispersal between 2006 and 2009, after the moratoria on 
district splits ended, liquidated substantial forest assets compared to similar villages that did not 
experience regulatory dispersal. This trend echoes the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry’s 2007 
initiative to revitalize the forestry sector, and may have been exacerbated by declining export 
prices for timber and timber products, forcing districts to liquidate more forest cover to raise the 
same amount of revenue (Blaser et al. 2011; Masiero, Pettenella, and Cerutti 2015). The 2006-
2009 period marks the end of strong negative effects on forest cover change from district-level 
changes. Post-2009 policy trends indicate increasing formalization of Indonesian timber 
production propelled by mandatory timber legality verification (Erbaugh, Nurrochmat, and 
Purnomo 2017; Lesniewska and McDermott 2014), as series of moratoria that prohibit new 
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concessions in primary and peatland forests (Busch et al. 2014), and continued emphasis of 
regulation within forest management units (Sahide, Maryudi, et al. 2016). Villages that 
experienced district-level transitions from 2009 to 2014 show a positive or non-significant effect 
of administrative change on annual forest cover change.  
 3.4.3 Institutional formality, regulatory dispersal, and forest change 
 
The effects of village- and district-level regulatory dispersal are similar in aggregate, but 
they differ in the importance of sequencing and land change patterns. This contrast resembles the 
way in which formal powers over forest management have, or have not, changed within these 
different levels of administration. From 2000 to 2014, less than 1% of the Indonesian forest 
estate was managed at the village-level (Lee, Rianti, and Park 2017). Over the same time period, 
district administrations first enjoyed transfer rights over forest areas, followed by the 
responsibility to design and execute forest management plans and the ability to receive revenue 
from forest products (Nurfatriani et al. 2015).  This variation in the relationship between the 
sequence of policy change and the effect of regulatory dispersal on forest cover change indicates 
that village-level dispersal is likely to have occurred in contrast to formal rules, and district-level 
dispersal is likely to have occurred in accordance with formal rules (Table 3.1). This conclusion 
is further supported by the patterns of land cover change that define village- and district-level 
dispersal. 
Village-level dispersal is characterized by the greatest comparative increase in mixed 
agriculture, and district-level dispersal by field agriculture. Mixed agriculture is representative of 
agricultural mosaics that include trees and field crops (Ministry of Environment and Forestry 
2018), which are more characteristic of smallholder agriculture (Cohn et al. 2017; Perfecto and 
Vandermeer 2010). Thus, for villages that underwent village-level dispersal, smaller-scale and 
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“bottom-up” land cover change is more likely, with local actors converting land for smallholder 
agriculture or economic advantage. In contrast, large increases in field agriculture require a 
greater amount of time, money, and/or labor. These larger investments are more characteristic of 
“top-down” land cover change, when government and corporate actors drive the conversion of 
forest area to intensive agriculture in line with formal institutions (White et al. 2012). Thus, 
taken together village-level dispersal seems to occur through decentralized clearing in contrast 
with formal rules, and district-level dispersal in accordance with formal rules through actors or 
organizations capable of large investments.  
Regulatory dispersal affects forest cover change, and its relationship with formal 
institutions shapes the land change patterns through which the effect is generated. Assuming only 
formal rules matter, one could dismiss village-level regulatory dispersal when considering forest 
cover change. Our analyses show, however, that village-level regulatory dispersal is more 
consistent and significant than district-level dispersal. Though it is beyond the scope of this 
study, future research would do well to understand how the type of regulatory dispersal and land 
cover change interacts with customary institutions. For example, is forest cover loss that occurs 
following village-level dispersal a result of regulatory forebearance (Holland 2016), or does it 
occur against the wishes of village leaders as a result of insufficient training or capacity 
(Grossman and Lewis 2014)? Case-specific and field-based research that augments this research 
is necessary to confirm the connections between forest cover loss, land cover change, and 
institutional mechanisms within Indonesian villages.  
3.5 Conclusion 
 
Regulatory dispersal generates change in Indonesian forests. However, the timing and 
nature of these effects varies. As Indonesia transitioned to become the third largest democracy in 
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the world, the state pursued a strategy of alternating the rights districts and provinces had to 
state-managed forest areas (Kimura 2013). Additionally, international agencies and foreign  
governments began making significant financial contributions and loans for reduced 
deforestation and forest degradation, support for mandatory timber legality verification, and 
improved governance of forest management units (Busch et al., 2011, 2014; Nurrochmat et al., 
2014; Luttrell et al., 2014; Sahide, Maryudi, et al., 2016). As the governance of Indonesia’s 
forests increased in formalization, the impact of regulatory dispersal at the district-level has 
become positive or non-significant; however, the effect of regulatory dispersal at the village-
level remains consistent.  
The difference in formal and informal rights to forest management best explains 
differences in the effect of village- and district-level regulatory dispersal on forest change. 
Between 2000 and 2014, the vast majority of Indonesian villages had no formal right to manage 
forest areas. The consistent and negative effect of village-level regulatory dispersal on forest 
cover and rate of forest change mirror the consistent lack of forest management rights and point 
to an informal mechanism of land conversion. Similarly, the inconsistently negative effect of 
district-level dispersal mirrors changing policy over district rights to sell and manage state-
owned forest area. Assessing average land conversion five to six years following district only 
and village only regulatory dispersal lends additional support to this argument. Land conversion 
in villages that only experienced village-dispersal was defined by lower rates of field agriculture 
and higher rates of mixed field and tree agriculture when compared to villages that experienced 
only district-level dispersal. There is a strong association between mixed agriculture and 
informal, smallholder clearing in Indonesia (Gaveau, Linkie, et al., 2009; Levang, Sitorus, 
Gaveau, et al., 2012; Clough et al., 2016; Gaveau et al., 2017). Thus, it seems likely that the 
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district-level effect of regulatory dispersal is driven by larger scale agriculture, in line with 
formal institutions, whereas village-level dispersal is more likely driven by smallholder 
agriculture, in opposition to formal institutions. 
Our findings are particularly relevant to the current agenda for village-level 
decentralization. The 2014 Village Law increases village budgets, mandates democratically 
elected councils, and provides an increasing amount of natural resource rights to village 
governments (Antlöv, Wetterberg, and Dharmawan 2016) and the current presidential 
administration has pledged 12.7 Mha of forest land for new community, village, village 
plantation, and customary forests (Myers, Intarini, Sirait, et al. 2017; Santika et al. 2017). Further 
research that combines field-based methods with remotely sensed imagery to monitor and assess 
how regulatory dispersal affects Indonesian forest cover will remain essential for conservation 
and development agendas.  
Beyond Indonesia, institutional transitions that increase the density of regulatory units 
have accompanied drastic changes in tropical forest cover over the past two decades. Further 
analysis of the impact and causal mechanisms of regulatory dispersal on resource use can help 
inform scholarship on institutions and resource management. Our findings emphasize the need 
for analyses of land cover change and environmental outcomes to more rigorously engage with 
changing political institutions.  
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3.7 Supplemental information 
 
3.7.1 Regulatory dispersal in Indonesia 
In Indonesia, regulatory dispersal occurs after the approval of administrative 
proliferation. The proliferation of provinces, districts, sub-districts, and villages requires 
approval from different levels of government, depending on the level of administration seeking 
to proliferate. For villages, the process of administrative proliferation begins with local support, 
and proceeds through the submission of village regulation reports; meetings between village, 
sub-district, and district officials; and approval from the regional legislature and executive 
offices. For the period of study in this research, Ministry of Internal Affairs Regulation 27/2006 
and 28/2006 outlined requirements and processes for village-level proliferation. Ministry of 
Internal Affairs Regulation 45/2016 has since altered some of the regulations for official changes 
to village units. The number of villages in Indonesia rose from 69,050 in 2000 to 82,190 in 2014 
(BPS 2006a, 2011a, 2016).  
The creation of new sub-districts requires approval from village-level authorities (village 
councils and/or village heads) and province-level approval from the governor. This process is 
implemented by district governments, in order to facilitate the allocation of administrative 
services or resources. The process of sub-district change in this research is outlined in 
Government Regulation 19/2008. The number of new sub-districts rose from 4,049 in 2000 to 
7,024 in 2014. 
District and province creation require approval from district to national government 
authorities, with legal procedures outlined in Laws 22/1999, 32/2004, and 78/2007. The process 
of new district creation begins with citizens lobbying the current district legislature and 
executive authority for approval. After receiving district approval, province authorities 
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(legislative and executive) must approve the district fracture, which requires further approval 
from the president and the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) (Law 78/2007). Provincial 
proliferation follows a similar process, though without approval from district-level authorities. 
Research on the motivations behind district dispersal point to the role that local elites play in 
leading campaigns, and the important role ethnicity, identity, and perceived marginalization play 
in district creation (Choi 2011; Kimura 2013; Pierskalla 2016). From 2000 to 2014 the number of 
districts/cities in Indonesia increased from 341 to 514. Compared to the number of new villages, 
sub-districts, and districts, the number of new provinces created over this period is much smaller, 
growing from 32 to 344 (Figure 3.6). 
Scholarship that examines the drivers of administrative proliferation focus on material, 
political, and symbolic marginalization (Grossman and Lewis 2014; Kimura 2010). Material 
marginalization occurs when a sub-group perceives the distribution of goods and services, 
including natural resources, as allocated disproportionately within the administrative unit. 
Political marginalization, when a group within an existing administrative unit feels 
underrepresented in current ruling structures. And symbolic marginalization occurs when 
individuals identify differently than other members within the administrative unit. Scholarship 
that focuses on administrative proliferation in Indonesia emphasizes the important role of 
symbolic marginalization with reference to provincial proliferation (Kimura 2013) and material 
marginalization at the district-level (Barr et al. 2006; Burgess and Olken 2012; Pierskalla 2016). 
Research is yet to address drivers of village-level proliferation in Indonesia. 
  
                                                     
4 This number does not include the five provinces that were formed leading up to and in the first half of the year 
2000. 
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Figure 3.6: Year 2000 province boundaries by number of regulatory dispersal (BPS 2015) 
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3.7.2 Results 
 
3.7.2.1 Variable summaries, model summaries, and interpretation 
All models in this text include standardized independent variables. Standardizing 
independent variables provides uniform unit measurements. A one unit increase in each model 
variable refers to an increase in one variable standard deviation. Table 3.2 includes variable 
summaries to aid in the interpretation of all fixed-effect models. Table 3.3 provides summaries 
for the two-way fixed effect models whose estimates are plotted by Figure 3.3. Models 1.1 
through 1.4 in Table 3.3 provide estimates for the two-way fixed effect model that explained the 
greatest variation in village-level forest area. Appendix E presents models that use an alternative 
variable transformation for village-level forest area (Table B.2) and that regress CAR of forest 
cover change on the same set of covariates in a two-way fixed-effect framework (Table B.3). 
These models affirm the robustness of our results, demonstrating significant negative effects of 
village- and district-level dispersal on forest area and CAR of forest change in periods following 
the dispersal. Table 3.4 presents model summaries of forest cover change in data subset to only 
Table 3.2: Variable summaries 
Variable Abbreviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Percent forest cover Forest 0.13 0.26 
Percent paddy agriculture Paddy ag. 0.22 0.32 
Percent field agriculture Field ag. 0.12 0.25 
Percent mixed agriculture Mixed field/tree ag. 0.21 0.32 
Percent timber plantation Timber plant. 0.04 0.14 
Percent agricultural tree plantation Ag. tree plant. 0.04 0.14 
Percent settlement Settlement 0.11 0.22 
Percent protected area Protected area 0.03 0.13 
Village council Village council 0.91 0.52 
Distance to nearest road (m) Distance to roads 4161 11053 
Number of households Household pop. 851.48 1205.44 
Multidimensional development index MDVDI 0.22 0.18 
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include villages that underwent regulatory dispersal. These models demonstrate similar signs and 
significance to models of forest change for all villages, but coefficient estimates are often of 
slightly larger magnitude. Model summares in Table 3.4 contain values for three alternative 
dependent variables: the IHS of forest area (Model 2.1), the natural log of forest area +.01 
(Model 2.2), and the CAR of forest cover change (Model 2.3). 
3.7.2.2 Matching data 
  
We assessed matched villages for difference in mean CAR of forest cover change for 
fifteen different combinations of village fracture periods and time periods. This “moving 
window” approach to longitudinal analysis enables an assessment of immediate and eventual 
impacts from regulatory dispersal on forest cover change. It makes best use of a dataset that 
improves over time, as the baseline year for comparison is not limited to the earliest time point. 
However, each “window” of time contains different numbers of “dispersed” and “undispersed” 
villages, and estimates from that window are subject to the quality of data within that time 
period. Thus, although matching analysis provides for rigorous estimation of the differences in 
CAR of forest change between villages that did and did not experience regulatory dispersal, 
these estimates are constrained by data quality. In Table 3.5 (A) we provide the total number of 
villages within each category of administrative change and within each time period. Table 3.5 
(B) presents the percentage of the total number of dispersed villages in each administrative 
category, within each period. 
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Table 3.3 Two-way fixed effect models for village-level forest area. Coefficient estimates are transformed by the inverse hyperbolic sine function. Models 1.1 through 1.4 
include different time effects for regulatory dispersal. Land cover and sociopolitical variables remain anchored to the period of forest area measurement. SEs are robust and 
clustered at both village-level (Std Err) and district-level (Clst. Std Err). 
 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
** 
 
 Coef. Std Err
Clst. 
Std Err
Coef. Std Err
Clst.  
Std Err
Coef. Std Err
Clst. 
Std Err
Coef. Std Err
Clst.  
Std Err
Same period dispersal 
level
   Village 0.014 0.01 0.016 -0.021 0.009 ** 0.017 -0.031 0.011 *** 0.029 0.018 0.014 0.039
   Sub-district 0.048 0.006 *** 0.017 *** -0.002 0.005 0.011 -0.034 0.006 *** 0.018 * 0.035 0.006 *** 0.022 *
   District 0.011 0.004 *** 0.013 -0.014 0.004 *** 0.011 0.012 0.004 *** 0.01 0.042 0.006 *** 0.025
   Province 0.033 0.009 *** 0.028 -0.105 0.008 *** 0.034 *** -0.006 0.004 0.011 0.052 0.017 *** 0.041
Land-cover
   Forest 1.306 0.026 *** 0.064 *** 1.309 0.026 *** 0.064 *** 1.14 0.027 *** 0.07 *** 1.055 0.035 *** 0.121 ***
   Paddy ag. -0.068 0.015 *** 0.033 ** -0.066 0.015 *** 0.033 ** -0.074 0.016 *** 0.041 * -0.018 0.014 0.042 *
   Field ag. -0.049 0.011 *** 0.026 * -0.05 0.011 *** 0.026 * -0.056 0.012 *** 0.032 * -0.008 0.01 0.033 *
   Mixed field/tree ag. -0.056 0.015 *** 0.037 -0.057 0.015 *** 0.037 -0.071 0.017 *** 0.045 0.008 0.014 0.046
   Timber plant. -0.033 0.01 *** 0.018 * -0.032 0.01 *** 0.018 * -0.009 0.01 0.02 -0.019 0.01 0.033
   Ag. tree plant. -0.121 0.016 *** 0.034 *** -0.12 0.016 *** 0.034 *** -0.105 0.016 *** 0.036 *** -0.069 0.017 *** 0.044 ***
   Settlement -0.027 0.01 *** 0.022 -0.031 0.01 *** 0.022 -0.034 0.011 *** 0.027 0.002 0.009 0.028
   Protected area 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.013 0.003 *** 0.005 ** 0 0.004 0.011 **
Sociopolitical variables
   Village council -0.025 0.004 *** 0.01 ** -0.028 0.004 *** 0.01 *** -0.049 0.005 *** 0.013 *** -0.016 0.004 *** 0.007 ***
   Distance to roads 0.043 0.005 *** 0.021 ** 0.053 0.005 *** 0.02 *** 0.025 0.004 *** 0.019 0.092 0.006 *** 0.054
   Household pop. -0.018 0.003 *** 0.005 *** -0.021 0.004 *** 0.006 *** -0.02 0.004 *** 0.006 *** -0.008 0.003 ** 0.005 ***
   MDVDI 0.032 0.002 *** 0.006 *** 0.034 0.002 *** 0.006 *** 0.036 0.002 *** 0.007 *** 0.02 0.002 *** 0.009 ***
Constant 1.883 0.004 *** 0.009 *** 1.892 0.004 *** 0.009 *** 1.936 0.004 *** 0.012 *** 1.84 0.004 *** 0.009 ***
Number of obs  
Within R
2 0.179 0.179 0.15 0.08
Model 1.1: Same Period 
regulatory dispersal
Model 1.2: One lagged period 
regulatory dispersal
Model 1.3: Two lagged periods 
regulatory dispersal
Model 1.4: One lead period 
regulatory dispersal
311,232 311,232 254,324 244,049
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Table 3.4: Two-way fixed effect models of forest area (Models 2.1 and 2.2) and CAR of forest cover change (Model 2.3) for 
villages that experienced regulatory dispersal between 2000 and 2014. Models 2.1 to 2.3 include lagged effects of regulatory 
dispersal. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the village- and district-level. 
 
 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 Coef.
Std 
Err
Clst.  
Std Err
Coef.
Std 
Err
Clst.  
Std Err
Coef.
Std 
Err
Clst. 
Std Err
Same period 
dispersal level
   Village -0.022 0.009 ** 0.0170 -0.037 0.014 *** 0.028 -0.011 0.004 *** 0.007 *
   Sub-district -0.003 0.005 0.0110 -0.002 0.008 0.017 0.000 0.002 0.005
   District -0.014 0.004 *** 0.0110 -0.022 0.006 *** 0.018 -0.010 0.002 *** 0.005 *
   Province -0.094 0.009 *** 0.0320 *** -0.136 0.013 *** 0.048 *** -0.025 0.002 *** 0.008 ***
Land-cover
   Forest 1.291 0.034 *** 0.0850 *** 1.816 0.053 *** 0.125 *** -0.039 0.006 *** 0.014 ***
   Paddy ag. -0.059 0.019 *** 0.0470 -0.103 0.030 *** 0.071 -0.036 0.012 *** 0.021 *
   Field ag. -0.045 0.015 *** 0.0360 -0.078 0.023 *** 0.055 -0.037 0.007 *** 0.017 **
   Mixed ag. -0.048 0.020 ** 0.0510 -0.082 0.032 ** 0.078 -0.007 0.007 0.017
   Timber plant. -0.053 0.018 *** 0.0390 -0.072 0.029 ** 0.059 -0.002 0.006 0.011
   Ag. tree plant. -0.129 0.021 *** 0.0370 *** -0.184 0.032 *** 0.054 *** -0.029 0.006 *** 0.008 ***
   Settlement -0.027 0.013 ** 0.0320 -0.050 0.021 ** 0.049 -0.034 0.024 0.027
   Protected area 0.009 0.004 ** 0.0070 0.018 0.007 *** 0.011 * 0.001 0.001 0.002
Sociopolitical 
variables
   Village council -0.030 0.005 *** 0.0120 ** -0.051 0.009 *** 0.019 *** -0.008 0.002 *** 0.005 *
   Distance to roads 0.039 0.006 *** 0.0210 * 0.052 0.009 *** 0.032 * 0.010 0.001 *** 0.005 **
   Household pop. -0.021 0.007 *** 0.0080 *** -0.032 0.010 *** 0.012 *** -0.006 0.004 0.004
   MDVDI 0.036 0.003 *** 0.0060 *** 0.055 0.004 *** 0.009 *** 0.011 0.001 *** 0.002 ***
Constant 2.357 0.008 *** 0.0210 *** -0.976 0.012 *** 0.032 *** -0.039 0.015 *** 0.029
Number of obs  
Within R
2 
Model 2.1: One lagged period 
regulatory dispersal: Inverse 
hyperbolic sine of forest cover
150,210
0.178 0.0170.142
Model 2.3: One lagged period 
regulatory dispersal: CAR forest 
change
Model 2.2: One lagged period 
regulatory dispersal: Logged ha + 
0.01 of forest cover
52,824150,210
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Table 3.5 Matching data village frequencies by the number of changes (Table A) and by the number of changes per the total 
number of villages with complete data (Table B) 
A   Period of Forest Loss (Compounded Annual Rate) 
    2000-2003 2003-2006 2006-2009 2009-2011 2011-2014 
Year of 
Village 
Change 
2000-2003 302 344 569 775 1085 
2003-2006   222 838 1017 1424 
2006-2008     384 1567 1967 
2008-2011       422 2101 
2011-2014         58 
Year of 
Sub-
District 
Change 
2000-2003 1286 1616 1661 1802 1995 
2003-2006   1381 1408 1748 1771 
2006-2008     1360 1838 1970 
2008-2011       667 1676 
2011-2014         494 
Year of 
District 
Change 
2000-2003 1611 1720 1695 1852 1962 
2003-2006   1750 1575 2064 2551 
2006-2008     675 735 764 
2008-2011       957 1046 
2011-2014         297 
              
B   Period of Forest Loss (Compounded Annual Rate)   
    2000-2003 2003-2006 2006-2009 2009-2011 2011-2014 
Year of 
Village 
Change 
2000-2003 0.030 0.024 0.039 0.043 0.052 
2003-2006   0.016 0.058 0.057 0.068 
2006-2009     0.026 0.088 0.094 
2009-2011       0.024 0.101 
2011-2014         0.003 
Year of 
Sub-
District 
Change 
2000-2003 0.129 0.116 0.114 0.101 0.095 
2003-2006   0.099 0.097 0.098 0.085 
2006-2009     0.093 0.103 0.094 
2009-2011       0.037 0.080 
2011-2014         0.024 
Year of 
District 
Change 
2000-2003 0.161 0.123 0.116 0.104 0.094 
2003-2006   0.126 0.108 0.116 0.122 
2006-2009     0.046 0.041 0.037 
2009-2011       0.054 0.050 
2011-2014         0.014 
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Chapter 4  
 
Green handcuffs or head-starts? The legacy of sustainable conservation, 
forest cover change, and household well-being in the Kerinci Valley  
 
Abstract:  
 
Empirical evidence of the long-term impacts from international conservation funding is limited. 
We examine the conservation legacy of Indonesia’s most ambitious Integrated Conservation and 
Development Project (ICDP). The Kerinci-Seblat ICDP operated from 1997 to 2002, provided 
$19 million in funding to integrate management of Kerinci-Seblat National Park (KSNP) with 
local development, and distributed $1.5 million in local development grants to support village 
conservation agreements (VCAs). We assess forest cover change across the entire KSNP 
landscape from 2003 to 2016 and analyze household survey data (n=1,303) from a subset of 
villages (n=51) surrounding KSNP. Using statistical matching, linear and generalized linear 
models, we conclude that forest cover loss within KSNP is higher in villages that received direct 
ICDP funding; households in directly funded villages are more likely to own land without a 
formal title, farm high-value tree crops (coffee, cinnamon, rubber, and oil palm), and have lower 
incomes. We discuss how the project may have devalued conservation motivations and bolstered 
interest in agricultural expansion. The stakes for conservation funding are high. Failures can 
engender long-term outcomes opposite the very goals they aim to achieve. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Protecting high conservation value tropical forests promotes the dual goals of reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and conserving biodiversity. This low-cost 
option for multiple environmental benefits attracted significant international funding for 
conservation in the Global South, with a focus on tropical forests and biodiversity conservation 
(Miller, Agrawal, and Roberts 2013). In addition to providing environmental benefits, 
international conservation funding is often charged with ensuring local communities benefit from 
project implementation (Garnett, Sayer, and Du Toit 2007; Tallis et al. 2008). However, few 
studies examine how conservation legacies, established through international funding, generate 
long term social-ecological outcomes across conservation landscapes. 
Establishing, enforcing, and monitoring the protection of high-value conservation areas is 
one of the most widespread methods for protecting tropical forests (Jones et al. 2018; Miller and 
Nakamura 2018; Watson et al. 2016). Protected areas (PAs) protect land through 
territorialization, which is a specific of practices that render spaces governable by an authority 
(Sack 1986). For a PA, these practices include the establishment of boundaries, creation of 
monitoring protocols, and enforcement of sanctions, among others (Peluso and Vandergeest 
2001; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). PA conservation has provided immense environmental 
benefits, conserving more forest area and biodiversity than the most similar unprotected areas 
(Andam et al., 2008; Gaveau, Epting, et al., 2009; Nolte et al., 2013). However, separating PAs 
from proximate communities that depend on land for their livelihood and well-being, and whose 
presence may even predate the establishment of the PA itself, raises significant concerns over the 
fairness and justice of PAs (West, Igoe, and Brockington 2006). To address this concern, 
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conservation funding that aims to improve PA effectiveness often incorporates a “social 
dimension” that seeks to enhance the livelihoods and well-being of nearby communities (Adams 
et al. 2004; Herren et al. 2018; Watson et al. 2014).  
Communities can benefit from conservation, including PAs, through direct and indirect 
pathways (Erbaugh and Oldekop 2018). First, “direct investment” refers to when PAs provide 
incentives that are directly disbursed to communities or individuals near the PA in return for 
specific, conservation-based activities. Second, communities may receive “indirect benefits” 
from PAs from infrastructure development, increased employment opportunities, and enhanced 
ecosystem services (Ferraro and Hanauer 2014b). There is a growing body of evidence that, on 
average, communities near PAs enjoy more development benefits than do similar communities 
that are further away (Ferraro et al. 2015). However, research into the specific mechanisms that 
provide community benefits remain limited (Agrawal 2014). Studies that examine joint social-
ecological impacts of international conservation over space and time, also known as 
“conservation legacies” (Miller 2013), are fewer still. To investigate long-term social-ecological 
outcomes of reduced forest cover and community well-being from international conservation 
funding, we examine social-ecological outcomes in and surrounding Kerinci-Seblat National 
Park (KSNP) associated with direct investment from the Kerinci-Seblat Integrated Conservation 
and Development Project (KS-ICDP). 
4.2 Kerinci-Seblat National Park (KSNP) and Direct Conservation Investment 
 
KSNP is Indonesia’s second largest, terrestrial national park (Figure 4.1). It covers an 
area of over 1.375 Mha, extends 345 km along the Bukuit Barisan Mountains, and contains 
territory within four provinces and 15 districts/cities in central Sumatra. The Dutch Colonial 
Government  protected forest area now within KSNP boundaries in 1929 (Aumeeruddy 1994). 
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The Indonesian government combined a set of 15 pre-existing conservation areas, adding 
approximately 100,000 additional ha (Bettinger 2015), to declare the Kerinci-Seblat area a 
national park in 1982 (Minister of Agriculture Decree No. 736/Mentan/X/1982). Disputes over 
the size of KSNP marked the beginning of the park’s history, but in 1993 the Ministry of 
Forestry and relevant district and provincial governments reached a boundary agreement to 
finalize the size of KSNP (D. Wibowo 1999), although it was not officially gazetted until 1999, 
through the KS-ICDP. 
The KS-ICDP operated from 1997 to 2002 and allocated $19 million to gazette the 1.375 
Mha national park, improve park management and service delivery, and promote sustainable 
development within proximate communities (World Bank 1996).  This research focuses on the 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Kerinci-Seblat National Park and surrounds 
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methods KS-ICDP used to promote sustainable development and the long-term outcomes from 
the project in villages surrounding the national park. 
The KS-ICDP implemented sustainable development through voluntary conservation 
agreements (VCAs) that provided development grants to improve local livelihoods, reduce local 
reliance on forest resources, and ensure villagers did not deforest traditional or national park 
forest areas (World Bank 1996, 2003). Trained and local facilitators drafted the VCAs, which 
village councils and village head supported and signed. According to facilitation standards, all 
adult members of VCA villages should have been aware of how the VCA was drafted and what 
it stipulated (Wood et al. 2014). Of the 425 villages available for selection among in the KSNP 
landscape, and the 134 villages in the “park buffer zone,” project managers and the Indonesian 
Government selected 75 villages to sign VCAs (Linkie et al. 2007). The 72 villages that reached 
and signed a VCA were promised $25,000 in development grant money ($34,069.10 AFI), to be 
applied toward “income generating” as well as “physical and infrastructure” activities. Upon 
signing the VCA, villages were supposed to receive the initial grant disbursement ($12,500), 
with the final tranche disbursed upon initiation of conservation activities. Due to problems with 
project implementation, administration, and project timelines, only 19 of 72 villages received the 
second tranche of funding, with 64% of VCA villages recieved their first disbursement in the 
KS-ICDP’s final year of operation (World Bank, 2003, 23).  
This study examines how forest cover and household livelihoods surrounding KSNP vary 
between villages that did and did not receive direct investment from the KS-ICDP. A growing 
body of literature examines how payments for ecosystem services affect conservation 
motivations. “Crowding-in” refers to when pre-existing motivation for conservation activities are 
reinforced through direct payments; “crowding-out” refers to when direct payments erode the 
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intrinsic motivation to conserve (Rode, Gómez-Baggethun, and Krause 2015). Examining the 
conservation legacy of KS-ICDP can contribute to this literature by determining whether 
activities representative of crowding-in or crowding-out best characterize forest cover change 
from 2003 to 2016. Combining information on forest cover change with household livelihood 
strategies provides further evidence of how forest cover change may have occurred, and how 
findings support current literature on conservation motivations. 
Although previous studies have examined the outcomes of conservation across the KSNP 
landscape, the current research is novel in its temporal and methodological scope. Previous 
research has examined drivers of deforestation in KSNP (Bettinger 2014, 2015; Linkie et al. 
2003; Linkie, Smith, and Leader-Williams 2004), including an analysis of forest cover change 
between VCA villages before and during the KS-ICDP implementation that found no difference 
in rates of forest loss (Linkie et al. 2008). Other research has examined traditional livelihood 
strategies surrounding KSNP (Hariyadi and Ticktin 2012; D. Wibowo 1999), with one study 
finding that 43% of VCA activities continued five years after the KS-ICDP finished (Wood et al 
2014). The current research is the first to examine the legacy of conservation, and its relationship 
to motivation, within and adjacent to KSNP through empirical research on forest cover change 
and household livelihood in villages surrounding the national park. 
4.3 Methods 
 
To determine the relationship between conservation funding from the KS-ICDP and 
forest cover as well as household livelihood and well-being, we combine remotely sensed land 
cover data, the village census (Sensus Potensi Desa) from 2003 to 2014, and a novel survey that 
collected data from households within three km of KSNP in Jambi province. This research thus 
represents a mixed-methods approach, using a combination of data types to provide insights into 
 88 
forest cover change, village development, and household well-being (Ostrom and Nagendra 
2006). The following two sub-sections explain data sources and the final subsection describes 
empirical methods.   
4.3.1 Forest cover change 
 
To determine where and when forest cover loss occurs in KSNP, we combine tree cover 
loss data (Hansen et al. 2013) with land cover data from the Indonesian Ministry of Environment 
and Forestry (Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan 2016a) and administrative 
boundary data from the Central Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2015). Combining these 
datasets enables us to investigate temporal trends of when forest cover loss has occurred, in what 
type of land cover category, and if forest cover loss occurred within the KSNP boundaries. 
To examine differences between villages that signed a VCA (VCA villages) and villages 
that did not sign a VCA (non-VCA villages), we extracted information from the World Bank KS-
ICDP project narratives (WWF Indonesia, n.d.). Using village and district names, we combined 
narrative information with data from the Central Statistics Agency to identify VCA village 
boundaries. We matched 59 of the villages listed in KS-ICDP project narratives with villages 
directly adjacent to KSNP in 2003. Two villages were not directly adjacent, and thus not 
included in our analysis, and we could not reconcile 13 villages with official records from the 
Central Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik—BPS). 
4.3.2 Survey design and household indicators 
 
Our household survey provides cross-sectional information on differences between 
household livelihood strategies and well-being across a segment of the KSNP landscape. The 
primary unit of analysis for this survey was the household, and the sample population included 
all households within three km of KSNP in the districts of Sungai Penuh, Kerinci, and Merangin. 
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We sampled households using a stratified cluster design that maximized the proportionate 
representation and minimized survey costs through clustering (Groves, R.M. et al. 2009; Kish 
1965). We stratified our sample based on district population, and we clustered our sample within 
51 randomly selected villages (Appendix C). Within each village, we selected approximately 25 
households at random, adjusting the number of households selected based on the proportionate 
size of the population at the time of surveying (Kish 1965). We generated our random household 
selection using household rosters from village heads (kepala desa) and village maps we obtained 
from district statistic agencies (Appendix C). Developed through the Forest and Livelihoods: 
Assessment, Research, and Engagement research community (FLARE Network 2016), our 
survey instrument contained modules on household demographics, livelihood, health, forest-use, 
finances, and public participation. We translated the survey instrument into Bahasa Indonesia 
and trained eight local enumerators to conduct survey interviews. Enumerators piloted the survey 
instrument for two days before our three-month period of survey dissemination. We completed 
survey data collection in January 2017. 
4.3.3 Analytical techniques 
 
Our analytical approach contains three steps. First, we use land cover and village census 
data to test forest cover differences between VCA and non-VCA villages. Second, we visualize 
and test differences in livelihood and well-being between VCA and non-VCA households within 
our sample. And third, we test the relationship between household income and demographic, 
economic, and village-level indicators, including VCA participation. Together, these analyses 
provide insight into how legacies of conservation investment affect conservation and 
development outcomes in and surrounding KSNP. 
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We used matching—a non-parametric pre-processing step in data analysis—to control for 
selection bias among VCA villages when measuring differences in forest cover loss from 2003 to 
2016. Selection bias refers to consistent similarities between units within a “treatment” group 
that may confound comparisons with “control” group members. For example, VCA villages 
demonstrate more village-level deprivations in access to education, health, and infrastructure 
than non-VCA villages. These differences, if they are not controlled for using empirical methods, 
can drive the differences in average forest cover loss between VCA and non-VCA villages. 
Using statistical matching to compare villages with similar indicators for multidimensional 
village deprivation can controls for these differences, leading to more robust estimates of the 
difference between VCA and non-VCA houses5.  
In addition to multidimensional village deprivation, we matched villages based on 2003 
values for: village area, average elevation, percent of area over 12% slope, distance to roads, 
distance to nearest district capital, percent of village are dedicated to paddy or field agriculture, 
percent of village area dedicated to agricultural or timber plantations, percent of village area 
dedicated to settlement areas, number of households, and mean precipitation (2000 to 2003). We 
also matched on year 2000 mean forest cover, to control for parallel trends before the baseline 
period of analysis. We then re-matched without year 2000 mean forest cover to assess robustness 
of our matching to alternative specification (Appendix F). Other studies use a similar set of 
covariates to control for deforestation pressure (Andam et al. 2008; Blackman et al. 2017; 
Brandt, Nolte, and Agrawal 2016; C. Nolte et al. 2013; Santika et al. 2017). We used two 
different matching algorithms—full matching and nearest-neighbor (1:4) propensity score 
matching—to test the robustness of our results, and ensure that covariance balance is below 0.25 
                                                     
5 For further information on the multidimensional village deprivation indicator (MDVDI), as well as the 
multidimensional deprivation index (MDI), please see Appendix A. 
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in standardized difference (Stuart, 2010). We further controlled for confounders by including the 
matched covariates in a weighted least-squares (WLS) regression to generate point estimates for 
the differences in forest cover loss within KSNP between villages that did and did not receive 
direct ICDP funding (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). 
We combined visualization, statistical tests of independence, and generalized linear 
models to examine livelihood strategies in VCA and non-VCA villages within our survey 
sample. First, we identified and tested general proportional differences between household 
occupation, land ownership, land titles, income, and multidimensional poverty. The household 
multidimensional deprivation indicator (MDI) equally weights education, health, and livelihood 
indicators to provide a general and widely comparable measurement of household welfare 
(Alkire and Santos 2014). To test if VCA and non-VCA households significantly differ, 
controlling for other household variables, we ran generalized linear models on outcome variables 
that demonstrated significant differences in means or proportions from the previous step. The 
differences between VCA and non-VCA households inform our models within the third 
analytical step. 
Regressing logged yearly income over demographic, economic, and village-level 
indicators tests for differences between VCA and non-VCA household economies. Studies show 
that yearly income varies more than other economic indicators, such as consumption indices 
(Coudouel, Hentschel, and Wodon 2002). Thus, we included the household MDI as a covariate 
to control for longer term household well-being. For all the models included in our analysis, we 
include selection criteria in Appendix F. Each covariate in every model was assessed for 
multicollinearity and removed if it had a variable inflation factor over three. We controlled for 
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potential heteroskedactisity as well as inter-cluster correlation resulting from our clustered 
sample design using clustered robust standard errors (Abadie et al. 2017).  
4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 Forest cover change 
 
Comparing VCA and non-VCA villages matched on covariates linked to forest cover loss 
demonstrates forest-loss in VCA villages was greater in VCA villages. We examine the 
difference between primary forest cover loss as well as primary forest cover loss within KSNP 
(Figure 4.2). When we correct for village-level attributes often tied to forest cover loss, we find 
that the difference in 2003-2016 forest cover loss within KSNP is significantly higher in villages 
that received VCA funding. Although overall primary forest loss is also higher in non-VCA 
villages, the difference is not significant. VCA villages lost an average 38.6 ha of KSNP forest 
area more than non-VCA villages (p<0.1), according to our full matching result, which provided 
the best covariate balance between VCA and non-VCA villages (Appendix F). However, the 1:4 
Propensity Score Matching dataset, which generated only slightly less balanced results, estimates 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Forest type (x-axis) by difference in average forest cover change (ha) between VCA and non-VCA villages (y-
axis), by different matching techniques 
 93 
that VCA villages lost 10.5 ha more than non-VCA villages between 2003 and 2016. The 10.5 ha 
estimate more closely resembles matching estimates that do not include pre-2003 average forest 
cover as a matched covariate. With estimates of KSNP forest cover loss in VCA villages 
between 10.5 and 38.6 ha, VCA villages lost significantly more forest cover within KSNP 
boundaries as compared to the most similar non-VCA villages. 
4.4.2 Household livelihood 
 
1,304 respondents living in 51 villages across three districts in Jambi Province 
contributed responses, with a response rate of 0.99. Of the 1,304 randomly selected respondents, 
180 lived in seven villages that signed VCAs. The proportion of VCA to non-VCA villages in 
our random sample (0.137) does not significantly differ from the proportion of VCA villages 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Primary commercial crop among farming households for non-VCA households (Panels A and C) and VCA 
households (Panels B and D). 
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across all four provinces (0.186) in a two-sample test for equality of proportions (p-value = 
0.51).  
The most pronounced cropping patterns occur across the elevation gradient and between 
VCA and non-VCA households. Figure 4.3 illustrates VCA and non-VCA households’ most 
important commercial crops by distance to the park and elevation. Rubber and oil palm are 
farmed at lower elevations (<500 m), tubers at higher elevations (>1,250 m), with coffee, 
cinnamon, other vegetables and horticultural crops more prevalent between these extremes. To 
determine differences in environmental factors and livelihood variables between VCA and non-
VCA households, we use clustered Wilcoxon rank tests (Rosner-Glynn-Lee method) for 
continuous variables and clustered t-tests for nominal variables. Both of these tests account for 
our clustered survey design. VCA and non-VCA households do not differ in average distance to 
KSNP border (Z = -1.67, p > .05, n = 1,276), average elevation (Z = -0.28, p > .05, n = 1,276), 
total income (Z = 1.61, p > .05, n = 1,267), or MDI (Z = 0.19, p > .05, n = 1,285). However, 
VCA households own significantly more land than non-VCA households (Z = 2.2358, p<.05, 
n=1,290), fewer official land titles (Z=-1.18, p<.1, n=1,290), report more coffee farming (Z = 
2.17, p < .01, n = 1,290), cinnamon farming (Z = 2.67, p < .01, n = 1,290), and rubber or oil palm 
farming (Z = 2.11, p < .05, n = 1,290). To control for potential confounding within the clustered 
Wilcoxon rank and t-tests, we model total land area and high-value tree crops (Table 4.1).  
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Controlling for economic, demographic, as well as village factors indicates that VCA 
households are more likely to own land and farm high-value tree crops. Using a nested model 
selection process (Appendix F) we find that accounting for economic, demographic, and village 
indicators best predicts a household’s propensity to farm high-value tree crops, own land, as well 
as the amount of land a household owns. Table 4.1 presents the best-fit models from model 
selection. Model 1 demonstrates that the odds a household residing in a VCA village owns land 
is 2.59 times greater than a household in a non-VCA village (𝛽 = 0.952, SE = 0.451). Although 
the effect is nonsignificant, residing in a VCA village predicts owning 25% more land (𝛽 = 
0.226, SE = 0.206), and the significant effect of farming high-value tree crops predicts an 81% 
Table 4.1: Models of the propensity to use a livelihood strategy, accounting for demographic, economic, and village-level 
indicators 
  
Model 1: Logistic regression of 
any land owned 
Model 2: Linear 
regression of logged 
hectares of land owned 
Model 3: Logistic regression of 
farmed high-value tree crops 
  
Coef. 
Log 
Odds 
SE   Coef. SE   Coef. 
Log 
Odds 
SE   
Intercept -9.625 NA 2.236 *** -7.000 0.846 *** 2.257 NA 0.209   
Female head of house 0.258 1.295 0.197   0.007 0.112   -0.262 0.770 0.221   
Head of house age 0.025 1.025 0.007 *** 0.005 0.004   0.004 1.004 0.543   
Head of house ed. years 0.055 1.057 0.026 ** 0.022 0.007 *** -0.014 0.986 0.514   
Number of adults 0.184 1.202 0.163   -0.003 0.052   0.005 1.005 0.954   
Ag. primary occupation 1.512 4.538 0.248 *** 0.325 0.157 ** 0.050 1.051 0.821   
Ethnicity: Jambi 0.930 2.535 0.484 * -0.471 0.251 * -1.117 0.327 0.071 * 
Ethnicity: Javanese 1.030 2.802 0.625 * 0.144 0.212   0.552 1.737 0.283   
Ethnicity: Kerinci 0.536 1.709 0.355   -0.276 0.217   -0.609 0.544 0.141   
Farms high value tree 
crop 
2.720 15.181 0.448 *** 0.596 0.149 *** 
NA 
Total land owned (ha) NA NA 0.391 1.478 0.009 ** 
Ln(total income (IDR)) 0.313 1.367 0.146 ** 0.368 0.057 *** -0.093 0.911 0.346   
MDI -2.050 0.129 1.100 * -0.807 1.012   -0.671 0.511 0.555 * 
Holds formal land title NA 0.130 0.114   -0.501 0.606 0.133   
VCA village 0.952 2.591 0.451 ** 0.226 0.206   1.071 2.919 0.000 *** 
Elevation 0.119 1.126 0.057 ** -0.015 0.022   -0.184 0.832 0.000 *** 
Distance to KSNP (km) 0.112 1.118 0.077   -0.029 0.042   0.057 1.059 0.381   
KSNP forest-loss (ha) 0.000 1.000 0.001   0.000 0.000   0.000 1.000 0.866   
AIC 1010 NA 1147.9 
R-Squared, Adj. R-
Squared NA 0.201, 0.187 NA 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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increase in the amount of land a household 
owns (𝛽 = 0.596, SE = 0.149). Finally, 
households in VCA villages are 2.9 times 
more likely to farm high-value tree crops 
(𝛽 = 1.071, SE = 0.000).  
Modeling income shows small yet 
significant differences between VCA and 
non-VCA households (Table 4.2). The 
income model that included economic, 
demographic, and village-level indicators 
with an interaction between VCA-
treatment and hectares of agricultural land 
owned performed best (Appendix F). This 
model demonstrates that the predicted 
increase in income from owning more land 
is attenuated for VCA households. Our model predicts a 14% increase in total income for non-
VCA households that own one hectare of land, and a 2% increase for VCA households that own 
one hectare of land.  
4.5 Discussion 
 
Our findings explain heterogeneity in social-ecological outcomes within and surrounding 
Indonesia’s second largest terrestrial PA.  Many studies indicate that, compared to similar 
unprotected areas, PAs significantly reduce forest cover loss in Indonesia (Ferraro et al. 2013, 
2015), Sumatra (Gaveau et al. 2012; Gaveau, Epting, et al. 2009), and across KSNP (Linkie, 
Table 4.2: Model of income among KSNP proximate 
households. SEs are robust and clustered at the village-level. 
Model 4: Linear regression of log (total income (IDR)) 
 
Coef. SE 
  
Intercept 17.192 0.354 *** 
Female head of house -0.098 0.058 * 
Head of house age -0.007 0.002 ** 
Head of house ed. years 0.015 0.012   
Number of adults 0.098 0.035 ** 
Ag. primary occupation -0.097 0.065   
Ethnicity: Jambi -0.212 0.151   
Ethnicity: Javanese -0.029 0.124   
Ethnicity: Kerinci -0.123 0.129   
Farms high-value tree crop -0.048 0.067   
MDI -2.946 0.446 *** 
Holds formal land title 0.055 0.060   
Total land owned (ha) 0.137 0.042 ** 
VCA village 0.114 0.140   
Elevation 0.028 0.013 ** 
Distance to KSNP (km) -0.006 0.027   
KSNP forest-loss (ha) 0.000 0.000   
Land Owned * VCA Village -0.115 0.059 ** 
R-Squared, Adj. R-Squared 0.1997, 0.1884 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Rood, and Smith 2010; Linkie, Smith, and Leader-Williams 2004; Shah and Baylis 2015). 
However, this research often focuses on the average effect of protected areas, rather than 
attending to heterogeneity over space and time within PAs. Notable exceptions document how 
PAs, such as KSNP, contain considerable spatial variation of marginal forest cover loss (Shah 
and Baylis 2015), how park enforcement and management contribute to biodiversity 
conservation and reduced forest cover loss (Linkie et al. 2015; Linkie, Rood, and Smith 2010) 
and  how local and international commodity prices affect Indonesian forest cover (Gaveau, 
Linkie, et al. 2009; Wheeler et al. 2013). In our study, heterogeneity of social-ecological 
outcomes is predicated upon institutional changes from the KS-ICDP. Significant differences 
divide villages that signed VCAs and those that did not. First, VCA villages contain greater 
levels of forest cover loss in KSNP than non-VCA villages. Second, households in VCA villages 
are more likely to own land and farm high-value cash-crops. And third, VCA households have 
overall lower incomes and demonstrate a smaller increase in yearly income as land ownership 
increases. These findings indicate that VCA villages own more land, plant high-value tree crops, 
but do not report higher incomes. KS-ICDP funding may have engendered these differences by 
crowding out conservation motivations. 
By monetizing conservation and failing to pay villages the full amount for their 
conservation activities, the KS-ICDP may have crowded out intrinsic motivations and decreased 
extrinsic motivation for forest conservation. Recent literature demonstrates that providing 
material benefits can “crowd out” intrinsic motivations (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000), including 
those related to conservation values (Agrawal, Chhatre, and Gerber 2015; Börner et al. 2017; 
Chervier, Le Velly, and Ezzine-de-Blas 2016). Although the KS-ICDP sought to promote local 
development and conservation through a variety of livelihood and infrastructure activities, only 
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19 of 72 villages received all of the grant money the VCAs promised (World Bank 2003). 
Offering $25,000 for signing and implementing a VCA monetizes conservation, potentially 
crowding out intrinsic motivations to conserve forest area. Paying half of the agreed upon 
amount to 53 villages reduces the extrinsic motivation to maintain VCA activities, including the 
pledge not to convert KSNP forest area into agricultural land cover. Time series data that 
provides information on land-ownership type, amount of land owned, and VCA participation 
does not exist; without it, research cannot definitively claim that KS-ICDP funding caused higher 
rates of forest cover loss and informal land ownership in VCA villages. However, our findings 
provide substantial evidence that the the conservation legacy of KS-ICDP is opposite its intended 
objectives. The significant differences between VCA and non-VCA villages and households 
indicate that the legacy of KS-ICDP promoted agricultural expansion rather than forest 
conservation.  
The increased likelihood of VCA households to own land without a formal title and farm 
high-value tree crops points to potential problems for future conservation activities in these same 
villages. High-value tree crops require longer time to harvest than standard field crops, such as 
tubers and other vegetables common among our household sample. Coffee (C. arabica and C. 
canephora), the high-value tree crop with the shortest time to harvest, takes approximately three 
to four years before first harvest; cinnamon (Cinnamomum burmanni), the crop with the longest 
time to first harvest, requires approximately 10 years. If KSNP forest loss within VCA villages is 
primarily from planting high-value tree crops, as our surveys indicate is likely, then households 
have invested time and money into land conversion that will provide returns over over ten-year 
time horizons, at a minimum; reclamation of such territory is unlikely to occur through voluntary 
abandonment. Further, 40% of VCA households that farm coffee as their main commercial crop 
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reported an increase in production over the past five years, as compared to 31% non-VCA coffee 
farmers. It is possible that these farmers are taking advantage of government support for coffee 
farming, harvest, and production in Jambi province and in Kerinci district (Saputra 2018; 
Wintani 2017). Literature on commodity production, coffee prices, and forest cover change 
surrounding KSNP remains wanting, but other studies have documented how coffee demand and 
PA encroachment are related elsewhere in Sumatra (Scholz, 1983; Gaveau, Linkie, et al., 2009; 
Levang, Sitorus, Gaveau, et al., 2012). Heavy investment in high-value tree crops within VCA 
villages may mean increasing re-investment and expansion. Future research should focus on the 
relationship between increased production of high-value tree crops and forest cover change 
across the KSNP landscape. 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Conservation legacies can last long after project funding and activities cease. We find 
that the legacy of KS-ICDP generated long-term, village-level outcomes in contrast to project 
goals and objectives. Villages that signed the VCA to implement conservation activities and 
receive $25,000 ($34,068.10 AFI) show higher levels of forest loss within KSNP than villages 
that did not sign VCAs. Households within VCA and non-VCA villages in Jambi province 
demonstrate little difference in total income but are more likely to own land without a formal 
title and grow high-value tree crops, including coffee, cinnamon, oil palm, and rubber. We argue 
that differences between VCA and non-VCA villages may be motivated by the way in which 
KS-ICDP monetized and did not pay most VCA villages the agreed upon amount. Over 70% of 
VCA villages received half the agreed upon funding for signing VCAs and implementing 
conservation activities. Thus, the KS-ICDP may have simultaneously devalued intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations for conservation. This, in turn, may have led households within VCA 
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villages to increase informal land ownership and invest in high-value tree crops. With more 
support and incentives to plant and sell coffee, and a history of land cover change related to high-
value tree crop expansion in other Sumatran PAs, future research should investigate the role of 
land-ownership, agricultural expansion, and international conservation aid across the KSNP 
landscape.  
 Over a decade after its implementation, the conservation legacy of KS-ICDP persists. 
This points to the significance of investigating heterogeneity surrounding PA efficacy, in 
addition to the importance of considered and fair engagement with local communities. 
International funding that seeks to promote conservation and local development is becoming 
more common in countries with tropical forests. Those who implement conservation projects that 
aim to provide direct livelihood benefits for conservation activities would do well to ensure the 
communities they work with receive promised benefits, and fully understand their rights and 
responsibilities with regard to conservation activities. The stakes for such funding are high. 
Long-term failure is a real possibility. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Conclusions 
 
 
Institutional changes, forest cover, and rural livelihoods are intertwined across Indonesia. 
This dissertation finds that over the first two decades of Indonesian democracy, political 
transitions generate specific outcomes for people and forests. Together, these findings support 
understanding institutional change as a series of institutional transitions. As defined in the 
introduction, analysis of institutional transitions centers on recognition of how the timing or 
sequencing of an institutional change is embedded in place-based histories; how an institutional 
change can generate varying effects over time; and how an institutional change can generate 
varying effects over space. The results of this dissertation contain conclusions relevant to the 
relationship between political transitions, forests, and people in Indonesia. In studying Indonesia, 
this dissertation motivates a “geographical turn” in the institutional analysis of social-ecological 
outcomes.  
5.1 Institutional transitions and Indonesian forest landscapes, 1999 to 2016 
 
Previous scholarship on Indonesian politics and forest cover change provide precedent 
for understanding Indonesian forest change as created within and through processes of political 
transition. During the New Order, government claimed authority over forest lands through policy 
based in Dutch colonial law (Peluso 1992). This translated to state control over specific forms of 
forest labor and complete control over forest lands and trade in certain timber species. Through 
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the Basic Forestry Law (41/1999), the Indonesian state retains authority of the Indonesian forest 
estate, which accounts for approximately 60% of Indonesia’s total land area. Scholarship that 
examines the causes of forest cover change in Indonesia post-reformasi point to land conversion 
related to global commodity demand (McCarthy and Cramb 2016; Mccarthy and Robinson 2016; 
Tsing 2005). However, contemporary and empirical institutional analyses often seek to separate 
analytical methods from overarching political change. Accounting for space and time in 
empirical method can be challenging, and social-ecological data may not be available at 
appropriate temporal or spatial resolution. As this dissertation shows, when data is available that 
enables deeper consideration of institutional change as transitional processes, examining some 
combination of sequence, longitudinal effects, and spatial variation can assist in the identification 
and explanation of causes that drive institutional effects related to social-ecological outcomes.  
Chapter 2 examines a puzzle: From 1999 to 2016, political support for forest 
conservation has increased but there was not a concomitant decrease in forest cover loss. Results 
from Chapter 2 show that, in line with pledges and vocal support, Indonesian political actors 
have passed an increased number of national, forest-related policies (n=269), with the most 
significant increase in policy content that addresses forest protection, monitoring, ecosystem 
services, and biodiversity conservation. Between 1999 and 2016, there has also been a significant 
increase in policy that reorganizes forest-related administrations in Indonesia. Significant 
international pressures, including changes in trade laws, norms surrounding climate change and 
carbon emission, as well as market incentives for evidenced-based conservation likely motivate 
these policy changes. The combination of this significant change in policy content, coupled with 
significant international motivation and pathways of influence (Bernstein and Cashore 2012), 
indicate that Indonesian forest-related policy has undergone a “classic paradigm shift” from 1999 
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to 2016 (Cashore and Howlett 2007). However, these increases in policy change do not 
demonstrate an associated increase in forest-related policy amendments. Thus, national forest-
related policy in Indonesia has changed through the process of policy layering (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010).  
Policy layering indicates that new policy and old policy co-exist, potentially generating 
ambiguity around implementation and regulatory enforcement. Through a discussion of current 
trends in Indonesian forest governance, Chapter 2 provides evidence of considerable ambiguity 
surrounding the regulation of forest territories and the flow of forest products. Regulation of 
forest territory is subject to horizontal layering, or the ambiguity surrounding new regulatory 
policies at the national level. It is also subject to vertical layering, when provinces and 
administrations pass overlapping and sometimes contradictory policies. However, the regulation 
of forest products provides an example of how policy layering can translate into regulatory 
change. Over the past decade, timber legality verification has increased the formalization of 
Indonesian timber production (Obidzinski and Kusters 2015; Setyowati and McDermott 2017). 
This process began through policy layering, but has since become less ambiguous through 
ministerial enforcement and legal clarification (Nurrochmat et al., 2014; Erbaugh, Nurrochmat 
and Purnomo, 2017). 
The results from Chapter 2 demonstrate the need to consider sequencing and spatial 
variation when measuring the relationship between institutional change and social-ecological 
outcomes in Indonesia. Forest-related policy content typically seeks to codify, and thus 
formalize, processes of forest management. Formalization increases as social and economic 
activities become more entangled in official state technologies, and as the structure and pattern 
of these processes becomes more predictable (Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, and Ostrom 2006). 
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From 1999 to 2016, Indonesian political actors passed a series of policies that sought to increase 
the role, scope, and reach of government in controlling forest resources.  The fast tempo of 
policy content change in Indonesia indicates that when a social-ecological outcome is measured 
against a policy instrument or institutional change can drastically effect the relationship under 
study. For example, the influence of Indonesian timber legality and certification on smallholder 
timber production has changed drastically from when Indonesia and the EU first signed the 
voluntary partnership agreement (VPA), to the present (Obidzinski et al. 2014; Purnomo et al. 
2016). Research that measures the impact of smallholder timber production on forest cover or 
livelihoods must carefully select timeframes that account and include the diversity of legal 
ambiguity and enforcement that has accompanied timber legality verification in Indonesia, or 
else risk finding incomplete and/or spurious relationships between smallholder timber production 
and social-ecological outcomes. Further, due to policy layering, the increased amount of forest-
related policy that sought to extend the function of government may not have increased the 
predictability of interactions surrounding forest use. Ambiguity surrounding layered policy and 
regional implementation emphasize the need to focus on local-level drivers and spatial variation 
when studying social-ecological outcomes in Indonesia.   
Chapter 3 focuses on how village- and district-level regulatory dispersal affect 
Indonesian forest cover from 2000 to 2014. Regulatory dispersal is the process by which 
regulatory powers are dispersed across a greater number of administrative units (Agrawal 2005). 
In the period following administrative proliferation, village-level regulatory dispersal generates 
an overall and consistently negative effect on forest cover change. District-level regulatory 
dispersal decreases forest cover but demonstrates a heterogeneous effect that depends on when a 
district proliferated between 2000 and 2014. Over this time period, a variety of forest-related 
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policies sought to reduce the powers that district-level authorities have over forest management 
(Barr et al. 2006; Kimura 2010), while village-level natural resource management rights 
remained nonexistent (Antlöv, Wetterberg, and Dharmawan 2016).  These findings suggest that 
the effect of regulatory dispersal is generally negative, but that formal policy that addresses 
incentives for administrative proliferation and natural resource management can attenuate this 
trend. 
Chapter 3 also investigates drivers of forest cover change as a result of regulatory 
dispersal. Villages that only underwent district-level dispersal demonstrated significantly greater 
conversion of land cover to field agriculture in the first and second periods after administrative 
proliferation (+3.5%). In contrast, villages that only underwent village-level dispersal show 
similar increases in conversion to field agriculture (+0.8%) and mixed field and tree agriculture 
(+0.6%). Since few villages claim any formal land use rights, it is surprising that any relationship 
exists between regulatory dispersal and land conversion at all. The difference between district-
level and village-level land conversion elucidates conversion trends. This difference suggests 
that, following regulatory dispersal, district-level conversion occurs through more formal 
processes of land clearing that result in an increase of large-scale monocropped field agriculture; 
village-level dispersal, however, seems to promote the conversion of smallholder agriculture, 
detectable through and increased amount of mixed field and tree agricultural mosaics. 
Through longitudinal and multi-scalar analysis of regulatory dispersal, Chapter 3 
demonstrates the importance of attending to sequencing and longitudinal effects when studying 
decentralization. The period when villages experienced district-level regulatory dispersal shifted 
how dispersal effected forest cover change. Understanding overarching policy trends help 
explain these differences and emphasize the importance of timing and sequencing. Comparing 
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the effect of district-level dispersal to village-level dispersal show that multi-scalar analysis can 
identify important relationships between institutional change and social-ecological outcomes. 
Chapter 4 retains a similar focus on village-level outcomes and examines how international 
conservation finance generates legacies surrounding Kerinci-Seblat National Park (KSNP). 
Chapter 4 examines the conservation legacy of Indonesia’s largest Integrated 
Conservation and Development Project (ICDP). From 2000 to 2016, Indonesia received 
increasing amounts of international environmental aid; the Kerinci-Seblat ICDP was a flagship 
project, operating between 1999 and 2003. One of the ICDP objectives was to incent 
conservation and development activities in proximate populations by paying villages to sign 
voluntary conservation agreements (VCAs) in the early 2000s. In return for two disbursements of 
$12,500 betwene 2000 and 2003, villages agreed to pursue specific development projects and 
pledge not to convert forestland within the recently gazetted KSNP. Of the 72 villages that 
signed VCAs, only 19 received the full disbursement of funding. Chapter 4 shows that, a decade 
later, villages that signed a VCA demonstrate significantly higher rates of deforestation within 
KSNP boundaries. Further, households in VCA villages are more likely to own land that is held 
informally (i.e. no formal title), farm high-value tree crop, and the direct relationship between 
land ownership and income is significantly attentuated in VCA households. The differences 
between VCA and non-VCA villages suggest that households in VCA villages have pursued 
agricultural expansion instead of conservation activities specified in their VCA. 
The significant differences between VCA and non-VCA villages may be attributable to 
the monetization of conservation land that was immediately devalued. Chapter 4 discusses how, 
by paying villages to sign and pursue activities outlined in the VCA, the KS-ICDP may have 
crowded out intrinsic motivations for conservation. When the KS-ICDP failed to pay the full 
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amount to villages, as specified in the VCA, they may have further crowded out extrinsic 
motivation to conserve forest area in KSNP. The chapter thus concludes that, as conservation aid 
continues to affect landscapes across Indonesia, it will be crucial to study the long-term and 
potentially heterogeneous effects born by international funding and that it is crucial to study 
heterogeneity of conservation efficacy, as related to space and institutional change. 
Chapter 4 provides an example of how considering sequencing and spatial variation can 
provide understanding of potential causal mechanisms that generate social-ecological outcomes. 
In payments for ecosystem service projects, payments matter. Differences in VCA and non-VCA 
villages suggest that international conservation aid, though a manifestation of globalized 
diplomacy and development assistance, mixes with logistical, economic, and political realities to 
produce place-based transitions. Through the consideration of varying social-ecological 
outcomes across a conservation landscape, Chapter 4 shows that the legacy of the largest ICDP 
in Indonesia is largely opposite project goals and ambitions, within villages that received direct 
benefits from project activities. Considering spatial variation, especially spatial variation over 
time, can improve research on conservation and conservation legacies. 
5.2 Institutional transition and Indonesian forest landscapes, 1999 to 2016 
 
Individual chapters of this dissertation investigate the temporal and/or spatial processes 
of political change in Indonesia, and its relationship to forests and people. Analyses in this 
dissertation have been built upon baselines relevant to overarching institutional change, assess 
periods of time that encapsulates longitudinal variation relevant to individual research questions, 
and examine variation across and within political spaces. In sum, these findings promote greater 
consideration of how processes of institutional change “stretch” across space and time to affect 
and generate social-ecological outcomes. 
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General processes of formalization, decentralization, and globalized governance affect 
outcomes for forests and people in Indonesia. Chapter 2 examines the process of increasing 
formalization through policy content change, and how it has engendered ambiguity. As Indonesia 
has progressed to become the world’s third largest democracy, significant policy change 
occurred alongside natural resource management. Chapter 3 examines the sequence, longitudinal 
effect, and scalar variation of decentralization. It finds a significant and time-sensitive effect of 
village-level regulatory dispersal, which encourages other institutionalist studies of land cover 
change to more rigorously engage with changes in administrative boundaries. Chapter 4 
examines how the international conservation funding, implemented through the globalization of 
NGOs, combines with international commodity demand to generate conservation legacies 
surrounding an Indonesia’s second largest terrestrial PA. It supports analysis of how 
conservation efficacy varies through political and financial drivers of heterogeneous 
conservation outcomes. However, these examples are not exhaustive. Continued research of 
institutional transitions and forest outcomes in Indonesia can examine different aspects of 
formalization, decentralization, and globalized governance. Extending insights from this 
dissertation beyond Indonesia requires further analysis of how institutional transitions affect 
social-ecological outcomes.  
Many barriers exist to studying institutional transitions. Within this dissertation, 
individual chapters focus more on one or two aspects of institutional transition, often at the 
expense of analyzing and discussing the rest. Chapter 2 engages with temporal elements but is 
unable to assess spatial variation in policy content change. Chapter 3 examines sequencing, 
longitudinal effects, and variation across political space, but it does not engage with the 
heterogeneity of regulatory dispersal’s effect across geographical space. Chapter 4 examines 
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variation across administrative space, but it controls for sequencing effects through matching 
analysis and does not engage with longitudinal effects within the study period. If a dissertation 
dedicated to understanding institutional change as spatiotemporal transitions can only perform 
analysis in part, what hope is there for other research? This dissertation represents a small step 
on the path toward the scholarship on institutional transitions and social-ecological outcomes. 
Along with the growing number of studies that seek to understand institutional and social-
ecological change in tandem, it is one step in a larger movement. 
Studies at the interstices of institutional analysis and land systems science have already 
started to more comprehensively engage with the analysis of institutional transitions. Among 
others, these studies examine the heterogeneous effects of conservation rules over space (den 
Braber, Evans, and Oldekop 2018; Shah and Baylis 2015), elevation and slope gradients (Ferraro 
et al. 2015; Santika et al. 2017), as well as the longitudinal effects of environmental policy on 
human-environmental relationships (Allington, Li, and Brown 2017; Sylvester, Gutmann, and 
Brown 2016; Waroux et al. 2017). As with individual chapters in this dissertation, most of this 
research is able to focus on one or two elements of institutional transition. The ongoing quest for 
better data, especially social data of high temporal and spatial resolution (Erbaugh and Agrawal 
2017), is related to improving analyses of institutional change and social-ecological outcomes.  
As improvements in data and computing capacity permit more rigorous 
operationalization of space and time within empirical research, institutional analysis and land 
systems science will be able to more fully operationalize institutional change as transitional 
processes. Future research related to this dissertation can examine if and/or how vertical policy 
layering generates heterogeneous outcomes for forest cover and rural livelihoods; whether forest 
cover change following regulatory dispersal demonstrates unique land change patterns; and how 
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international conservation projects that provide economic inventives differ across geographical 
contexts. Each of these future directions examines timing, longitudinal effects, and spatial 
variation, of institutional change in a new way. Like institutional change, research is a social 
process that occurs in space and time. Analyzing institutional transitions through successive 
research iterations will be crucial for advancing understanding of social-ecological outcomes in a 
world of institutional change.  
The beginning of the 21st century has witnessed rapid environmental, social, political, and 
economic changes. Living in the Anthropocene, we are aware as never before of 
interconnections within social and ecological systems. Institutions shape the way in which 
people engage with one another, and they structure human-environmental interaction. 
Communities and the institutions they create and enact are capable of limitless change; however, 
the natural resources upon which they depend are limited in amount or in their regenerative 
capacity. If the sustainable use of resources for present and future generations is the goal, 
institutional transitions that promote such sustainability is the means. Studying how changes in 
rules, norms, and behaviors influence outcomes within social-ecological systems promises to 
improve our capacity for institutional design, how we understand the world around us, and our 
place in it.  
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Appendix A  
Spatial Data 
A.1 Land cover data 
 
Data on land cover categories come from the Indonesian Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry (Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan—KLHK). KLHK generated this 
dataset using manual classification of Landsat and MODIS imagery from 2000 to 2008, and a 
combination of manual and automatic classification of exclusively Landsat imagery from 2008 to 
2014 (KLHK, 2016). From 2000 to 2010, KLHK produced land cover data at three year intervals 
(2000, 2003, 2006, 2009). After 2009, KLHK produced land cover data annually. There are 22 
categories of land cover within the KLHK dataset (KLHK, 2015). To measure the change in 
overall forest cover, this dissertation combines the following categories: “primary forest,” 
“primary peat forest,” “secondary forest,” and “secondary peat forest” following other studies 
that find the combination of these forest areas in best agreement with other remotely sensed 
forest products (Hansen et al. 2013; Margono et al. 2014). Overall forest cover explicitly 
excludes “primary mangrove forest” and “secondary mangrove forest” from analyses, because 
these forests are subject to different deforestation drivers than terrestrial forests (Richards and 
Friess 2016). Table A.1 contains further information on all land cover variables contained in this 
dissertation that derive from the KLHK land cover product. 
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Variable Original variable name/s Definition Treatment Source 
Forest Hutan lahan kering 
primer; hutan lahan kering 
sekonder, hutan rawa 
primer; hutan rawa 
sekonder 
Terrestrial forest Combined primary and 
secondary forest land cover 
KLHK 
2016 
Paddy agriculture Sawah Wet agriculture None KLHK 
2016 
Field agriculture Pertanian lahan kering Dryland agriculture None KLHK 
2016 
Mixed agriculture Pertanian lahang kering 
campur 
Mixed field and 
tree agriculture 
mosaics 
None KLHK 
2016 
Timber plantation Hutan tanaman Forest plantation None KLHK 
2016 
Agricultural 
plantation 
Perkebunan Agricultural tree 
plantation 
None KLHK 
2016 
Settlement area Pemukiman Settlement None KLHK 
2016 
Distance to roads Roads Euclidean distance 
to roads within an 
administrative unit 
or from a specific 
point 
Measured Euclidean 
distance to roads (2000 and 
2015) in ArcGIS 10.5 and 
calculated a weighted 
average of distances based 
on intervening year 
BIG 2016, 
CIESIN 
2013 
Elevation Elevation Meters above sea-
level 
Cubic interpolation of NAs SRTM 
2008 
Slope over 12% Slope Land over 12% 
slope 
Created slope raster and 
identified all pixels (90m 
resolution) greater than or 
equal to 12% slope 
SRTM 
2008 
Precipitation Average mm/day Precipitation in 
mm/day 
Averaged over a three year 
period, including the year 
of analysis. For example, 
average precipitation for 
2003 includes 2001, 2002, 
and 2003 
Huffman et 
al. 2017 
Protected area IUCN Protected area 
categories I-IV 
Strictly protected 
areas 
Subsetted protected area 
shapefiles to Indonesia, 
dropped marine protected 
areas, dropped protected 
areas established after a 
given year in analysis, 
dropped less strictly 
protected areas and 
multiple use areas 
UNEP-
WCMC 
and IUCN 
2016 
 
Table A.1: Spatial data variables, definition, treatment, and source 
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A.2 Additional spatial data 
 
In addition to KLHK land cover data, this dissertation incorporates elevation, slope, 
precipitation, and road network data from different sources. Values for elevation and slope 
derive from the SRTM digital elevation model (Jarvis, Reuter, and Nelson, 2008). To generate 
the slope raster, this dissertation uses the SRTM digital elevation model processed with ArcGIS 
10.5. Instead of using average village slope, analyses in this dissertation use the average amount 
of village area with slope greater than 12%, following other studies that seek to more accurately 
control for agricultural suitability (Blackman et al. 2017). 
To calculate relevant precipitation values, this dissertation incorporates data from the 
Tropical Rainfall Measurement Mission (TRMM), calculating average precipitation for two 
years preceding and including each year within the panel data (Huffman et al. 2007).  Three year 
precipitation averages in Indonesia demonstrate strong, positive correlation with field 
agriculture, paddy agriculture, and elevation. Analyses in Chapter 3 drop the measurement of 
average precipitation due to strong positive associations. However, matching pre-processing in 
Chapter 4 controls for average precipitation, as the association between it and agricultural 
variable and elevation did not make it redundant. 
Spatially explicit road network data comes from two sources that enable interpolation of 
average distance to road values between 2000 and 2014. As with many spatially-explicit 
analyses, finding and incorporating accurate and time-varying road data into analyses proved 
challenging (Frizzelle et al. 2009). The GROADS database (CIESIN, 2013) provides road 
information for Indonesia, at the national level, for the year 2000. The Geographical Information 
Agency (Badan Informasi Geospasial—BIG) provided public data on Indonesian road networks 
for the year 2014 (BIG, 2014). To calculate average distance to roads for intervening years in our 
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analyses (2003, 2006, 2009, 2011), we assume road growth is linear. Although this method does 
not model average distance to roads using population or land cover changes, it improves on the 
current state of incorporating road network data within institutional studies of social-ecological 
outcomes in Indonesia. Leading studies that incorporate rigorous causal inference to assess 
institutional drivers of land or forest cover change treat distance to roads as a time-invariant 
variable, either matching on road data once  or by holding the average distance to roads or cities 
as constant in an analysis of panel data (Ferraro et al. 2015; Miteva, Loucks, and Pattanayak 
2015; Santika et al. 2017; Shah and Baylis 2015). By interpolating road data, even using a basic 
assumption of linear growth, analyses in this dissertation more accurately consider distance to 
roads as time-variant. Future research can build upon this small step forward in combining 
insights from land-change science into institutional analyses to develop more accurate models of 
road-network growth in Indonesia and include more accurate interpolation of road data. 
Analyses include data on protected areas from the International Union for Conservation 
of Nature and Natural Resources World Database for Protected Areas (UNEP-WCMC and IUCN 
2016). This dataset has been used extensively in other studies that investigate the efficacy of 
protected area networks (den Braber, Evans, and Oldekop 2018; Miller and Nakamura 2018; 
Christoph Nolte et al. 2013). Since this dissertation focuses on terrestrial forests (excluding 
mangrove forests), it limits the dataset to terrestrial protected areas. 
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Appendix B  
Multidimensional deprivation indicators 
 
B.1 Background 
 
Multidimensional measurements of livelihoods and well-being combine health, 
education, and livelihood data to generate a more accurate picture of human well-being than 
unidimensional measurements. Although economic measurements of income or consumption 
provide valid and easily quantifiable data on national or sub-national economic well-being, these 
measurements have been critiqued as unrepresentative and subject to temporary and drastic 
fluctuations that are unrepresentative of human well-being. Multidimensional measurements that 
combine economic well-being with measurements of health and education can provide more 
comprehensive insight into poverty and well-being (Alkire and Foster 2011b; UNDP 1997; 
World Bank 2000). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reports the Human 
Development Index (HDI) as well as the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). The HDI draws 
on national statistics of average life expectancy at birth, expected years of schooling, mean years 
of schooling, and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita to provide a multidimensional 
development measurement. The MPI borrows from the theory and logic of the HDI, and applies 
the multidimensional well-being framework to the household level.  
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 Using nationally representative surveys, the Alkire-Foster method calculates the MPI 
based on household data for health, education, and assets. Using a set of variables common 
among nationally representative household surveys, the Alkire-Foster method first calculates a 
deprivation matrix (Table B.1). The deprivation matrix contains information on which 
households are deprived in what indicators that comprise the more general categories of health, 
education, and livelihood (Alkire and Foster 2011a; Alkire and Santos 2014). Equally weighting 
health, education, and asset deprivation categories, the Alkire-Foster method estimates the 
incidence of multidimensional poverty as the proportion of households with an overall 
deprivation indicator score of 0.33 or lower. This cut-point reflects a household that is 
completely deprived in one of the three categories. Analyses in this dissertation use the logic and 
Table B.1: Deprivation categories, variables, and weight for MPI (Alkire & Santos 2014) 
Deprivation 
Category 
Variable Description Overall Weight 
(Category Weight) 
Health 
Nutrition: If the household had to skip a meal, ran out of all food, or 
went an entire day without eating during the past four weeks 
16.67% 
(50.0%) 
Child mortality: If any child (household member less than 15 years 
old) died in the past year 
16.67% 
(50.0%) 
      
Education 
Educational attainment: If no household member completed over 
five years of schooling 
16.67% 
(50.0%) 
Educational attendance: If any child (household member less than 15 
years old) does not attend school 
16.67% 
(50.0%) 
      
Livelihood 
Fuel Deprivation: If the household reports dung, wood, or carbon 
(charcoal or coal) as their primary cooking fuel 
5.56% 
(16.67%) 
Sanitation Deprivation: If the household does not have a private and 
improved toilet 
5.56% 
(16.67%) 
Flooring: If the household has dirt, sand, or dung floor 5.56% 
(16.67%) 
Drinking Water Deprivation: If the household does not have 
protected drinking water (i.e. piped, public tap, borehole/pump, 
protected spring or rainwater) 
5.56% 
(16.67%) 
Electricity Deprivation: If the household does not have electricity 5.56% 
(16.67%) 
Assets: If the household does not own a radio, TV, telephone, 
bicycle, motorbike, or refrigerator and does not own a car or truck 
5.56% 
(16.67%) 
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theory of MPI to generate multidimensional deprivation indicators (MDI) that assist with the 
examination of multidimensional deprivations at the household and village level. 
B.2 Household MDI 
 
It is essential to control for household or regional development when assessing the effect 
of institutional change on land cover change or social-ecological outcomes. The relationship 
between development, poverty, and land cover change is contextual and dependent, but 
controlling for multidimensional well-being in the empirical examination of institutions and land 
cover change is crucial. Failing to control for multidimensional well-being risks identification of 
a spurious relationship between the institution under examination and the land cover outcome. 
Thus, analyses in Chapter 3, which examine differences in household livelihood strategies and 
income in villages that did and did not sign a Voluntary Conservation Agreement (VCA), control 
for multidimensional household deprivations. 
The multidimensional deprivation indicator in this dissertation combines health, 
education, and asset data collected through a household survey disseminated in Jambi province 
(Appendix C). Table B.2 provides information on how the different categories of deprivation are 
calculated and weighted to produce the overall multidimensional deprivation indicator. This 
value follows the first step of the MPI protocol, where a “deprivation matrix” is calculated. 
Subsequent steps for generating the MPI include censoring the deprivation matrix to focus only 
on multidimensionally poor households (incidence, or H), calculating the average deprivation 
index score per multidimensionally poor household (intensity, A), and taking the product of H 
and A to generate M0, which is the adjusted headcount ratio that is reported as the MPI. These 
steps focus on the identification of multidimensionally poor households and accounting for the 
intensity of poverty among them. Instead of limiting consideration of the deprivation matrix to  
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Table B.2: Multidimensional village deprivation indicator (MDVDI) by deprivation category, variable, and weighting 
strategy 
Deprivation 
Category Variable Description 
w1 
Overall Weight 
(Category Weight) 
w2 
Overall Weight 
(Category Weight) 
w3 
Overall Weight 
(Category Weight) 
Health 
Nutrition Deprivation: If anyone in the 
village was reported to suffer from 
malnutrition over the past year 
16.67% 
(50.0%) 
16.67% 
(50.0%) 
16.67% 
(50.0%) 
Hospital Access Deprivation: If a 
Hospital is over approximately 60 
minutes away 
8.33%  
(25%) 
0 16.67% 
(50.0%) 
Treatment Deprivation: If anyone in the 
village has died from the following 
treatable illnesses: Diarrhea/Vomiting, 
Measles, Dengue Fever, Malaria, 
Respiratory Infection,  
8.33%  
(25%) 
16.67% 
(50.0%) 
0 
          
Education 
Overall School Access Deprivation: If the 
average distance to the nearest 
Kindergarten, primary, Middle, High, or 
Private Religious School is over 9 km 
away (approximately 2-3 hours walking 
distance) 
16.67% 
(50.0%) 
0 33.33% 
(100%) 
Leadership Education Deprivation: If the 
Current Village Leader (if not Village 
Head, then Village Secretary) has less 
than High School Education 
16.67% 
(50.0%) 
33.3% 
(100%) 
0 
          
Livelihood 
Fuel Deprivation: If the majority of HHs 
in a village use wood, charcoal, or dung 
as their primary fuel type 
5.56% 
(16.67%) 
8.33% 
(25.0%) 
5.56% 
(16.67%) 
Sanitation Deprivation: If the majority of 
HHs in a village use shared toilets or 
rivers/open land 
5.56% 
(16.67%) 
8.33% 
(25.0%) 
5.56% 
(16.67%) 
Road Material Deprivation: If the major 
road in town is not paved (asphault) 
5.56% 
(16.67%) 
0 5.56% 
(16.67%) 
Drinking Water Deprivation: If majority 
of HHs receive water from an 
unimproved and insecure source 
(river/lake or rain water) 
5.56% 
(16.67%) 
8.33% 
(25.0%) 
5.56% 
(16.67%) 
Electricity Deprivation: If over 10% of 
households in the village do not have 
electrictiy 
5.56% 
(16.67%) 
8.33% 
(25.0%) 
5.56% 
(16.67%) 
Overall Village Asset Deprivation: If the 
major road in the village is not passable 
all year AND the mobile phone signal is 
weak or does not exist 
5.56% 
(16.67%) 
0 5.56% 
(16.67%) 
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identify and measure poverty within poor households alone, this dissertation uses the deprivation 
matrix to calculate a multidimensional deprivation indicator (MDI) that provides information for 
households that are and are not multidimensionally poor.  
B.3 Village MDI 
 
Developing a multidimensional deprivation indicator at the village-level holds great 
promise for empirical analysis of social-ecological outcomes at small spatial scales. Previous 
studies have generated small-scale poverty indices by aggregating household data (Bedi, 
Coudouel, and Simler 2007) or through the use of remotely sensed land cover data that is 
associated with livelihoods and well-being (Watmough et al. 2016). Although aggregating 
household-level information can provide detailed and robust data on poverty and well-being at 
smaller jurisdictional levels, such data collection is expensive, time consuming, and requires 
explicit sampling protocols to ensure a representative sample is collected. Alternatively, 
predicting poverty and well-being across small jurisdictional units using remotely sensed land 
cover imagery costs little, but requires strong assumptions about the connections between land 
cover, livelihood, and well-being. Surveying regional officials about infrastructure, livelihood, 
and well-being can provide a compromise on data quality and cost for estimating small-area 
poverty and well-being. The Indonesian Village Census (Sesus Potensi Desa—PODES), 
completed by Village Heads every three years, provides a dataset rich in village-level 
information that this dissertation uses to generate a multidimensional village deprivation index 
(MDVDI). 
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MDVDI measurements using PODES provide multidimensional deprivation data at a 
significantly smaller jurisdictional scale than other available data sources. However, other 
Indonesian surveys have higher temporal resolution, such as the National Socioeconomic Survey 
(Sensus Sosioekonomi Nasional—SUSENAS). Future research can improve on the MDVDI 
presented here by combining PODES data with SUSENAS data to generate low-cost, small-area, 
multidimensional well-being information with high spatial as well as temporal resolution. 
 
 
Table B.3: Kendall’s tau correlations of multidimensional village deprivation indicator weighting scenarios by year 
Ranking 
pair 
2000 2003 2006 2008 2011 2014 
τB(w1,w2) 0.76 0.74 0.75 0.69 0.83 0.86 
τB(w1,w3) 0.81 0.71 0.79 0.60 0.82 0.84 
τB(w2,w3) 0.58 0.53 0.51 0.59 0.63 0.69 
 
 
Figure B.1: Year of Indonesian village census (PODES) data collection (x-axis) by MDVDI (y-axis) by weighting strategy 
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Appendix C  
Survey design and dissemination 
 
C.1 Sample size and precision 
 
This survey aims to collect data representative of the population of households living in 
close proximity to Kerinci-Seblat National park (KSNP). To maximize precision and minimize 
survey costs, the sample is selected from a stratified cluster sample  (Groves et al., 2009). To 
define the sample population, households in villages within 3 km of the KSNP border are 
considered “proximate” (Figure C.1), following methods that define intact forest landscapes 
through 3 km buffers of human impact (Potapov et al. 2008, 2017a). These three districts (Table 
C.1) contain the largest proportion of KSNP and primary forest cover within their administrative 
boundaries. Two additional districts within Jambi province contain villages within 3 km of the 
KSNP boundary. However, due to budgetary constraints and a lack of official research approval, 
Bungo and Sarolangun districts were not included in the survey sample.  
 
Table C.1: Sample population 
Note: Three boundaries were dropped from the village population, including two lake boundaries and one village boundary. 
The lakes were dropped because they contain only water bodies. The village was dropped because it did not reconcile with 
PODES data, and thus could not be verified. All dropped boundaries were inside Kerinci district. 
 
District/City Sub-District Village Households 
Kerinci 16 143 48,151 
Merangin 7 37 9,699 
Sungai Penuh 5 15 4,979 
Totals 28 195 62,829 
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Equation C.1 calculates the optimal number of primary sampling units (PSUs) and 
secondary sampling units (SSUs) in order to maximize the representation and precision of the 
survey sample based on a budget of $11,200.00.  
 
𝑏𝑜𝑝𝑡 =⁡√(
⁡𝑐𝑎
𝑐𝑏
⁡) ∗ ⁡
1−⁡𝑟𝑜ℎ𝑦
𝑟𝑜ℎ𝑦⁡
⁡    [Equation C.1] 
 
Where c is cost, a is the primary sampling unit (villages), b is the secondary sampling unit 
(households), rohy is the rate of homogeneity within clusters, and bopt is the optimal number of 
households sampled per village. The rate of homogeneity (roh) is calculated by:  
 
 
Figure C.1: Villages in Kerinci, Merangin, and Sungai Penuh districts within 3 km of Kerinci-Seblat National Park (KSNP) 
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𝑟𝑜ℎ = ⁡
(𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑓−1)
𝑏−1
     [Equation C.2] 
Where deff is the design effect and b refers to SSUs (villages). Previous to this study, a 
sample design that focuses on the Jambi Highlands did not exist. In interviews, local NGO 
leaders and government officials estimated the marginal cost of each village (ca) to be between 
$70.00 and $85.20, and the marginal cost of each survey (cb) as $6.08. Due to a lack of data 
survey design information for the Jambi Highlands, we use the Indonesian Demographic Health 
Survey (DHS) collected in 2012 (BPS, 2013) to estimate roh.  However, the Indonesian DHS 
contains significant differences in focus and aim from this research. First, it collects data to be 
representative at the province level; this study seeks to collect data representative of households 
that live within 3 km of KSNP in Kerinci, Merangin, and Sungai Penuh districts. Second, the 
Indonesian DHS uses selects census blocks as the PSU; this study uses villages. And finally, the 
Indonesian DHS selected a representative sample across Jambi province in order to measure 
individual and household health. This study seeks to calculate health, livelihood, and 
environmental statistics at the household level. Despite these differences, some of the measures 
provided by the Indonesian DHS are similar to measures of interest in this study and it is the only 
rigorous, publically available survey to provide survey design information relevant to Jambi 
province.  
 
Table C.2: Cost and sample design scenarios 
 
ca bopt cb/village 
  Village Cost  
(ca + cb) 
Total 
Villages  
Total 
surveys  
42.6 17.06 103.74 146.34 76 1292 
70 21.87 132.99 202.99 55 1155 
85.2 24.13 146.71 231.91 48 1152 
100 26.14 158.95 258.95 43 1118 
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Calculating roh from the design effect of clustered survey sampling informs our 
calculation of optimal sub-sample size (bopt). The average roh for relevant indicators, including 
literacy rates, morbidity, mortality, and educational attainment in Jambi province, is of 0.012, 
with an average deff  of 1.31. Using the cost estimates (ca and cb) as well as average roh for 
Indonesian DHS data from Jambi province, Table C.2 presents a series of optimal cluster size 
scenarios. 
Using this information, we decided to draw a sample of 60 villages with the aim to 
complete 25 household surveys within 50 to 56 of the sampled villages. This sample target 
represents a balance between feasibility and ambition, given the survey budget and dearth of cost 
information. Since no prior estimates of actual enumerator travel times and marginal village cost 
exist, we selected to sample 25 households per village, in the event that ca approached $85.20. 
However, randomly selecting 60 villages represents a best-case scenario where both ca and cb are 
lower than the estimates calculated at the beginning of this survey design. Completion of 25 
surveys within 60 villages represents the best-case scenario, completion of 25 surveys within 50 
to 55 villages represents the survey target, and the completion of 25 surveys within 48 represents 
the worst-case scenario. Since the study target was to complete 25 surveys within at least 50 
villages, precision estimates were calculated using 50 clusters of 25 subsamples. Table C.3 
illustrates the proportionate stratum totals for primary and secondary sampling units within 
Kerinci, Merangin, and Sungai Penuh districts. 
Table C.3: Stratum, cluster, and survey totals based on bopt 
Stratum Households 
Weighted 
Cluster Totals 
HH Total per 
Stratum 
Kerinci 37,104 37 925 
Sungai 
Penuh 
4,118 4 100 
Merangin 9,699 9 225 
Total Sample 50,921 50 1250 
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C.2 First stage selection 
 
All villages with boundaries within 3km of the Kerinci Seblat National Park, in Kerinci, 
Merangin, and Sungai Penuh were possible primary sampling units (PSUs) for this study 
(n=195). Three boundary areas were dropped—two were water body areas and one village 
boundary was recorded twice. We selected villages systematically, based on probability 
proportionate to estimated size (PPeS), using the number of households within each village as 
recorded by 2015 BPS estimates from each district (Kish 1965). Village and household totals 
were collected from district-level BPS offices between April and May 2016. Each village was 
ordered according to its province, district, and sub-district identification number. Then, villages 
were selected using the sampling fraction of 52,423/1,250 and a random start of 18,489. Table 
C.4 presents the list of 51 villages that comprise the final village sample. 
Table C.4: List of villages selected for survey dissemination (continued on next page) 
ID 2013 District/City Sub-District Village 
1501010003 KERINCI GUNUNG RAYA LEMPUR TENGAH 
1501010017 KERINCI GUNUNG RAYA MANJUNTO LEMPUR 
1501020001 KERINCI BATANG MERANGIN MUARA HEMAT 
1501020004 KERINCI BATANG MERANGIN TAMIAI 
1501020009 KERINCI BATANG MERANGIN DUSUN BARU PULAU SANG 
1501030011 KERINCI KELILING DANAU DUSUN BARU PULAU TENG 
1501030022 KERINCI KELILING DANAU PULAU TENGAH 
1501040005 KERINCI DANAU KERINCI KOTO TENGAH 
1501040012 KERINCI DANAU KERINCI CUPAK 
1501050022 KERINCI SITINJAU LAUT AMBAI ATAS 
1501070040 KERINCI AIR HANGAT PENDUNG HILIR 
1501071007 KERINCI AIR HANGAT TIMUR PUNGUT MUDIK 
1501071013 KERINCI AIR HANGAT TIMUR AIR HANGAT 
1501071016 KERINCI AIR HANGAT TIMUR KEMANTAN KEBALAI 
1501072004 KERINCI DEPATI VII DUSUN BARU KUBANG 
1501072017 KERINCI DEPATI VII TAMBAK TINGGI 
1501080024 KERINCI GUNUNG KERINCI SIMPANG TUTUP 
1501080027 KERINCI GUNUNG KERINCI DANAU TINGGI 
1501080034 KERINCI GUNUNG KERINCI 
BARU SUNGAI BETUNG 
MUDIK 
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C.3 Second stage selection 
 
After first stage selection, we received permission to survey in each village from village 
heads (kepala desa), and we acquired address and household location information from district-
level BPS offices (Figure C.2 and Figure C.3). From BPS maps, we randomly selected 
households. To account for any new addresses added after BPS maps were made, we 
disseminated surveys with a half-open interval technique. Sampling with half-open intervals 
ID 2013 District/City Sub-District Village 
1501081024 KERINCI SIULAK SUNGAI PEGEH 
1501082001 KERINCI SIULAK MUKAI MUKAI HILIR 
1501082008 KERINCI SIULAK MUKAI TEBING TINGGI MUKAI M 
1501090003 KERINCI KAYU ARO SUNGAI DALAM 
1501090016 KERINCI KAYU ARO KOTO PANJANG 
1501090024 KERINCI KAYU ARO BATANG SANGIR 
1501090025 KERINCI KAYU ARO KERSIK TUO 
1501090040 KERINCI KAYU ARO MEKAR SARI 
1501090043 KERINCI KAYU ARO MEKAR JAYA 
1501091002 KERINCI GUNUNG TUJUH BENGKOLAN DUA 
1501091004 KERINCI GUNUNG TUJUH TANGKIL 
1501091007 KERINCI GUNUNG TUJUH LUBUK PAUH 
1501091010 KERINCI GUNUNG TUJUH SUNGAIJERNIH 
1501092001 KERINCI KAYU ARO BARAT BATU HAMPAR 
1501092005 KERINCI KAYU ARO BARAT SAKO DUA 
1501092008 KERINCI KAYU ARO BARAT PATOK EMPAT 
1501092011 KERINCI KAYU ARO BARAT GIRI MULYO 
1501092014 KERINCI KAYU ARO BARAT KEBUN BARU 
1501092016 KERINCI KAYU ARO BARAT PASAR MINGGU 
1502010015 MERANGIN JANGKAT MUARA MADRAS 
1502010017 MERANGIN JANGKAT PULAU TENGAH 
1502010022 MERANGIN JANGKAT RENAH KEMUMU 
1502020004 MERANGIN MUARA SIAU DURIAN RAMBUN 
1502021006 MERANGIN LEMBAH MASURAI DUSUN TUO 
1502021011 MERANGIN LEMBAH MASURAI SUNGAI LALANG 
1502052001 MERANGIN PANGKALAN JAMBU BUKIT PERENTAK 
1502052007 MERANGIN PANGKALAN JAMBU KAMPUNG LIMO 
1502067003 MERANGIN TABIR BARAT TELENTAM 
1572020001 SUNGAI PENUH KUMUN DEBAI RENAH KAYU EMBUN 
1572031001 SUNGAI PENUH PONDOK TINGGGI SUNGAI JERNIH 
1572031002 SUNGAI PENUH PONDOK TINGGGI KOTO LEBU 
1572040012 SUNGAI PENUH 
HAMPARAN 
RAWANG 
LARIK KEMAHAN 
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requires that every address starting with the selected household until the next listed address be 
sampled for survey completion. If no address exists between the selected address and the next 
address in the list, no additional households are sampled. Further, if a selected household was at 
the end of a road, all addresses before the first listed address for that road are included in the 
sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.2: Example map from which random household samples were drawn 
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C.4 Survey dissemination 
 
 Survey enumeration ran between October 2016 and January 2017. Enumerators used 
electronic tablets and entered survey data using the Qualtrics electronic survey platform. At the 
end of each every week, each enumerator uploaded their surveys. To ensure quality data 
collection, surveys were assessed for completion and errors every two weeks. Eight enumerators 
conducted interviews with 1,304 households within the 51 sampled villages. This total number 
includes households that comprised the survey pilot, conducted in Sungai Jernih village (Sungai 
Penuh city). The response rate was 0.98. Figure C.4 plots household survey locations on the 
sample population map. 
 
 
Figure C.3: Example of BPS Census Block maps that combine to make a village. Figure C.2 is the second map from the 
right. 
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In addition to household surveys, enumerators disseminated a unique survey to each 
Village Head (n=51). In contrast to the household survey, the Village Head survey elicited 
information on village history, demographics, economy, forest-use, and interaction with political 
figures as well as NGOs. The response rate for the Village Head survey was 100%. 
 
  
 
 
Figure C.4: Household survey location within the village sample population 
 
 
 
 
 131 
 
Appendix D  
Supplemental material for Chapter 2 
 
 
 
  
 
Table D.1: Additional sources used to identify national forest-related policy 
Citation Peer-
Reviewed 
Sahide, M. A. K. and Giessen, L. (2015) ‘The fragmented land use administration in 
Indonesia - Analysing bureaucratic responsibilities influencing tropical rainforest 
transformation systems’, Land Use Policy. Elsevier Ltd, 43, pp. 96–110. doi: 
10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.11.005. 
Yes 
Brockhaus, M. et al. (2012) ‘An overview of forest and land allocation policies in Indonesia: 
Is the current framework sufficient to meet the needs of REDD+?’, Forest Policy and 
Economics. Elsevier B.V., 18, pp. 30–37. doi: 10.1016/j.forpol.2011.09.004. 
Yes 
Nurfatriani, F. et al. (2015) ‘Redesigning Indonesian forest fiscal policy to support forest 
conservation’, Forest Policy and Economics. Elsevier B.V., 61, pp. 39–50. doi: 
10.1016/j.forpol.2015.07.006. 
Yes 
Harahap, F., Silveira, S. and Khatiwada, D. (2017) ‘Land allocation to meet sectoral goals in 
Indonesia—An analysis of policy coherence’, Land Use Policy. Elsevier Ltd, 61, pp. 451–
465. doi: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.11.033. 
Yes 
Nurrochmat, D. N. et al. (2015) ‘Changing policies over timber supply and its potential 
impacts to the furniture industries of Jepara, Indonesia’, Jurnal Manajemen Hutan Tropika 
(Journal of Tropical Forest Management), 21(1), pp. 36–44. doi: 10.7226/jtfm.21.1.36. 
Yes 
Ardiansyah, F., Marthen, A. A. and Amalia, N. (2015) ‘Forest and land-use governance in a 
decentralized Indonesia: A legal and policy review’, CIFOR Working Paper, 132, p. 114. doi: 
10.17528/cifor/005695 Ardiansyah. 
No 
Indonesia. Forest Legality Initiative. WRI. 2017. 15 June 2018 https://forestlegality.org/risk-
tool/country/indonesia 
No 
Indonesia: Plans and Policies. The REDD Desk. 2018. 15 June 2018 https://theredddesk.org/ No 
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Table D.2: List of all national forest related policies from analysis (continued next seven pages) 
Type No. Year Name 
Law 22 1999 Tentang Pementahan Daerah 
Law 25 1999 Tentang Pembangan Keuangan Antara Pementah Pusat Dan Daerah  
Law 41 1999 Tentang Kehutanan 
Law 17 2000 Tentang Perubahan Ketiga UU7-1983 : Tentang Pajak Penhasilan 
Law 29 2000 Tentang Perlindungan Varietas Tanaman 
Law 22 2001 Tentang Minyak Dan Gas Bumi 
Law 27 2003 Tentang Panas Bumi 
Law 7 2004 Tentang Sumber Daya Air 
Law 17 2004 Tentang Pengesahan Protokol Kyoto Atas Konvensi Kerangka Kerja Persekatan Bangsa-
Bangsa Tentang Perubahan Iklim 
Law 18 2004 Tentang Perkebunan 
Law 19 2004 Tentang Penetapan PerPem Pengganti UU 1/2004: Tentang Perubahan Atas UU 41/1999: 
Tentang Kehutanan 
Law 25 2004 Tentang Sistem Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional 
Law 32 2004 Tentang Pemerintahan Daerah 
Law 33 2004 Tentang Pembangan Keuangan Antara Pementah Pusat Dan Daerah  
Law 38 2004 Tentang Jalan 
Law 4 2006 Tentang Perjanjian Mengenai Sumber Daya Genetik Tanaman Untuk Pangan Dan 
Pertanian  
Law 16 2006 Tentang Penyuluhan Pertanian Pekanan Dan Kehutanan 
Law 24 2007 Tentang Penanggulangan Bencana 
Law 17 2007 Tentang Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional Tahun 2005-2025 
Law 26 2007 Tentang Penataan Ruang 
Law 27 2007 Tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir Dan Pulau-Pulau Kecil 
Law 30 2007 Tentang Energi 
Law 4 2009 Tentang Pertambangan Mineral Dan Batu Bara 
Law 28 2009 Tentang Pajak Daerah Dan Retbusi Daerah 
Law 32 2009 Tentang Perlindungan Dan Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup 
Law 39 2009 Tentang Kawasan Ekonomi Khusus 
Law 41 2009 Tentang Perlindungan Lahan Pertanian Berkelanjutan 
Law 13 2010 Tentang Hortikultura 
Law 4 2011 Tentang Informasi Geospasial 
Law 2 2012 Tentang Pengadaan Tanah Bagi Pembangunan Dan Kepentingan Umum 
Law 18 2012 Tentang Pangan 
Law 11 2013 Tentang Protokol Nagoya Tentang Akses Pada Sumberdaya Genetik Dan Pembagian 
Keuntungan Yang Adil Pada Konverensi Keanekaragaman Hayati 
Law 18 2013 Tentang Pencegahan Dan Pemberantasan Pengrusakan Hutan  
Law 19 2013 Tentang Perlindungan Dan Pemberdayaan Petani  
Law 1 2014 Tentang Perubahan Atas UU 27/2007: Tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir Dan Pulau-
Pulau Kecil 
Law 6 2014 Tentang Desa 
Law 21 2014 Tentang Panas Bumi 
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Type No. Year Name 
Law 23 2014 Tentang Pemerintahan Daerah 
Law 26 2014 Tentang Pengesahan Persutujuan Asean Tentang Pencemaran Asap Lintas Batas 
Law 37 2014 Tentang Konservasi Tanah Dan Air 
Law 39 2014 Tentang Perkebunan 
Law 12 2016 Tentang Prubahan Atas UU 14/2015: Tentang Anggaran Pendapatan Dan Belanja Negara 
Tahun Anggaran 2016 
GR 6 1999 Tentang Pengusahaan Hutan Dan Pemungutan Hasil Hutan Pada Hutan Produksi. 
GR 27 1999 Tentang Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan Hidup 
GR 53 1999 Tentang Perusahaan Umum Kehutanan Negara (Perum Perhutani ) 
GR 74 1999 Tentang Perubahan Atas Peraturan Pemerintah No 59 Tahun 1998 Tentang Tarif Atas 
Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak Yang Berlaku Pada Departemen Kehutanan Dan 
Perlkebunan 
GR 83 1999 Tentang Kerjasama Antar Pemerintah Dan Bank Umum Dalam Rangka Pembiayaan 
Kredit Usaha Tani 
GR 92 1999 Tentang Perubahan Kedua Atas Peraturan Pemerintah No 59 Tahun 1998 Tentang Tarif 
Atas Jenis Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak Yang Berlaku Pada Departemen Kehutanan 
Dan Perkebunan 
GR 25 2000 Tentang  Kewenangan Pemerintah Dan Kewenangan 
Propinsi Sebagai Otonom 
GR 57 2000 Tentang Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Republik Indonesia Ke Dalam Modal 
Saham Perusahaan Perseroan (Persero)  Pt Perkebunan Nusantara Iv 
GR 95 2000 Tentang Perusahaan Umum (Perum)Sarana Pengembangan Usaha 
GR 150 2000 Tentang Pengendalian Kerusakan Tanah Untuk Produksi Biomassa 
GR 4 2001 Tentang Pengendalian Kerusakan Atau Pencemaran Lingkungan Hidup Yang Berkaitan 
Dengan Kerusakan Lingkungan Hidup Dan Lahan 
GR 14 2001 Tentang Pengalihan Bentuk Perusahaan Umum (Perum) Kehutanan Negara Menjadi 
Perusahaan Perseroan 
GR 75 2001 Tentang Perubahan Kedua Atas Peraturan Pemerintah No 32 Tahun 1969 Tentang 
Pelaksanaan Uu No 11 Tahun 1967 Tentang Ketentuan Pokok Pertambangan 
GR 34 2002 Tentang Tata Hutan Dan Penyusunan Rencana Pengelolaan Hutan Pemanfaatan Hutan 
Dan Penggunaan Kawasan Hutan 
GR 35 2002 Tentang Reboisasi 
GR 38 2002 Tentang Daftar Koordinat Titik Pangkal Kepulauan Indonesia 
GR 63 2002 Tentang Hutan Kota 
GR 68 2002 Tentang Ketahanan Pangan 
GR 4 2001 Tentang Pengendalian Kerusakan Dan Pencemaran Lingkungan Hidup Yang Berkaitan 
Dengan Kebakaran Hutan Dan Lahan 
GR 7 2004 Tentang Perubahan Atas Peraturan Pemerintah No 49 Tahun 2002 Tentang Tarif Atas 
Jenis Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak Yang Berlaku Pada Departemen Pertanian 
GR 15 2004 Tentang Perusahaan Umum ( Perum) Pembangunan Perumahan Nasional 
GR 16 2004 Tentang Penatagunaan Tanah  
GR 44 2004 Tentang Perencanaan Kehutanan 
GR 45 2004 Tentang Perlindungan Hutan 
GR 48 2004 Tentang  Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Ri Kedalam Modal Saham Perusahaan 
Perseroan (Persero) Pt Eksploitasi Dan Industri Hutan I (Inhutani I) 
GR 49 2004 Tentang  Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Ri Kedalam Modal Saham Perusahaan 
Perseroan (Persero) Pt Eksploitasi Dan Industri Hutan Ii (Inhutani Ii) 
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Type No. Year Name 
GR 50 2004 Tentang  Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Ri Kedalam Modal Saham Perusahaan 
Perseroan (Persero) Pt Eksploitasi Dan Industri Hutan Iii (Inhutani Iii) 
GR 52 2004 Tentang Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Ri Kedalam Modal Saham Perusahaan 
Persero Pt Eksploitasi Industri Hutan V (Pt Inhutani V) 
GR 53 2004 Tentang Pengurangan Penyertaan Modal Negara Republik Indonesia Pada Modal Saham 
Perusahaan Perseroan ( Pt Persero) Pt Eksploitasi Dan Industri Hutan Ii Dan Penambahan 
Penyertaan Modal Negara Dalam Modal Saham Perusahaan Pt Persero Pt Eksploitasi 
Dan Industri Hutan V (Pt Inhutani V) 
GR 22 2005 Tentang Pemeriksaan Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak 
GR 6 2007 Tentang Tata Hutan Dan Penyusunan Rencana Pengelolaan Hutan Serta Pemanfaatan 
Hutan 
GR 59 2007 Tentang Kegiatan Usaha Panas Bumi 
GR 68 2007 Tentang Penyertaan Modal Negara Ri Ke Dalam Modal Perusahaan Pt Perseroan 
(Persero) Pt Perkebunan Nusantara Xiv 
GR 2 2008 Tentang Jenis Dan Tarif Atas Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak Yang Berasal Dari 
Penggunaan Kawasan Hutan Untuk Kepentingan Pembangunan Diluar Kegiatan 
Kehutanan 
GR 3 2008 Tentang Perubahan Atas Aturan Pemerintah No 6 Tahun 2007 Tentang Tata Hutan Dan 
Penyususnan Rencana Pengelolaan Hutan Serta Pemanfaatan Hutan  
GR 26 2008 Tentang Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Nasional  
GR 37 2008 Tentang Perubahan Atas Peratuan Pemerintah No 38 Tahun 2002 Tentang Daftar 
Koordinat Geografis Titik Pangkal Kepulauan Indonesia 
GR 51 2008 Tentang Provisi Sumberdaya Hutan 
GR 76 2008 Tentang Rehabilitasi Hutan Dan Lahan 
GR 29 2009 Tentang Tata Cara Penentuan Jumlah Pembayaran Dan Penyetoran Penerimaan Negara 
Bukan Pajak  
GR 31 2009 Tentang Perlindungan Wilayah Geografis Penghasil Produk Perkebunan Spesifikasi 
Lokal 
GR 43 2009 Tentang Pembiayaan, Pembinaan , Pengawasan Penyuluhan Pertanian Perikanan Dan 
Kehutanan 
GR 60 2009 Tentang Perubahan Atas Peraturan Pemerintah No.45 Tahun 2004 Tentang Perlindungan 
Hutan 
GR 69 2009 Tentang  Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Ke Dalam Pt Perkebunan Nusantara V 
GR 78 2009 Tentang Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Ke Dalam Modal Saham Perusahaa 
Perseroan Pt Persero Ptpn Ii 
GR 5 2010 Tentang Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional Tahun 2010-2014 
GR 10 2010 Tentang Cara Perubahan Peruntukan Dan Fungsi Kawasan  
GR 11 2010 Tentang Penerniban Dan Pendayagunaan Tanah Terlantar 
GR 12 2010 Tentang Penelitian, Pengembangan Seta Pendidikan Dan Pelatihan Kehutanan 
GR 15 2010 Tentang Penyelenggaraan Penaatan Ruang 
GR 22 2010 Tentang Wilayah Pertambangan 
GR 23 2010 Tentang Pelaksanaan Kegiatan Usaha Pertambangan Mineral Dan Batu Bara  
GR 24 2010 Tentang Penggunaan Kawasan Hutan  
GR 36 2010 Tentang Pengusahaan Pariwisata Alam Di Suaka Marga Satwa Taman Nasional Taman 
Hutan Raya Dan Taman Wisata Alam 
GR 55 2010 Tentang Pembinaan Dan Pengawasan Penyelenggaraan Pengelolaan Usaha 
Pertambangan Mineral Batu Bara 
GR 68 2010 Tentang Bentuk Dan Tata Cara Peran Masyarakat Dalam Penataan Ruang 
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Type No. Year Name 
GR 70 2010 Tentang Perubahan Atas Peraturan Pemerintah No 59 Tahun 2007 Tentang Usaha Panas 
Bumi 
GR 72 2010 Tentang Perusahaan Umum (Perum) Kehutanan 
GR 78 2010 Tentang Reklamasi Dan Pasca Tambang 
GR 1 2011 Tentang Penetapan Dan Alih Fungsi Lahan Pertanian Pangan Berkelanjutan 
GR 28 2011 Tentang Pengelolaan Kawasan Suaka Alam Dan Kawasan Pelestarian Alam 
GR 72 2011 Tentang Penyertaan Modal Negara Ke Dalam Modal Saham Perusahaan Perseroan Pt 
Inhutai I  
GR 12 2012 Tentang Insentif Perlindungan Lahan Pertanian Pangan Berkelanjutan 
GR 24 2012 Tentang Perubahan Atas Peraturan No 23 Tahun 2010 Mengenai Pelaksanaan Kegiatan 
Pertambangan Batu Bara Dan Mineral 
GR 25 2012 Tentang Sistem Informasi Lahan Pertanian Berkelanjutan. 
GR 27 2012 Tentang Izin Lingkungan 
GR 30 2012 Tentang Pembiayaan Perlindungan Lahan Pertanian Pangan Berkelanjutan 
GR 37 2012 Tentang Pengelolaan Aerah Aliran Sungai 
GR 60 2012 Tentang Perubahan Atas Peraturan Pemerintah No. 10 Tahun 2010 Tentang Tata Cara 
Perubahan Peruntukan Dan Fungsi Kawasan Hutan 
GR 61 2012 Tentang Penggunaan Kawasn Hutan 
GR 10 2013 Tentang Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Ri Kedalam Modal Saham Perusahhan 
Persero Pt Perkebunan Nusantara  I 
GR 11 2013 Tentang Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Ri Ke Dalam Modal Perusahaan Persero 
Pt Perkebunan Nusantara Ii 
GR 12 2013 Tentang Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Republik Indonesia Kedalam Modal 
Saham Perusahaan Perseroan (Persero) Pt Perkebunan Nusantara Iii 
GR 13 2013 Tentang Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Ke Dalam Saham Perusahaan Perseroan 
(Persero) Pt Perkebunan Nusantara Ix 
GR 19 2013 Tentang Tunjangan Jabatan Fungsional Penyuluh Kehutanan  
GR 63 2013 Tentang Badan Pertanahan Nasional  Republik Indonesia 
GR 73 2013 Tentang Rawa 
GR 79 2013 Tentang Jaringan Lalu Lintas Dan Angkutan Jalan 
GR 1 2014 Tentang Perubahan Kedua Atas Peraturan Pemerintah No 23 Tahun 2010 Tentang 
Pelaksanaan Kegiatan Usaha Pertambangan Batu Bara Dan Mneral 
GR 12 2014 Tentang  Jenis Dan Tarif Atas Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak Yang Berlakku Pada 
Kementerian Kehutanan 
GR 33 2014 Tentang Jenis Dan Tarif Atas Jenis Penerimaan Negara Bukanpajak Yang Berasal Dari 
Penggunaan Kawasan Hutan Untuk Kepentingan Pembangunan Di Luar Kegiatan 
Kehutanan Yang Berlaku Pada Kementerian Kehutanan  
GR 71 2014 Tentang Pengelolaan Ekosistem Gambut 
GR 72 2014 Tentang  Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Ri Kedalam Modal Saham Perusahaan 
Saham Perusahaan Persero  Pt   Perkebunan Nusantara Iii 
GR 73 2014 Tentang Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara  Republik Indonesia Kedalam Modal 
Perusahaan Umum (Perum) 
GR 165 2014 Tentang Penataan Tugas Dan Fungsi Kabinet Kerja  
GR 86 2015 Tentang Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Republik Indonesia Ke Dalam Modal 
Saham Perusahaan Perseroan (Persero) Pt Pertani 
GR 104 2015 Tentang Tata Cara Peruntukan Fungsi Kawasan Hutan 
Type No. Year Name 
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GR 105 2015 Tentang Perubahan Kedua Atas Peraturan Pemerintah No.24 Tahun 2010 Tentang 
Penggunaan Kawasan Hutan 
GR 108 2015 Tentang Perubahan Atas Peraturan Pemerintah No 28 Tahun 2011 Tentang Pengolaan 
Kawasan Pelestarian Alam 
GR 109 2015 Tentang Pembiayaan Hortikultura 
GR 128 2015 Tentang Jenis Dan Tarif Atas Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak Yang Berlaku Pada 
Kementerian Agraria Dan Dan Tata Ruang Badan Pertanahan Nasional 
GR 135 2015 Tentang Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Republik Indonesia Ke Dalam Modal 
Saham Perusahaan Perseroan Pt Perkebunan Nusantara Iii 
GR 136 2015 Tentang Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Republik Indonesia Ke Dalam Saham Pt 
Perkebunan Nusantara Vii 
GR 137 2015 Tentang Penyertaan Modal Negara Ri Kedalam Pt Perkebunan Nusantara Ix 
GR 139 2015 Tentang Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Ri Kedalam Modal Saham Pt 
Perkebunan Nusantara Ix 
GR 140 2015 Tentang Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Republik Indonesia Ke Dalam Modal 
Saham Pt Perkebunan Nusantara Xii 
GR 55 2016 Tentang Penambahan Penyertaan Modal Negara Republik Indonesia Kedalam Modal 
Saham Perseroan Pt Pertani  
PR 36 2005 Tentang Pengadaan Tanah Bagi Pembangunan Untuk Kepentingan Umum 
PR 42 2005 Tentang Komite Percepatan Kebijakan Percepatan Infrastruktur  
PR 5 2006 Tentang Kebijakan Energi Nasional 
PR 10 2006 Tentang Badan Pertanahan Nasional 
PR 65 2006 Tentang Perubahan Peraturan No 36 Tahun 2005 Tentang Pengadaan Tanah Bagi 
Pelaksanaan Kepentingan Umum. 
PR 89 2007 Tentang Gerakan Nasional Rehabilitasi Hutan Dan Lahan 
PR 109 2007 Tentang Pengesahan Confention For The Conservation Of Southern Bluefin Tuna ( 
Konvensi Tentang Konservasi Tuna Sirip Biru Selatan) 
PR 3 2008 Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No.3 Tahun 2008 Tentang Perubahan Atas 
Tentang Tata Hutan Penyusunan Rencana Pengelolaan Hutan Serta Pemanfaatan Hutan 
PR 26 2008 Tentang Pembentukan Dewan Energi Nasional 
PR 46 2008 Tentang Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim  
PR 78 2008 Tentang Pengesahan International Tropical Timber Agreement 2006 
PR 10 2010 Tentang Tata Cara Perubahan Peruntukan Dan Fungsi Kawasan Hutan  
PR 55 2010 Tentang Perpanjangan Batas Usia Pensiun Bagi Pegawai Negeri Sipil Yang Menduduki 
Jabatan Fungsional, Penyuluhan Pertanian, Perikanna Dan Kehutanan  
PR 78 2010 Tentang Penjaminan Infrastruktur dalam Proyek Kerjasma Pemerintah dengan Badan 
Usaha yang dilakukan melalui Badan Usaha Penjaminan Infrastruktur 
PR 10 2011 Tentang Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penyuluh Pertanian Perikanan Dan Kehutanan 
PR 12 2011 Tentang Perubahan Atas Peraturan Presiden No 42 Tahun 2005 Tentang Komite 
Kebijakan Percepatan Penyediaan Infrastruktur 
PR 28 2011 Tentang Penggunaan Kawasan Lindung Untuk Penambangan Bawah Tanah 
PR 32 2011 Tentang Master Plan Percepatan Dan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia 2011-
2025 
PR 61 2011 Tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Penurunan Emisi Gas Rumah Kaca 
PR 71 2011 Tentang Penyelenggaraan Inventarisasi Gas Rumah Kaca Nasional 
PR 80 2011 Tentang Dana Perwalian  
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Type No. Year Name 
PR 3 2012 Tentang Rencana Tata Ruang Pulau Kalimantan 
PR 13 2012 Tentanng Rencanan Tata Ruang Pulau Sumatera 
PR 71 2012 Tentang Penyelenggaraan Pengadaan Tanah Bagi Pembangunan Untuk Kepentingan 
Umum  
PR 73 2012 Tentang Strategi Nasional Pengelolaan Ekosistem Mangroove 
PR 103 2012 Tentang Tunjangan Kinerja Pegawai Di Lingkungan Kementerian Pertanian 
PR 121 2012 Tentang Rehabilitasi Wilayah Pesisir Dan Pulau-Pulau Kecil 
PR 122 2012 Tentang Reklamasi Di Wilayah Pesisir Dan Pulau Pulau Kecil  
PR 16 2013 Tentang Tunjangan Jabatan Fungsional Penyuluh Pertanian Pengendali Organisme, 
Pengawas Bibit Tanaman Pengawas Bibit Ternak Medik Veteriner, Paramedik Veteriner 
Dan Pengawas Mutu Pangan 
PR 18 2013 Tentang Tunjangan Fungsional Polisi Kehutanan 
PR 19 2013 Tentang Tunjangan Jabatan Fungsional Penyuluh Kehutanan 
PR 23 2013 Tentang Pengesahan Agreement Between The Governments Of The Member States Of 
Assosiation Of Southeast Asian Nations And The Republic Of Korea On Forest 
Cooperation 
PR 61 2013 Tentang Pengesahan Convention On The Conservation And Management Of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks In The Western And Central Pacifik Ocean (Konvensi Tentang 
Konservasi Dan Pengelolaan Sdiaan Ikan Beruaya Jauh Di Samudera Pasifik Barat Dan 
Tengah 
PR 62 2013 Tentang Badan Pengelola Penurunan Emisi Gas Rumah Kaca Dari Deforestasi Degradasi 
Hutan Dan Lahan Gambut 
PR 63 2013 Tentang Badan Pertanahan Nasional Ri 
PR 79 2013 Tentang Tunjangan Kinerja Pegawai Di Lingkungan Kementrian Kehutanan 
PR 6 2014 Tentang Tunjangan Jabatan Analisis Pasar Hasil Pertanian 
PR 19 2014 Tentang  Pengesahan Persetujuan Mengenai Pembentukan Sekretariat Pemrakarsa 
Segitiga Krang, Terumbu Krang, Perikanan Dan Ketahanan Pangan. 
PR 21 2014 Tentang Persetujuan Kemiteraan Sukarela Antar Republik Indonesia Dan Uni Eropa 
Tentang Penegakan Hukum Indonesia Tentang Penegakan Hukum Kehutanan 
PR 154 2014 Tentang Kelembagaan Penyuluhan Pertanian, Perikanan Dan Kehutanan 
PR 170 2014 Tunjangan Jabatan Fungsional Pengendalian Ekosistem Hutan 
PR 171 2014 Tentang Tunjangan Jabatan Fungsional Penyuluh Kehutanan  
PR 16 2015 Tentang Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup Dan Kehutanan 
PR 17 2015 Tentang Kementerian Agraria Dan Tata Ruang 
PR 45 2015 Tentang Kementerian Pertanian  
PR 61 2015 Tentang Penghimpunan Dan Penggunaan Dana Perkebunan Kelapa Sawit 
PR 134 2015 Tentang Tunjangan Kinerja Pegawai Di Lingkungan Kementerian Pertanian  
PR 139 2015 Tentang Tunjangan Kinerja Pegawai Di Lingkungan Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup 
Dan Kehutanan 
PR 140 2015 Tentang Tunjangan Kinerja Pegawai Negeri Sipil Di Lingkungan Kementerian Agraria 
Dan Tata Ruang Pertanian Nasional 
PR 1 2016 Tentang Badan Restorasi Gambut 
PR 53 2016 Tentang Pengesahan Perjanjian Negara Tuan Rumah  Antara Pemerintah Republik 
Indonesia Dan Dana Internasional Untuk Pembangunan Pertanian (Fad) Tentang 
Pendirian Kantor Ifad Di Indonesia 
PP 10 2006 Tentang Badan Pertanahan Nasional  
Type No. Year Name 
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PP 65 2006 Tentang Perubahan Atas Peraturan Presiden No 36 Tahun 2005 Tentang Pengadaan 
Tanah Bagi Pelaksanaan Pembangunan Untuk Kepentingan Umum. 
PP 59 2007 Peraturan Presiden Ri No 59 Tahun 2007 Mengenai Kegiatan Usaha Panas Bumi 
PP 32 2011 Tentang Master Plan Percepatan Dan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia  2011-
2025 
PP 165 2014 Tentang Penataan Tugas Dan Fungsi Kabinet Kerja 
KP 80 1999 Tentang Pedoman Umum Perencanaan Dan Pengelolaan Kawasan Pengembangan Lahan 
Gambut Di Kalimantan Tengah 
KP 172 1999 Tentang Penataan Kembali Fungsi Depatemen Pertanian Departemen Kehutanan Dan 
Departemen Perkebunan 
KP 175 1999 Tentang Pencabutan Keputusan Presiden No 172 Tahun 1999 Tentang Penataan Kembali 
Tugas Dan Fungsi Departemen Pertanian Kehutanan Dan Perkebunan 
KP 80 2000 Tentang Komite Antar Departemen Bidang Kehutanan 
KP 95 2000 Tentang Bdan Pertahanan Nasional 
KP 10 2001 Tentang Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah Dibidang Pertanahan 
KP 25 2001 Tentang Tim Koordinasi Penanggulangan Pertambangan Tanpa Izin , Penyalahgunaan 
Bahan Bakar Minyak Serta Perusakan Instalasi Ketenaga Listrikan Dan Pencurian Aliran 
Listrik 
KP 81 2001 Tentang Komite Kebijakan Pembangunan Infrastruktur 
KP 34 2003 Tentang Kebijakan Nasional Dibidang Pertanahan  
KP 41 2004 Tentang Perizinan Atau Perjanjian Dibidang Pertambangan Yang Berada Di Kawasan 
Hutan 
KP 19 2010 Tentang Satuan Tugas Persiapan Pembentuakan Kelembagaan Redd+ 
KP 25 2011 Tentang Satuan Tugas Persiapan Kelembagaan Reducing Emission From Deforestastion 
And Degradation (Redd+) 
KP 32 2011 Tentang Rincian Anggaran Belanja Pemerintah Pusat Tahun Anggaran 2012 
IP 5 2001 Tentang Pemberantasan Penebangan Kayu Illegal Dan Peredaran Hasil Hutan Di 
Kawasan Ekosistem Leuser Dan Taman Nasional Tanjung Putting 
IP 4 2005 Tentang Pemberantasan Penebangan Kayu Secara Illegal Dikawasan Hutan Dan 
Peredarannya Di Seluruh Wilayah Indonesia 
IP 1 2006 Tentang Penyediaan Dan Pemanfaatan Bahan Bakar Nabati Sebagai Bahan Bakar Lain 
IP 2 2006 Tentang Penyediaan Dan Pemanfaatan Batu Bara Yang Dicairkan Sebagai Bahan Bakar 
Lain 
IP 2 2007 Tentang Rehabilitasi Dan Revitalisasi Pengembangan Lahan Gambut Di Kalimantan 
Tengah 
IP 3 2009 Tentang Pengembangan Infrastruktur Istana Kepresidenan Kebun Raya Dan Cagar Alam 
Budaya 
IP 1 2010 Tentang Percepatan Pelaksanaan Prioritas Pembangunan Tahun 2010 
IP 5 2011 Tentang Pengamanan Produksi Beras Nasional Dalam Menghadapi Kondisi Ekstrim 
IP 10 2011 Tentang Penundaan Pemberian Izin Baru Hutan Alam Primer Dan Lahan Gambut 
IP 16 2011 Tentang Peningkatan Pengendalian Kebakaran Hutan Dan Lahan 
IP 6 2013 Tentang Penundaan Pemberian Izin Baru Dan Penyempurnaan Tata Kelola Hutan Alam 
Primer Dan Lahan Gambut 
IP 8 2015 Tentang Penundaan Pemberian Izin Baru Dan Penyempurnaan Tata Kelola Hutan Alam 
Primer Dan Lahan Gambut  
IP 11 2015 Tentang Peningkatan Pengendalian Kebakaran Hutan Dan Lahan 
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Appendix E  
Supplemental material for Chapter 3 
 
E.1 Robustness tests: Linear fixed effect models 
 
 To assess the need to control for time-period and village-level trends, we conduct 
Lagrange Multiplier Tests: Gourieroux, Holly, and Monfort to assess the need to control for 
cross-sectional and time effects (Baltagi, Chang, and Li 1992). We run Hausman Tests to assess 
the consistency of random intercept estimators (Hausman, 1978). For each model in our analysis, 
we determine the need to use two-way fixed effects to provide consistent estimators ( Table E.1).  
We present findings from the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation of village-
level forest area in the main text but check the robustness of our results by running the same 
models on the natural log of forest area plus 0.01 as well as on the CAR of forest change. We re-
run our models with an alternate transformation (Table E.2) and with alternate dependent 
 
Table E.1 Diagnostic tests for serial correlation and consistent village-level estimators 
Dependent 
Var. Test 
Lead 
model 
(x2) 
No time 
effect (x2) 
Lag 1 
model 
(x2) 
Lag 2 
model 
(x2) df (w) p Interpretation 
Log of forest 
area 
Lagrange 
Multiplier 
(GHM)  
242570 402390 402360 256940 0/1/2 
(0.25/0.5/0.25) 
< .001 Control for 
time and 
individual 
effects 
Hausman 
Test 
25664.76 14270.78 14226.22 14452.76 16 < .001 
Control for 
individual 
effects with 
fixed effects 
CAR of forest 
cover change 
Lagrange 
Multiplier 
(GHM)  
9780.1, 8866.2 10940 857.75 0/1/2 
(0.25/0.5/0.25) 
< .001 Control for 
time and 
individual 
effects 
Hausman 
Test 
764.22 659.76 474.08 394.14 16 < .001 
Control for 
individual 
effects with 
fixed effects 
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variables (Table E.3) to ensure that results are not driven by variable specification and are the 
result of robust patterns within the data. We find that coefficient direction and relative magnitude 
are consistent between specifying 𝑌𝑖𝑡 as CAR of forest change (Equation 3.2), the IHS of forest 
area (Equation 3.1) or as ln(forest area + 0.01). 
To ensure our results are robust to reverse causation, we run all models with lead effects 
for regulatory dispersal. We find that the coefficient for village- and district-level regulatory 
dispersal in the period before forest cover change is either non-significant and positively related 
to forest cover change (as for village-level dispersal) or significant and positively related to 
forest cover (as with district-level dispersal). Models 1.4 (Table 3.3), 3.4 (Table E.2), and 4.4 
and 2.4 (Table E.3) provide estimates. This demonstrates that reverse causation—change in 
forest cover drives regulatory dispersal—is unlikely. 
To examine the relationship between clustering and outcomes, we provide village-level 
and district-level cluster robust standard errors for all models. Clustered robust standard errors 
help solve design issues, as when survey samples are clustered at a geographic unit for ease of 
dissemination, or for experimental problems, for when a treatment is assigned to a higher-level 
unit (Abadie et al. 2017). Although regulatory dispersal from sub-district, district, and province 
proliferation is clustered at those levels of administration, village-level dispersal is not. Thus, we 
interpret village-level regulatory dispersal with village-level clustered robust standard errors, and 
district-level regulatory dispersal with district-level clustered robust standard errors. 
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 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 Coef. Std Err
Clst. 
Std Err
Coef. Std Err
Clst.  
Std Err
Coef. Std Err
Clst. 
Std Err
Coef. Std Err
Clst.  
Std Err
Same period dispersal 
level
   Village 0.025 0.016 0.025 -0.036 0.014 ** 0.028 -0.047 0.017 *** 0.045 0.033 0.022 0.039
   Sub-district 0.072 0.01 *** 0.026 *** -0.002 0.008 0.016 -0.052 0.01 *** 0.027 * 0.051 0.01 *** 0.022 **
   District 0.019 0.007 *** 0.02 -0.022 0.006 *** 0.018 0.018 0.006 *** 0.016 0.066 0.01 *** 0.025 ***
   Province 0.059 0.015 *** 0.046 -0.151 0.013 *** 0.049 *** -0.012 0.006 ** 0.016 0.08 0.028 *** 0.04 **
Land-cover
   Forest 1.835 0.042 *** 0.098 *** 1.84 0.042 *** 0.097 *** 1.601 0.042 *** 0.106 *** 1.491 0.055 *** 0.121 ***
   Paddy ag. -0.119 0.023 *** 0.053 ** -0.117 0.023 *** 0.053 ** -0.13 0.025 *** 0.065 ** -0.028 0.022 0.042
   Field ag. -0.087 0.018 *** 0.041 ** -0.088 0.018 *** 0.042 ** -0.098 0.02 *** 0.05 * -0.013 0.017 0.033
   Mixed field/tree ag. -0.099 0.024 *** 0.059 * -0.102 0.024 *** 0.058 * -0.123 0.026 *** 0.071 * 0.014 0.022 0.046
   Timber plant. -0.044 0.016 *** 0.028 -0.043 0.016 *** 0.028 -0.01 0.017 0.033 -0.021 0.016 0.033
   Ag. tree plant. -0.168 0.025 *** 0.049 *** -0.167 0.025 *** 0.048 *** -0.147 0.025 *** 0.055 *** -0.083 0.026 *** 0.044 *
   Settlement -0.053 0.016 *** 0.036 -0.059 0.016 *** 0.035 * -0.062 0.017 *** 0.043 0.002 0.014 0.028
   Protected area 0.01 0.006 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.023 0.006 *** 0.009 ** 0.003 0.006 0.011
Sociopolitical variables
   Village council -0.041 0.006 *** 0.015 *** -0.045 0.006 *** 0.015 *** -0.079 0.008 *** 0.01 *** -0.026 0.006 *** 0.015 *
   Distance to roads 0.056 0.008 *** 0.031 * 0.071 0.008 *** 0.031 ** 0.031 0.007 *** 0.025 0.132 0.01 *** 0.054 **
   Household pop. -0.026 0.005 *** 0.008 *** -0.03 0.005 *** 0.008 *** -0.029 0.006 *** 0.007 *** -0.011 0.004 *** 0.005 **
   MDVDI 0.049 0.003 *** 0.009 *** 0.051 0.003 *** 0.009 *** 0.053 0.004 *** 0.01 *** 0.03 0.003 *** 0.01 ***
Constant -1.713 0.006 *** 0.014 *** -1.7 0.006 *** 0.014 *** -1.631 0.007 *** 0.006 *** -1.776 0.006 *** 0.015 ***
Number of obs  
Within R
2 0.144 0.144 0.122 0.08
Model 3.1: Same Period 
regulatory dispersal
Model 3.2: One lagged period 
regulatory dispersal
Model 3.3: Two lagged periods 
regulatory dispersal
Model 3.4: One lead period 
regulatory dispersal
311,232 311,232 254,324 244,049
Table E.2: Two-way fixed effect models of forest area transformed by: ln(ha forest cover + 0.01). Covariates include regulatory dispersal dummy variables, mean village land 
cover change, and sociopolitical variables. Models 3.1 through 3.4 include different time effects for regulatory dispersal. Land cover and sociopolitical variables remain anchored 
to the period of CAR of forest cover change. Standard errors are robust and clustered at both the village-level (Std Err) and the district-level (Clst. Std Err). 
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  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 Coef. Std Err
Clst. 
Std Err
Coef. Std Err
Clst.  
Std Err
Coef. Std Err
Clst. 
Std Err
Coef. Std Err
Clst.  
Std Err
Same period dispersal 
level
   Village 0.01 0.003 *** 0.005 * -0.011 0.004 *** 0.007 * -0.004 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.008
   Sub-district 0.022 0.002 *** 0.006 *** 0 0.002 0.005 -0.016 0.003 *** 0.007 ** 0.014 0.002 *** 0.006 **
   District 0.006 0.002 *** 0.006 -0.011 0.002 *** 0.005 ** 0.007 0.002 *** 0.006 0.016 0.002 *** 0.006 ***
   Province 0.007 0.003 *** 0.01 -0.03 0.002 *** 0.007 *** -0.009 0.002 *** 0.004 ** 0.004 0.004 0.006
Land-cover
   Forest -0.047 0.005 *** 0.012 *** -0.046 0.005 *** 0.012 *** -0.069 0.005 *** 0.012 *** -0.075 0.007 *** 0.016 ***
   Paddy ag. -0.028 0.008 *** 0.014 ** -0.028 0.008 *** 0.014 ** -0.021 0.008 *** 0.015 -0.033 0.012 *** 0.019 *
   Field ag. -0.027 0.005 *** 0.012 ** -0.028 0.005 *** 0.012 ** -0.027 0.005 *** 0.012 ** -0.02 0.007 *** 0.014
   Mixed field/tree ag. -0.014 0.005 *** 0.013 -0.016 0.005 *** 0.013 -0.021 0.006 *** 0.014 0.011 0.006 * 0.01
   Timber plant. -0.003 0.005 0.008 -0.002 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.008 0 0.007 0.01
   Ag. tree plant. -0.028 0.004 *** 0.007 *** -0.027 0.004 *** 0.007 *** -0.019 0.005 *** 0.009 ** -0.015 0.005 *** 0.009 *
   Settlement -0.045 0.022 ** 0.027 * -0.051 0.023 ** 0.027 * -0.056 0.029 * 0.033 * 0.022 0.022 0.022
   Protected area 0.001 0.001 0.002 0 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 *** 0.002 ** 0 0.001 0.002
Sociopolitical variables
   Village council -0.008 0.002 *** 0.004 * -0.011 0.002 *** 0.004 ** -0.022 0.002 *** 0.006 *** -0.005 0.002 *** 0.005
   Distance to roads 0.009 0.001 *** 0.005 * 0.013 0.001 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 0.001 *** 0.004 0.021 0.001 *** 0.01 **
   Household pop. -0.009 0.005 * 0.006 * -0.01 0.006 * 0.006 * -0.009 0.006 0.006 -0.005 0.003 0.003
   MDVDI 0.012 0.001 *** 0.002 *** 0.013 0.001 *** 0.002 *** 0.015 0.001 *** 0.003 *** 0.01 0.001 *** 0.003 ***
Constant -0.037 0.012 *** 0.021 * -0.037 0.012 *** 0.021 * -0.001 0.014 0.021 0.022 0.014 0.024
Number of obs  
Within R
2 0.021
Model 4.1: Same Period 
regulatory dispersal
Model 4.2: One lagged period 
regulatory dispersal
Model 4.3: Two lagged period 
regulatory dispersal
Model 4.4: One lead period 
regulatory dispersal
0.017
79,123
0.018
66,570
0.023
79,123 61,312
Table E.3: Two-way fixed effect models of the CAR of forest cover change. Models 4.1 through 4.4 include different time effects for regulatory dispersal. Land cover and 
sociopolitical variables remain anchored to the period of CAR of forest cover change. Standard errors are robust and clustered at both the village-level (Std Err) and the district-
level (Clst. Std Err). 
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E.2 Robustness tests: Matching analysis 
 
 Dispersed and non-dispersed villages demonstrate significant overlap across variables 
that best predict CAR of forest cover change as well as variables that best predict CAR of forest 
cover change and administrative proliferation. Due to this overlap, in addition to the variables we 
identified in the literature as contributing to either forest cover change or forest cover change and 
administrative proliferation, we use traditional propensity score matching with replacement to 
generate our matched sample. We defend against potential biases from this technique by pruning 
fewer than 3% of the “treatment” villages (villages that experienced regulatory dispersal) in any 
matched sample and by ensuring that matching with replacement does not result in too few 
matched control units (Stuart, 2010; King and Nielsen, 2016). We test the robustness of our 
matched samples with alternative matching techniques and by assessing the standardized 
difference in means for each the fifteen matched datasets (Ho et al., 2007; Stuart, 2010) 
To determine the effect of matching technique on the difference in CAR of forest change 
means between villages that did and did not experience regulatory dispersal, we rematch the 
fifteen unique combinations of fracture period and time period using full matching matching 
with replacement (Ho et al. 2007). We also repeat our original matching technique using a ratio 
of 1:1 treatment to control. Figures E.1 and E.2 provide the results of these alternative matching 
methods. Our findings are robust to these alternative specifications. 
To measure the balance of matched units, we assess the standardized difference of all the 
covariates that contributed to generating the propensity score as well as two final measurements 
(mean precipitation and province number) that we did not include in matching because of their 
high correlation with other covariates. Figures E.3 through E.18 illustrate the standardized mean 
differences within our original matched samples (Figure 3.4, Main Text). 
 144 
 
  
 
Figure E.1:  Difference in means between villages that have and have not experienced administrative change. Matching 
sample generated with nearest neighbor matching with calipers of .25 std of the propensity score and a 1:1 treatment:control 
ratio. 
 
 
Figure E.2: Difference in means between villages that have and have not experienced administrative change. Matching sample 
generated with full matching within calipers of .25 std of propensity score. 
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Figure E.3-E.18: Standardized mean differences by covariate for one-to-many PSM 
 
Plots are organized by year of administrative change and year of baseline match 
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Appendix F  
Supplemental material for Chapter 4 
 
F.1 Matching and covariate balance 
 
  We compare the balance between VCA and non-VCA village covariate means across the 
original data with datasets pre-processed with one-to-one propensity score matching (1:4 PSM) 
and full matching (Table F.1). We find that full matching, which reduces the standardized 
difference between treated and control units based on a dynamic selection of one to many control 
units per treatment unit, performs the best. All standardized covariate means within the full 
matching dataset are below 0.25 (Stuart, 2010), and eight out of seven covariates out-perform 
Table F.1: Standardized difference between treatment and control covariate means for original data and data pre-processed 
with one-to-one propensity score matching (1:4 PSM) and full matching. 
Covariate 
Original 
Data 
Full 
Matching 1:4 PSM 
Best 
Balance 
Prop. Score 0.679 0.004 0.057 Full 
Village Area 2003 0.181 0.065 0.071 Full 
Mean Elevation -0.087 0.043 -0.074 Full 
Mean Area > 12% Slope 0.524 -0.041 -0.025 PSM 
Average Distance to Roads 0.008 -0.009 -0.045 Full 
Average Time to Nearest District Capital 0.257 -0.035 0.015 PSM 
Mean Forest Cover (2003) 0.379 0.062 0.029 PSM 
Mean Forest Cover (2000) 0.381 0.062 0.029 PSM 
Mean Field Ag. Cover 0.070 0.003 0.005 Full 
Mean Mixed Ag Cover -0.321 -0.072 -0.038 PSM 
Mean Plantation Forest (Timber and Ag) -0.462 0.029 0.034 Full 
Mean Settlement Area -2.416 0.100 0.115 Full 
Number of Households 0.055 -0.001 0.026 Full 
MDVDI 0.244 -0.014 0.009 PSM 
Mean Precipitation 0.159 0.065 0.037 PSM 
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covariate balance within the one-to-one matching dataset, including the overall balance, as 
indicated by the propensity score.  
We re-match VCA and non-VCA villages on all covariates, excluding “Mean Forest 
Cover (2000),” to ensure that our matching results account for parallel trends in year 2000 forest 
cover between VCA and non-VCA villages, but are not driven by these same trends. We find 
that eliminating parallel trends produces similar though slightly worse overall balance and 
similar estimate signs across all matching types. However, full matching estimates are 
approximately one fourth the average value when accounting for year 2000 forest cover (Figure 
F.1). Controlling for parallel trends in forest cover before the end of KS-ICDP implementation 
increases the estimate of average forest cover loss within VCA villages, thus lending greater 
credence to the overall conclusion that VCA villages lost greater amounts of forest cover 
between 2003 and 2016. 
 
 
Figure F.1: Forest type (x-axis) by difference in average forest cover change (ha) between VCA and non-VCA villages (y-
axis), by different matching techniques without “Mean Forest Cover (2000)” 
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F.2 Model selection 
 
We select the best-fit model using a nested modeling approach and analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) tests to measure significant differences between models (Montgomery, Peck, and 
Vining 2012). Each subsequent model number includes an additional covariate category (Table 
F.2). Models 1 begin with economic covariates, Models 2 include economic and demographic 
covariates, and Models 3 include economic, demographic, and environmental covariates (Table 
F.2). Table F.3 provides information on model selection criteria. Models two and three for 
“Ln(Area Land owned)” were not statistically significant, and included the same Adjusted R2  
values. For consistency, and because Model 3 provided a slightly higher R2 value due to the 
inclusion of more variables, we selected it as the best-fit model.  For all other variables, Model 3 
performed significantly better than Models 1 and 2. 
 
Table F.2: Standardized difference between treatment and control covariate means for original data and data pre-processed 
with one-to-one propensity score matching (1:4 PSM) and full matching that does not include “Mean Forest Cover (2000).” 
Covariate 
Original 
Data 
Full 
Matching 1:4 PSM 
Best 
Balance 
Prop. Score 0.679 0.005 0.066 Full 
Village Area 2003 0.181 0.083 0.035 PSM 
Mean Elevation -0.087 0.011 0.027 Full 
Mean Area > 12% Slope 0.524 -0.038 -0.024 PSM 
Average Distance to Roads 0.008 0.060 -0.058 PSM 
Average Time to Nearest District Capital 0.257 -0.036 -0.001 PSM 
Mean Forest Cover 0.381 0.080 0.036 Full 
Mean Field Ag. Cover 0.070 0.028 0.074 Full 
Mean Mixed Ag Cover -0.321 -0.131 -0.115 PSM 
Mean Plantation Forest (Timber and Ag) -0.462 0.111 0.045 PSM 
Mean Settlement Area -2.416 0.133 0.113 PSM 
Number of Households 0.055 0.035 0.039 Full 
MDVDI 0.244 0.046 -0.049 Full 
Mean Precipitation 0.159 0.073 0.047 PSM 
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Table F.4: Model selection criteria 
Variable Model Residual Dev. DF Dev. Pr(>Chi) R2 
Adj. 
R2 AIC 
Land 
Ownership 
1 1139.217 --- --- --- --- --- 1149.2 
2 993.073 7 146.144 *** 
--- --- 1017.1 
3 977.967 4 15.107 *** 
--- --- 1010 
Ln(Area Land 
Owned) 
1 1397.969 
--- --- --- 0.152 0.148 --- 
2 1322.152 8 75.817 *** 
0.199 
0.187 --- 
3 1318.862 3 3.290   
0.201 
0.187 --- 
Farms High 
Value Tree 
Crop 
1 1315.136 --- --- --- --- --- 1327.1 
2 1181.543 8 133.593 *** --- --- 1209.5 
3 1113.943 3 67.600 *** --- --- 1147.9 
Household 
Income 
1 809.166 --- --- --- 0.153 0.148 --- 
2 778.123 7 31.043 *** 
0.194 
0.183 --- 
3 764.556 3 13.567 *** 
0.2 
0.188 --- 
 
Table F.3: Covariates Category and names 
Covariate Category Covariates 
Economic 
Primary income from agriculture 
Multidimensional poverty indicator 
Household owns agricultural land 
Area of land owned (Ha) 
Holds formal land title 
Farms high-value tree crop 
Demographic 
Female head of household 
Head of household age 
Ethnicity: Jambi 
Ethnicity: Javanese 
Ethnicity: Kerinci 
Environmental 
Household elevation 
Euclidean distance to KSNP 
KSNP forest loss 
VCA village 
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